### Security Testing FIRST Annual Conference June 2008

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## Confessions of a pen tester

Typical scenario looks like this

- Customer calls and asks for a test
- 2-3 weeks prior to product going "live"
- Security test required by auditors
- Want to ensure "hackers can't get in"
- How secure are we?

#### What problems do you see here?

# The problem

Too many organizations have either:

- Neglected *security* testing entirely
- Assumed (incorrectly) their QA testing will catch security issues
- Adopted a late-cycle penetration test process as their sole security test

When you ask the wrong questions, you won't get the answers you need!

# Security testing is different

Security focus should primarily be on nonfunctional aspects of the software

- Not just focused on what the software can or should do
- Active deception of software intent
- Need to test every aspect of app

*QA team often has a tough time "thinking like an attacker"* 

# Uninformed "black box" testing

#### Advantages

- Unencumbered by prejudices of how things "should" behave
- Accurately emulates what an outsider might find
- Can be inexpensive and quick

Disadvantages

- Coverage is abysmal (10-20% LOC not abnormal)
- No notion of risk prioritization

# Informed testing

### Advantages

- Effort can be allocated by risk priority
- Can ensure high coverage through careful test design
- Emulate an insider attack

Disadvantages

- Functional "blinders" might miss things

### Case study: format strings

You are the engineering team leader of an embedded sw open source project

The chaos computer club just posted a paper detailing a newly discovered format string vulnerability 'sploit Your boss sends you a memo and asks, "are we ok?"

Your src includes: if (mystate==FOO) {
 printf(userstr);}

# **Testing methods**

- Common practices include
  - Fuzzing
  - Penetration testing
  - Dynamic validation
  - Risk-based testing

# Fuzzing

#### **Basic principle**

- Hit software with random/ garbage
- Look for unanticipated failure states
- Observe and record
- Any good?
  - MS estimates 20-25% of bugs found this way
  - Watch for adequate coverage



### **Fuzzing techniques**

### Smart fuzzing and dumb fuzzing

- "Dumb" refers to using random, unchosen data
- "Smart" implies using chosen garbage
- Example fuzzing a graphic renderer
  - Dumb approach is to throw it randomness
  - Smart approach is to study its expected file formats and to construct garbage that "looks" like what it expects, but isn't quite right

## What to fuzz

Fuzz targets – File fuzzing – Network fuzzing – Other I/O interfaces

Constructing "dumb" scenarios for each is easy, so let's look at some smart approaches

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# File fuzzing

### Smart scenarios

- *Really* study the expected file format(s)
- Look for things like parameters in data
- Construct nonsensical input data parameters
  - Negative or huge bitrate values for audio/video
  - Graphic dimensions

# **Network fuzzing**

#### **Smart scenarios**

- *Really* study the software-level network interfaces
  - Coverage here must include *state*
- Look for things like flags, ignoring state
- Construct nonsensical input data parameters
  - "Insane" packet sizes
  - Data overflows and underflows

# Interface fuzzing

Smart scenarios for all other "surfaces" *Really* study the data interfaces
APIs, registry, environment, user inputs, etc.
Construct nonsensical input data parameters
Overflows and underflows
Device names when file names are expected

# Automation is your friend

...and your enemy

- Lots of fuzz
   products are
   appearing
- How can one size possibly fit all?
- Best fuzzing tools are in fact frameworks



### Examples -OWASP's JBroFuzz, PEACH, SPI Fuzzer

# Finding value in pen testing


#### Enough with what's wrong

- Consider informed testing
- Quick form of attack resistance analysis
- Risk-based prioritization
- Nightmare scenarios from architectural risk analysis
- Abuse case stories
- Start with vendor tools, but then roll your sleeves up and do it yourself
  - Scripting tools can help tremendously

# Pen testing strategies

Inside => out approach is most likely to yield meaningful results

- It doesn't hurt to also do an outside => in test
- One very small part of overall testing
- Adversarial approach
- Surprises happen



# **Basic pen testing methods**

#### • Target scan

- Take inventory of target space
- Vulnerability scan
  - What potential preliminary weaknesses are present?
- Vulnerability exploit
  - Attempt entry
- Host-based discovery
  - What interesting "stuff" is on each breached system?
- Recursive branching
  - Repeat until finished

