

DNS as a Forensics Tool

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Internet as Territory

- But what **is** the internet?
 - It's the largest equivalence class in the reflexive transitive symmetric closure of the relationship *can be reached by an IP packet from*
 - (Seth Breidbart)
- IP addresses, IP packets, underlie everything
- We overlay IP with many things, e.g., *the web*
- Most important overlay (a layer) is: DNS


DNS as Map

- Every thing we do every day on the Internet...
 - B2C Web, B2B Web, E-mail, I-M, <*your idea here*>
 - ...relies on TCP/IP, and begins with a DNS lookup
- Mobile Internet is dominated by search...
 - ...but search itself relies extensively upon DNS
- DNS has a rigorous internal structure
 - Things that are in fact related, are related in DNS
 - You can have *whois* privacy, but not DNS privacy

Criminal DNS

- The Internet has been a great accelerator of human civilization
 - Sadly, the criminals came along for the ride
- Criminals can't do Internet crime without DNS
 - Cheap throw-away domain names
 - DNS registrars and servers in bad neighborhoods
 - *Whois* privacy or simply bad *whois* data
- *Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.*
 - (Francis Bacon)

Domain Name System Data Flow




So, About that Internal Structure

- Domain names are grouped into *zones*
- A *zone* has one or more *name servers*
- Each *name server* has one or more *addresses*
- Other domain names also have *addresses*
- IP *addresses* are grouped into *netblocks*
- Domain names appear in a lot of places:
 - Web – <http://domain/>
 - E-mail – somebody@domain

Traditional DNS Forensics

- DNS lets anybody look up a *<domain,type>*
 - You get back the current set of *resource records*
 - But there's no way to see the history
 - And, your query exposes your interest
- *Whois* lets you check ownership of a domain
 - But it's usually hidden/private or inaccurate




DNSDB Search

Search mode: RRset Rdata

Record type: ANY

Domain name:

Bailiwick:



RRset results for *.google.com/ANY

Found 4 RRsets in 0.22 seconds.

bailiwick	com.
first seen	2010-06-24 03:08:18 -0000
last seen	2010-07-26 22:33:51 -0000
first seen in zone file	2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000
last seen in zone file	2010-07-26 16:10:15 -0000
google.com.	NS ns1.google.com.
google.com.	NS ns2.google.com.
google.com.	NS ns3.google.com.
google.com.	NS ns4.google.com.

bailiwick	com.
first seen in zone file	2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000
last seen in zone file	2010-07-25 16:09:21 -0000
a.l.google.com.	A 74.125.53.9

bailiwick	com.
first seen in zone file	2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000
last seen in zone file	2010-07-25 16:09:21 -0000
b.l.google.com.	A 74.125.45.9

bailiwick	com.
first seen in zone file	2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000
last seen in zone file	2010-07-25 16:09:21 -0000
f.l.google.com.	A 72.14.203.9

📌 ❌ Rdata results for **ANY/a.l.google.com.** 🔊

Found 2 RRs in 0.10 seconds.

```
20comments.com. NS a.l.google.com.  
antifavlc.com. NS a.l.google.com.
```

📌 ❌ RRset results for **antifavlc.com./ANY** 🔊

Found 1 RRsets in 0.04 seconds.

```
bailiwick          com.  
first seen in zone file 2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000  
last seen in zone file 2010-07-25 16:09:21 -0000  
antifavlc.com.    NS a.l.google.com.  
antifavlc.com.    NS nsl.google.com.  
antifavlc.com.    NS a.gtld-servers.net.  
antifavlc.com.    NS h.root-servers.net.
```

📌 ❌ RRset results for **a.l.google.com./ANY** 🔊

Found 1 RRsets in 0.02 seconds.

```
bailiwick          com.  
first seen in zone file 2010-04-24 16:12:21 -0000  
last seen in zone file 2010-07-25 16:09:21 -0000  
a.l.google.com.   A 74.125.53.9
```


Owner Lookup, Show History

```
$ dnsdb_query -r vix.com/ns/vix.com
...
;; record times: 2010-07-04 16:14:12 .. 2013-05-12 00:55:59
;; count: 2221563; bailiwick: vix.com.
vix.com. NS ns.sql1.vix.com.
vix.com. NS ns1.isc-sns.net.
vix.com. NS ns2.isc-sns.com.
vix.com. NS ns3.isc-sns.info.

;; record times: 2013-10-18 06:30:10 .. 2014-02-28 18:13:10
;; count: 330; bailiwick: vix.com.
vix.com. NS buy.internettraffic.com.
vix.com. NS sell.internettraffic.com.
```

