Data on Data Breaches: Past, Present and Future

Adam Shostack and Chris Walsh Emergent Chaos


Welcome to Sevilla



Navigational charts were kept secret during the age of exploration

- Henry the Navigator encouraged exploration
- Wanted the results for competitive advantage
- Columbus ended up in the Caribbean
- Lots of sailors died at sea
- Maps are still secret in some places
 - They don't like http://maps.google.com

We face navigation hazards, too



We need to:

Know they exist :^)

Know how damaging they can be

Know our weak points if we run into them.

Know how to avoid them.

Image: http://www.materials.unsw.edu.au/news/brittlefracture/titanic%20sinking.jpg

Case in Point: Security breaches involving personal information


Definitely exist
But how numerous?
How do we know?
Are some more at risk than others?

Can be damaging
But how much so, and to whom?
How do we know?

Weak points driven by economics, not physics

Avoidance techniques must be strategic

Security Breaches: How numerous?



Below the waterline:

- 1.Undetected incidents
- 2.Unreported incidents
- 3. Reported, but unanalyzed
- 4. Reported, but privileged

Focus here is on 2, 3, and a little bit of 4.

How Do We Know?

Individual reports: News stories, press releases

Collections of same

- -For general use Emergent Chaos breaches category, Attrition.org's DLDOS, etc.
- -Google Alerts are the researcher's friend
- -For specific purposes data behind a journal article
- -Often use commercial news archives such as LexisNexis

Reports are much more numerous now that states have notification laws

Attrition's DLDOS


http://attrition.org/dataloss/dldos.html

•Provides "date, the company that reported the breach, the type of data impacted, the number of records impacted, third party companies involved, and a few other sortable items"

●700 records as of June 13, 2007.

A main data supplier to other well-known sources, academic works, etc.

Attrition.org Incident Archive



Etiolated.org

etiolated consumer\citizen


Shedding light on who's doing what with your private information. Searchable Attrition.org DLDOS index.


Search: Go


Main Statistics Research »Maps« Contact Login Signup Contribute!

Largest Incidents Since 2000			
Number Affected	Date	Companies	
45,700,000	2007-01-17	TJX Companies Inc.	
40.000.000	2005-06-19	Visa, CardSystems, Mastercard, American Express	
30,000,000	2004-06-24	America Online	
26,500,000	2006-05-22	U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs	
8,637,405	2007-03-12	Dai Nippon Printing Company	
5,000,000	2003-03-06	Data Processors International	
4,000,000	2006-06-13	KDDI	
3,900,000	2005-06-06	Cfigroup, UPS	
2,900,000	2007-04-10	Georgia Department of Community Health, Affillated Computer Services	
2,500,000	2006-09-07	Chase Card Services	


Most Recent Incidents				
Number Affected	Date	Companies		
3,000	2007-06-11	Grand Valley State University		
17.000	2007-06-11	Pfizer		
<u>10,847</u>	2007-06-11	Verus Inc., Stevens Hospital, Kennewick General Hospital, Concord Hospital		
3,000	2007-06-09	Concordia Hospital		
<u>1,100</u>	2007-06-08	University of Iowa		
<u>5,735</u>	2007-06-08	University of Virginia		
Zero or Unknown	2007-06-07	Dearfield Medical Building		
Zero or Unknown	2007-06-06	Cedarburg High School		
400	2007-06-03	Gadsden State Community College		
4,000	2007-06-01	Northwestern University		







US Breach Law Adoption




The Choicepoint incident certainly spurred legislative action.

Data: National Council of State Legislatures, Perkins Coie

Date Law Passed

U.S. State Breach Notification Laws

Legislative Lags




Response Time (Days post-ChoicePoint)

It is hard to measure the information security impact of these laws, in part because we only have two years' worth of data

Law passage times grow exponentially

Legislative Lags




Response Time (Days post-ChoicePoint)

This extremely simple model suggests reporting will not be universally required for several years.


December 17, 2010

Take that with a grain of salt, but perhaps we should look closely at what these laws offer us and learn from it.

US Data Breach Laws: Date Passed



US Data Breach Laws: Entities Covered



How Do We Know?

Reports required by national regulators

- Oversight committee reports
- **-**FOIA

Reports required by states

- -FOIA still needed (except in N.H.) but there are way fewer states than agencies
- -Some primary sources available on-line


http://doj.nh.gov/consumer/breaches.html

http://www.cwalsh.org/cgi-bin/docview.pl

Question is: Do they add information, or just "more of the same"?

Test: Look at reports obtained by states, and reports obtained through "traditional means". What, if anything, is added?

Central reporting is uncommon



What is collected by states?

North Caroline Security Breach Reporting Form. Purposet to the Identity Theft Protection Act of 2008 Some of this ones Owning or Licenson Information Affordably the PLEASE SERMIT POICH TO: Herena. Cutvetter Perturbet Drivers Address NC America General's Diffee. 9000 Mail Service Coater Rulabili, NC 29649-8081 Telephone: Interplanter (MP) 716-6000 Fell (1900 In NC): (1971) 500-7236 Blog.: House: LANCON OUT TO ARREST Close Recognity Throads Engestion Fount exhausters). Describe Security Breach was discovered: Belowed number of affected hally shade: Meliopetal countries of NC prelitative afficulati Name of Institutes makes have or new codes, information that was the sales of the Secure Meants, of the Invitors that expensesed the Recursy Details is not the more early as the humans reporting the Recurby Breadt countries to NALG S. 6 75-65000. Classifie Bits oursers seem constructing the Karucilly Second and scale wheeler the inflamence beneated was in decrease or owner former Disputing all creatic referentias in arched, state whether the sufermeten beauthed or passacially insuched was preserved preserved or encrypted to some marrier. If on, please describe the recently moneyes permeting the wittression. Denochronsy measures taken to overcom a should Securely Becards from our anneaus the future: Descriptioned SIC conducts we envel be notified. Unions has been one dates in secutions affected XC syndems, describe the correspondence sugmending. the dular ressums to N.C.G.S. a 73-48(a) and 6cit: If the delay was purposed to a request from low unforcement procured to X.C.X.S. § 76-67th, absorbedule the satisfacts program of the methodigististensing strengthenium. Hom XII resultant want will be easified? Marchine accuse COMMUNICAL S. C.G.S. # 75-48(cc) placements makes (again)) our meliated notice if in telephonic form. Activity of pages Dolor Cestury Fewers, Edit: Addresse A Link States Associated Associated Tideshous: Fec **Errort**