### Pen test results

Results need to be actions for *dev team* – Traditional pen test teams report to IT

- Need to adapt to different audience
- Map findings to modules and code

# Automation is really your friend

Pen test tool market is (arguably) one of the strongest in the security business

- Choices abound in commercial and open source
- Many are quite mature
- Almost a commodity market

Examples include

 Nmap, nessus, Metasploit, ISS, Core Impact, Retina

# **Dynamic validation**

Time to verify all those security requirements and functional specs

- QA will have easiest time building test cases with these
- Fault injection often used
- Helps if requirements verbiage is actionable

### Automation, what's that?

Dearth of available tools

- Some process monitors are available and helpful
- Test cases are easiest to define

## **Risk-based testing**

Time to animate those "nightmare scenarios" you uncovered in the architectural risk analysis

- Start with abuse cases, weakness scenarios
- Describe and script them
- Try them one step at a time

Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end; then stop. – Lewis Carroll

### Automation, what's that?

Dearth of available tools

- It's rare that these scenarios lend themselves to general purpose automation
- Test cases are really tough to define

### **Additional considerations**

There's plenty other things to think about

- Threat modeling
- Results tracking
- Five stages of grief
- Knowledge sharing
- Improvement and optimization

### Threat analysis can help

- Who would attack us?
- What are their goals?
- What resources do they have?
- How will they apply technology?
- How much time do they have?

Answers can help in understanding feasibility of attacks

# **Results tracking**

Lots of good reasons to track results

- Use again during regression testing
- Ensure closure
- Knowledge transfer of lessons learned
- Justify time spent



Tools can help – Test Director

# Five stages of grief

Security testers are often the bearers of bad news

- Learn from the K
   ü
   bler-Ross model
  - Denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance
  - Watch out for *denial* and *anger*!
- Understand and anticipate
- Diplomacy and tact will optimize likelihood of *acceptance*

# **Knowledge** sharing

Show the dev team how their code broke

- Best way to learn
- Public humiliation is a powerful motivator

If a picture tells a thousand words, a live demonstration shows a thousand pictures



### Improvement and optimization

Immediate goal is to find defects in today's software, but preventing future defects is also a worthy goal

- Formalize lessons learned process
- Consider papers, blog entries, etc., to share new findings (once fixed) with others
- Learn from medical community model

# **Getting started**

Some general tips and guidelines

- Interface inventory
- Let risk be your navigator
- Get the right tools for the job
- Scripting skills can be very valuable

## **Interface** inventory

Start by enumerating every interface, API, input, output, etc.

- This should be done per module as well as per application
- List everything
- Some call this the "attack surface"
- This list should become a target list as you plan your tests
- Flow/architecture charts are useful

## **Risk navigation**

The target list is probably too big to do a thorough job

- Prioritize focus in descending risk order
- Follow the most sensitive data first
- Those flow charts will set you free

Understand now why rigorous testing should be "white box"?

### Test scenario sources –1

**Develop test scenarios throughout SDLC** 

- Start at requirements, such as
  - US regs: GLBA, SOX, HIPPA
  - ISO 17799 / BS 7799
  - PCI
  - OWASP's WASS
- Warning, they're often fuzzy (no pun...)
  - SOX says, "Various internal controls must be in place to curtail fraud and abuse."

### Test scenario sources –2

Also look elsewhere in SDLC for test cases
Abuse cases
Many cases translate directly to test cases
Architectural risk analysis
Seek the doomsday scenarios
Code

Compliance with coding standards

# **Deployment testing**

### **Rigorous testing of environment**

- Network services
- File access controls
- Secure build configurations
- Event logging
- Patch management
- Test for all of this
  - Not your job? Who is doing it? The pen testers?


### References

#### Some useful additional reading

- "Adapting Penetration Testing for Software Development Purposes", Ken van Wyk, http://BuildSecurityIn.us-cert.gov
- "The Security Development Lifecycle", Michael Howard and Steve Lipner
- Fuzz testing tools and techniques http://www.hacksafe.com.au/blog/2006/08/

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