Owner Wildcards, Left Hand

```
$ dnsdb_query -r \*.vix.com/a | fgrep 24.104.150
internal.cat.lah1.vix.com.  A  24.104.150.1
ss.vix.com.                 A  24.104.150.2
gutentag.vix.com.          A  24.104.150.3
lah1z.vix.com.             A  24.104.150.4
mm.vix.com.                A  24.104.150.11
ww.vix.com.                A  24.104.150.12
external.cat.lah1.vix.com. A  24.104.150.33
wireless.cat.lah1.vix.com. A  24.104.150.65
wireless.ss.vix.com.       A  24.104.150.66
ap-kit.lah1.vix.com.       A  24.104.150.67
cat.lah1.vix.com.          A  24.104.150.225
vix.com.                   A  24.104.150.231
deadrat.lah1.vix.com.      A  24.104.150.232
ns-maps.vix.com.          A  24.104.150.232
ns.lah1.vix.com.          A  24.104.150.234
```

Owner Wildcards, Right Hand

```
$ dnsdb_query -r vixie.\*/ns
;; zone times: 2010-08-13 16:10:10 .. 2012-12-31 17:24:50
;; count: 872; bailiwick: com.
vixie.com. NS ns2317.hostgator.com.
vixie.com. NS ns2318.hostgator.com.

;; zone times: 2010-04-24 16:12:21 .. 2010-08-12 16:09:01
;; count: 111; bailiwick: com.
vixie.com. NS ns23.domaincontrol.com.
vixie.com. NS ns24.domaincontrol.com.

;; zone times: 2010-10-20 20:52:43 .. 2012-03-31 20:54:04
;; count: 0; bailiwick: info.
vixie.info. NS ns31.domaincontrol.com.
vixie.info. NS ns32.domaincontrol.com.
^C
```


Data Lookup, By Name

```
$ ./dnsdb_query -n ss.vix.su/mx
vix.su.           MX  10  ss.vix.su.
dns-ok.us.       MX   0  ss.vix.su.
mibh.com.        MX   0  ss.vix.su.
iengines.com.    MX   0  ss.vix.su.
toomanydatsuns.com. MX  0  ss.vix.su.
farsightsecurity.com. MX 10  ss.vix.su.
anog.net.        MX   0  ss.vix.su.
mibh.net.        MX   0  ss.vix.su.
tisf.net.        MX 10  ss.vix.su.
iengines.net.    MX   0  ss.vix.su.
al.org.          MX   0  ss.vix.su.
vixie.org.       MX   0  ss.vix.su.
redbarn.org.     MX   0  ss.vix.su.
benedelman.org.  MX   0  ss.vix.su.
```

Data Lookup, by IP Address

```
$ dnsdb_query -r ic.fbi.gov/mx  
ic.fbi.gov.  MX  10 mail.ic.fbi.gov.
```

```
$ dnsdb_query -r mail.ic.fbi.gov/a  
mail.ic.fbi.gov.  A  153.31.119.142
```

```
$ dnsdb_query -i 153.31.119.142  
ic.fbi.gov.          A  153.31.119.142  
mail.ic.fbi.gov.    A  153.31.119.142  
mail.ncijtf.fbi.gov. A  153.31.119.142
```

Data Lookup, by IP Address Block

```
$ dnsdb_query -i 153.31.119.0/24 | grep -v infragard
vpn.dev2.leo.gov.          A 153.31.119.70
mail.leo.gov.             A 153.31.119.132
www.biometriccoe.gov.    A 153.31.119.135
www.leo.gov.             A 153.31.119.136
cgate.leo.gov.          A 153.31.119.136
www.infraguard.net.      A 153.31.119.138
infraguard.org.         A 153.31.119.138
www.infraguard.org.     A 153.31.119.138
mx.leo.gov.             A 153.31.119.140
ic.fbi.gov.             A 153.31.119.142
mail.ic.fbi.gov.        A 153.31.119.142
mail.ncijtf.fbi.gov.    A 153.31.119.142
```

Technical Formatting Notes

- These slides use the “terminal interface”
 - Actual agents use a web browser interface
- These slides show a DNS output conversion
 - The real output is in JSON format, i.e.:

```
$ dnsdb_query -r f.root-servers.net/a/root-servers.net
;; record times: 2010-06-24 03:10:38 .. 2014-03-05 01:22:56
;; count: 715301521; bailiwick: root-servers.net.
f.root-servers.net. A 192.5.5.241
```

```
$ dnsdb_query -r f.root-servers.net/a/root-servers.net -j
{"count": 715301521, "time_first": 1277349038, "rrtype": "A",
"rrname": "f.root-servers.net.", "bailiwick": "root-
servers.net.", "rdata": ["192.5.5.241"], "time_last": 1393982576}
```

End Notes

- Demo
- Questions
- Thanks