Reparting Form For Business, individual or NY State Entity reporting a "Breach of the Security of the System" Parsuant to the Information Security Breach and Hollington Art (General Business Law (\$155-ee; State Texturelogy Law \$208)

Name of Basenese, Indire Date of Discounty of Bros Sistemized Humber of Alle Date of Halifeshoe to Aft Manner of Neilleskor.	ete eleci inclinatuole: edeci inclinatuole:	los terrolii	
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A Quick Test


Look at incidents involving entities based in New York

Should all be reported to the state, since New Yorkers undoubtedly involved Should appear in "traditional" reports "Traditional" data set


University of Washington (based on Attrition, Privacyrights.org, news reports)

NY reports
Obtained via FOIA requests

the picture is markedly different, state reports add value.




NY Breaches, 2006



Green: University of Washington
Blue: New York reports

This is new information!

Reported Incident Rates




Line segments show incident observation rates for multiple sources, over time.


Attrition	
PrivacyRights	
UWashington	
UIUC	
NY	
NC	
CA	

The Bigger Stuff makes the news?

Histogram of Breach Size (UWashington)



Histogram of Breach Size (New York)



What are the weak points?

	Exposed Online	External Intrusion	Insider Abuse or Theft	Missing or Stolen Hardware	Mishandled	Other	Unspecified
UWash	3		1	8			
New York	17	7	3	65	2	4	3
New York > 99	5	3	1	37	2	0	2

Results for NY, and for NY cases with more than 99 individuals affected, are statistically indistinguishable

Lesson: Keep track of your stuff, and know how to configure your web server

	Exposed Online	Insider Abuse or Theft	Missing or Stolen Hardware
UWash	1.6%	0.5%	97.9%
New York	1.0%	0%	98.7%

Or, maybe ... Just keep track of your stuff!

	New York	UWash
Utilities	2	0
Manufacturing	2	2
Retail Trade	1	0
Transportation and Warehousing	2	2
Information	2	2
Finance and Insurance	34	2
Educational Services	28	0
Health and Social Assistance	16	2
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation Accommodation and Food	1	0
Service	1	1
Public Administration	14	3
Other Services	1	0

washingtonpost.comJune 1, 2005:

The California Department of Consumer Affairs reported May 27 that since the state's notification law went into effect in July 2003, it has been aware of 61 significant breach notifications involving an average of 163,500 individuals each. About one-fourth of the breaches occurred at financial institutions and another one-fourth at universities, with 15 percent reported by medical institutions, 8 percent by government and 7 percent by retailers, according to the figures.

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So what now?

Should we only care about lost/stolen media and hardware?

What about low-frequency, huge impact events? Massive retailer breaches? Card processor breaches?

Small breaches may also be signs of poor practices.

Additional reporting, and clarification of notification requirements would help us get the information we need to make risk decisions.

More states' information would help

- Would let us get a better handle on (seemingly) rare events
- Would expose biases (if any) in current, "traditional" reporting
- Would help us to assess whether breaches tend to be local, regional, or national
- Would better inform national and international policy makers
- •Would better reveal the role of third parties as "impact magnifiers"

How to obtain this additional information?

- Revise existing laws to add central reporting
- Adopt breach notification requirements beyond U.S.
- Pass US Federal legislation
- Increase voluntary notification

Revise existing laws

- Require reporting to state Attorney General or consumer protection agency
- Standardize reporting to enhance comparability of states' data
- •Close loopholes so that breached entity must report, whether it owns data or not.

Adopt breach notification requirements beyond U.S.

While privacy protections afforded to data subjects are significantly greater in many non-US nations, the extent to which these translate into different rates of data exposure is not known.

Pass US Federal Legislation

Legislation on a national level would eliminate a blind spot: federal agencies not bound by state law

Central reporting is critical: eliminates need to individually request data from scores of agencies

Increase Voluntary

- •Higher notification trigger, but manda ory reporting to central entity?
- As means of limiting possible subsequent legal liability
- If you tell people, they can take steps, and thereby limit *your* risk
- Normative pressure: Customers expect it, law or no law
- •Honesty never killed anybody: TJX sales rise after they tell of very large breach!
- •Reflexive secrecy could be punished by regulators: why risk it?
- •It's an assurance game: Sharing helps all if sufficient numbers share. We just need to get there.

Things We Might Care About

Breach consequences	Aspects of the notifications
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	themselves

Impact on stock price Do they show acceptance of

Impact on customer loyalty/"churn" responsibility?

Direct notification costs Is there a clear "CYA" tone?

Impact on identity theft What level of detail do they provide?

Repeat offenders? Do they learn? Do standard forms increase the amount of information provided?

