

# Analyzing Targeted Attacks through "Hiryu" – An IOC Management and Visualization Tool

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# Agenda

- 1. Advanced attacks specifically targeting Japanese organizations
  - -APT Campaigns
  - -Getting IOC
  - -Motivation to Develop a Tool
- 2. Development of the tool
  - -Components
  - -Structure
- 3. Introducing "Hiryu"
  - -Web UI
  - -Import/Export Data
  - -Visualization

# **1. ADVANCED ATTACKS SPECIFICALLY TARGETING JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONS**



# **APT Campaign (1)**

- Cloudy Omega (Symantec) / Blue Termite (Kaspersky)
  - -Various targets
    - Government, Defence industry, Energy sector, Think tank, Media...
  - -TTP
    - Before intrusion
      - -Malware called "Emdivi" used
      - -Malware attached emails disguising medical bill notifications

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- -Drive-by download attacks
- After intrusion
  - -Steal domain administrator's account
  - -Active directory privilege escalation
    - Kerberos KDC vulnerability (MS14-068)
- Behavior
  - Gather information from network
  - Exfiltration
    - -Using password protected RAR file
    - -Domain credentials, sensitive information

# **APT Campaign (2)**

- Winnti (Kaspersky) / Axiom (Novetta)
  - -Target
    - Online gaming company
    - Pharmaceutical industry
  - $-\mathsf{TTP}$ 
    - Use malware signed by legitimate code signing certificates
    - Register a task to install malware on the server
    - Create a service to activate the malware and execute

#### -Behavior

- Steal code signing certificates
- Steal information



# **Getting IOC**



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## **Motivation to Develop a Tool**

#### Organizing information

- -What types of malware are used in which attacks
- -Correlation among IOCs in different incidents
- -Overall picture of attack campaigns
- Collecting public information
  - Need to organize IOCs published in blogs/reports by security vendors, as they sometimes link to the incidents
  - Need to sort out attack groups and campaigns that are named uniquely by different security vendors



# **2. DEVELOPMENT OF** THE TOOL



## Components

#### Django

- Web application framework
- vis.js —Visualization library
- Neo4j (Optional) —Graph Database

- Python modules
  - pythonwhois
    - for domain whois
  - ipwhois
    - for ip whois
  - Py2neo
    - Neo4j client library
  - $-ioc_writer$ 
    - export IOC as OpenIOC format
  - -python-stix
    - export IOC as STIX format

# Neo4j

# Graph DB stores Nodes and RelationsUsing Cypher query language





# Structure (1)

#### Node

- Components include
  - Host name
  - Domain name
  - IP address
  - Organization
  - Malware (hash)
  - File name
- Relation
  - Relation of Nodes
    - Host name tied to IP address
    - Organization tied to IP address
    - Host name tied to domain name
    - Malware connecting to IP address

Multiple Properties can be registered to Nodes/Relations

#### Property

- Combination of an arbitrary key and value
- e.g. Property of malware
  - md5:...
  - -sha1:...
  - -sha256:...
  - type: HTTP bot



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# **Structure (2)**



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### Cluster

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D	6		C	Description	
lame	FireEye			https://github.com/fireeye/iocs	
reated	Feb. 1, 2016, 10:31 a.m.				
Aodified	Feb. 1, 2016, 10:32 a.m.				
First seen	None				
Tag	information_source - security_vendor				
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# SubCluster(1)

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	Subcluster	Edit													
	ID			44				Description		This I Hiding	This IOC contains indicators detailed in the whitepaper " Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEve and Microsoft Expose Chine			tepaper " ose Chine	
	Name		В	LACKCO	OFFEE (FAMILY)					se APT	Group	o's Obfuscation Tactic". Th	. The whitepaper can be		
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	Tag							i u		icator uted t	icators for the BLACKCOFFEE malware family that is attrib uted to APT17.			is attrib	
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8	96 x				2016-02-01T10:35:43	.174Z	IP address		175.126.104.17	75		BLACKCOFFEE (FAMILY)	APT17 FireEye		
8	82 X				2016-02-01T10:35:41	.635Z	Domain name		wordraference.	com		BLACKCOFFEE (FAMILY)	APT17 FireEye		
8	61 X				2016-02-01T10:35:39	.293Z	Organization description		Georg Krber				APT17		

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# SubCluster(2)

		Description	This IOC contains indicators detailed in the whitepaper " Hiding in Plain Sight: FireEye and Microsoft Expose Chine
Name First seen	BLACKCOFFEE (FAMILY)		se APT Group's Obfuscation Tactic". The whitepaper can be read here: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/
Tag	oct. 10, 2014, 12.02 p.m.		2015/05/hiding_in_plain_sigh.html. This IOC contains ind icators for the BLACKCOFFEE malware family that is attrib uted to APT17.
Create Node/Rela	tion	Visualize Sho	ow Anonymize Hide Large View Large View(Anonymized)
Src Index:		]	
Source Value:			
Dst Index:		]	
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Postprocess:			
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Jse Template			
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# **Additional Processing of Nodes**

- Additional processing is performed when registering a specific type of Node
  - -Register host name
    - Extracts domain names
      - Searches whois for the domain name
        - > Extracts registrant's email address from whois results

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- DNS lookup for IP address
  - Searches whois for the IP address
    - Extracts organization name from whois results



## **Schema**

Top Cluster SubCluster Schema  → Graph DB				
Create Node Index (Label-Key Pair)	Index(7)	ntries	Search:	
Label:	ID v I	con 🍦 Label	¢ Key	\$
New label:	7 🗙	File	name	
Property key:	6 ×	Malware	md5	
Icon:	5 x	IP	address	
Create	4 X	Domain	name	
Delete Label Delete Key	3 X	Registrant	email	
	2 X	Organization	description	
Create Relation Template	1 X	Host	name	
Source:	Showing 1 to 7 of	f 7 entries	Previous 1	Next
Destination:				
Type:				
New type.				
Create Rename Type Replace Index				
Delete Type Delete Index(Source)				

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# **Import/Export Data**

CSV

-Able to import/export Node, Relation, Cluster, SubCluster

### 📕 Neo4j

- -Able to push/pull
- Need to register an Index (a combination of the Node's label and main key) to import data

#### OpenIOC

 $-\operatorname{Need}$  a table of how OpenIOC terms and Index correspond

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#### STIX

Able to import/export the following data
 Host name, Domain name, IP address

# **OpenIOC/STIX Correspondence Table**

Hir	ryu	OpenIOC	STIX & CybOX		
SubCluster		metadata	report:Header		
na	me	short_description	Title		
description		description	Description		
Node Index		term	Cybox:Object		
Label Key					
IP	address	PortItem/remoteIP	AddressObj		
Host name		DnsEntryItem/Host	HostnameObj		
Domain name		_	DomainNameObj		



## Visualization



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## **Visualization**





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## ToDo

Improve import/export of OpenIOC, STIX —Currently, only limited data can be imported from STIX —Import/Export is irreversible

- Implement a new feature on incident response timeline
  - -Record date/time and events
    - A suspicious file created on the server
    - A suspicious communication performed from the server

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- May be achieved to a certain extent by adding time information to the Relations field
- Some events may be difficult to fit in Relations
   Received a malware sample from victim organization
   Reported analysis results to victim organization

# Thank you for your attention

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Repository of Hiryu —https://github.com/S03D4-164/Hiryu

Incident report notifications —info@jpcert.or.jp

