

# Inside a BBB Malware Scheme: Mapping and Dissecting Attacker Infrastructure

Prepared for FIRST 2008

Michael La Pilla


VeriSign iDefense Malicious Code Operations Team

June 26, 2008




#### Why Should Incident Responders Care?

- US Commercial Accounts (the current target) NOT covered by Regulation E (read <a href="http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ecfr/">http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ecfr/</a> for more details in US)
- + Businesses of all size losing money, not just the banks





#### Retail vs. Commercial





#### What is a "BBB Attack"

- + Targeted e-mail using social engineering
- Coined after use of Better Business Bureau name
- + "BBB Attack" is like saying "Storm Worm"
- + 60+ documented attacks Feb 2007 June 2008

#### BBB CASE#: 351338595

Complaint filed by: Paul Moore

Complaint filed against: (COMPANY NAME REMOVED), Inc.

Complaint status: Forward Consumer Rebuttal to Business

Category: 
Case opened date: 11/22/2007

Case closed date: -



#### BBB Attacks - FTC





Dear

A complaint has been filled against you and the company you are affiliated to by Mr. George Hanson and sent to Federal Trade Comission by fax,in witch he's claiming that he has been cheated by you and your company in paying a greater ammount of money than the one appearing on the invoice you gave him for using your services.

The complaint states he contacted your company on MON,22 OCT 2007, trying to solve this situation without interference from any Governmental Institution, but your company refused to take action.

On WED, 24 OCT 2007, the complaint was sent by fax to Federal Trade Commission and we forwarded it to Internal Revenue.

Service and Better Business Bureau.

#### Complaint was filled against:

Name:

Company: -

If you feel that this message has been sent to you in error or if you have any questions regarding the next steps of this process, please di ownload the original complaint by clicking the link below:

amp://ttc.gov/fraud/complaints/24 oct 2007 george hanson.doc

Please take knowledge of the complaint's content and complete the form at the bottom of forward it to fraudcomplaint@ftc.gov.

Bruce Jameson Complaint Officer Federal Trade Commission,Fraud Department



#### US Courts – April 14, 2008

From: United States District Court [mailto:subpoena@uscourts.com]

Sent: Monday, April 14, 2008 7:00 AM

To: CEO Name

Subject: Subpoena in case #27-830-IBM

Place: United States Courthouse

880 Front Street

San Diego, California 92101

Room: Grand Jury Room

room 5217

Issuing officers name and address: O'Mevely & Meyers LLP; 400 South Hope Street, Los Angeles, CA 90071

Please download the entire document on this matter(follow this link) and print it for your secord.

Case number: Z/-830-1BM

Date and Time: May 7,2008

9:00 a.m. PST

United States District Court

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to appear and testify before the Grand Jury of the United States District Court at the place, date, and time specified below.



#### US Courts – April 14, 2008











#### **Not Just BBB**

#### **Attack by Template Brand**






#### Multiple Attackers, Different Infrastructures






#### The "A" Approach






#### The "A" Approach (continued)





#### The "B" Approach





### Demo #1 - BBBMapper.py




#### **Attack Mitigation Strategies**

- Variations on MFA
- + Transaction Verification
- + Server-side Detection
- + Credential Recovery / Victim IP Flagging
- User Education
- Transaction Fraud Detection
- + IDS/IPS Exploiting Lack of Attacker Innovation



#### User Education...Really?

- Never 100 percent, but many success stories
- Explain the situation, potential variations, and give a picture
- Water-cooler effect in action





#### Snort Sigs For FIRST Member Organizations

+ Available via e-mail for any members, can be shared with entire list if posting signatures to list is permissible



#### Demo #2 – The Real Payload





## Q&A

#### **Special Thanks**

- + Matt Richard
- + FIRST SC and Members
- + The kind folks from Conference & Publication Services, LLC for dealing with all our last minute changes

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