

# Semantic Potential of existing Security Advisory Standards

Secure Business Austria

# **Challenges**



- Well maintained and audited IT infrastructure is critical for ensuring business continuity
  - Ever-growing complexity of IT environments
  - -Legal regulations and rating systems (e.g., Basel II)
  - Numerous security alerts
    - majority is not structured for automatic processing
  - → Management of networks and IT infrastructure elements is time-consuming and expensive

# Challenges



- CERT Coordination Center
  - Cataloged vulnerabilities doubled in the past three years (3780 in 2004; 7236 in 2007).
- Channels
  - 93% of the CSIRT constituents receive their incident information via email, 79% also via phone
  - RSS Feeds, Websites, faxes, SMS, ...
  - →Unstructured and therefore not machine-processable



### **CSIRT**



- CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team)
  - -Reactive Services (Incident Handling, Alerts and Warnings, ...)
  - Proactive Services (Configuration, Technology Watch, Announcements,...)
  - Security Quality Management Services (Risk Analysis, Training, ...)
- Advisory Messages
  - -Describe computer security problems and/or solutions

### Contribution



- Introduction of a collection of existing security advisory standards
- Review and evaluation of those standards

#### **Evaluation**



- Goal
  - Identification of semantic usable standards
- Criteria
  - Semantic Usability
    - Does the standard use a standardized language such as XML to ensure machine-readability?
    - Does the standard provide clear and unambiguous semantics to ensure machine-recognition?
  - Information Complexity
    - Does the standard provide the necessary elements for describing IT incidents? A comprehensive and well defined set of elements is required to describe IT incidents in the most granular form.
    - Does the standard offer the possibility for a complete workaround for an IT incident or does it simply provide links to external resources?

#### **Evaluation**



#### Distribution

- -Is this standard used by any major CSIRTs?
- -Is it still supported? When was the last update?
- The usage and support by major CSIRTs is crucial for the acceptance of the semantic security advisory standard within the community.

## **ANML**



- Advisory and Notification Markup Language
- XML-based specification for advisories and other types of notifications
- Open Security Project (OpenSec)
- Aims to solve inconsistent use of terminology
  - -Benefit for the community and vendors
- Notifications: bug-fixes, feature enhancements, upgrade availability,...
- Description, Status, Affected, Assessments, Update, Verify, and Revision History

# **ANML Example**



```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
 <subject>Unchecked Buffer In Windows...</subject>
  <dateCreated>2003-03-17</dateCreated>
 <status>
       <vendor>Confirmed</vendor>
       <severity>Critical</severity>
       <class>Buffer overflow</class>
 </status>
  <summary>...</summary>
  <affected>
       <system id="WinNT">
              <os>
                     <name>Windows NT 4.0</name>
                     oductType>Workstation
              </os>
       </system>
```

### **ANML**



- Semantic usability ~
  - -Introduction of "RDF" element
  - -Allows the usage of free text fields
    - OS name, productType, .. "xs:string" ("Windows" / "Win")
    - SDML, SIML
- Information complexity ~
  - -Missing information (e.g., vendor, software on operating systems, and CVE ref.)
- Distribution
  - -No major CSIRTs are currently using ANML, last update 2003

#### **EISPP**




- European Information Security Promotion Programme
  - Advisory Format precise and timely information about new vulnerabilities
- EU-funded (5th framework programme)
- June 2002 until January 2004
- Cert-IST, esCERT-UPC, SIEMENS-CERT, Callineb Consulting, I-NET, CLUSIT and InetSecur
- Basic: Complete Identification (CVE, Bugtrag ID,...),
   Vulnerability Classification, System Information, Problem Description and Solution

# **EISPP**



- Semantic usability ~
  - Due to this flexibility, cooperating organizations sometimes need a further explanation of their usage conventions (free text fields)
  - -e.g., <FormattedText>Foo v1.3 on BAR OS</FormattedText>
  - Common Model of System Information (CMSI)
- Information complexity ~
  - Missing attributes such as required reboot, software and hardware vendor



- Distribution +
  - German CERT-Verbund uses the EISPP extension DAF

# **CAIF**



- Common Announcement Interchange Format
- Exchange and store security advisories
  - -multi-lingual textual descriptions
  - -different renderings (Markup)
- RUS-CERT
- Identification (target-group)
- Affected System (OVAL linking possible)
- identification, target-groups?, revisions, category, subject, summary, affected?, workaround?, solution?,

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# **CAIF**



- Semantic usability ~
- MTEXT, UTEXT (e.g., affected systems)
  <!ENTITY % MTEXT "(
  %UTEXT; | p | b | vb | em | pre | vendor | program | file | aff | update | ...)"
- Information complexity ~
  - -e.g., affected system and its operating system, patch level, and vendor are not described by distinct elements
- Distribution ~
  - Some middle-sized and company-owned CSIRTs use the CAIF advisory standard

# **IODEF**



- Incident Object Description Exchange Format
- Common data format for describing and exchanging incident information between CSIRTs
- IETF Extended Incident Handling (INCH) Working Group
- IDMEF compatibility
- Covers the entire attack (including e.g., log files)

# **IODEF**



- Semantic usability ~
  - -Overlapping elements such as Incident and EventData
- Information complexity -
  - No information on affected files, patch location (URL), or potential workaround
- Distribution +
  - -Some vulnerability management tools are able to handle IODEF messages; Oct-10-2007: accepted for RFC publication

## **OVAL**



- Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language
- US-CERT / U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- Transfer & expression of public available security content
- Assessment Process
  - -System Characteristics
  - Analysis (vulnerability, configuration, patch state, ...)
  - Results schema

## **OVAL**



- Semantic usability +
  - -Well-defined and semantically usable
- Information complexity ~
  - -Highly granular but missing patch information and predefined product lists (CPE in new versions "<reference source="CPE" ref\_id="cpe:/o:microsoft:windows\_2003::gold:itanium"/>")
- Distribution +
  - OVAL is supported and used by several governmental and commercial organizations, Various existing tools

## Conclusion



- Evaluation of existing security advisory standards
- OVAL standard is the most suitable standard for the automatic or semi-automatic interpretation of security advisories

→ Faster reaction times and avoidance of interpretation errors for newly-discovered vulnerabilities

### **Contact**



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