## **CVSS v3 Development Update**

Seth Hanford Chair, CVSS-SIG



Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams

## CVSS v2, Brief History

- Developed from April 2005 June 2007
- Based on industry peer review
- Major improvements to score comparison
  - Any item with 1 Complete impact scoring higher than 3 Partials
- Included "Scoring Tips" to help remove v1 inconsistencies
- Moved "Security Requirements" to Environmental to permit independent Base calculations by 3<sup>rd</sup> party scoring providers




### CVSS v3 Development

- Preliminary work June 2011 Mar 2012
  - Seth nominated; IPR development & SIG governance work
- Work on v3: March 2012 present
- Call for Participants (Mar May, 2012)
  - 17 Voting Representatives from 8 constituencies
  - Banking / Finance; Government; Academic; Manufacturing / Retail; Technology; Telecommunications; CIRTs & Security Research; Energy
- Call for Subjects (Apr Jun, 2012)
  - 93 subjects from 21 contributors
  - 4-phase development, ending in Jun 2014
- Hybrid model of read-only membership & active participants
  - IPR Agreement required for active participation; ensures CVSS output is unencumbered for all users



# **Development Timeline**






# Key Goals for v3

- Solve the "Scope" problem
  - 10 of 57 "Group A" subjects
  - Oracle Partial+ showing customer demand since v2 release
  - Address additional concerns for modern age: virtualization, sandboxing, etc
- Decrease subjectivity / increase objectivity & repeatability
- Better documentation and examples
- Address changes in technologies, threats, and vulnerabilities
- Increase actionable uses / decrease ineffective measures



## Base Metric Group Changes, v2 -> v3





### Privileges Required (A-Cisco-2) Approved

- Removes v2 "Authentication" metric
- Measures actual attacker privileges vs overloaded "local" definition
  AV:L, Au: N == v2 locally authenticated attacker
- Allows for measurements of attacker capability, not just login counting
  - v2 "None" used > 90% of all NVD vulnerabilities (2007 2012)
  - v2 "Multiple" used < 1% of all NVD vulnerabilities (2007 2012)</li>
- Allows for measuring "Complete" capabilities
  - Useful for corner cases involving a "root" user escalating across authorization boundaries (e.g. root on VM guest gains privilege on peer guest / VM hypervisor)



### Privileges Required (A-Cisco-2) Proposed

Metric Value	Description				
None	Unprivileged				
Low	Basic, low-impact capabilities; no "Complete" impacts authorized; only non-sensitive impacts				
High	Significant capabilities; one or two "Complete" impacts authorized; OR "Partial" impact to sensitive resources				
Complete	Fully privileged; three "Complete" impacts authorized				



#### User Interaction (A-Citi-1) Approved

Removes "Social Engineering" components from v2 Access Complexity definition

Metric Value	Description
None	Vulnerability requires no user interaction
Simple	Successful exploitation requires a user to take standard / expected actions (open email, click a link, view PDF, etc)
Complex	Successful exploitation requires a user to take non- standard / abnormal actions



### Authorization Scope (A-Cisco-1) Approved

- First of two metrics used to answer the "Scope" problem
  - Where is the attacker coming from?
- Measure the scope of the attacker's authorization, relative to the vulnerable component
- Removes host-centric vulnerability scoring
- Design agnostic
  - Application vs. Operating System
  - Virtualization (guest -> hypervisor, guest -> peer guest)
  - Application sandboxes
  - Multiple processor privilege separation (Proc. A Ring 0 -> Proc. B Ring -1)



### Authorization Scope (A-Cisco-1) Approved

Metric Value	Description
Increased	Authorization from independent authority, or whose control includes all resources of vulnerable component
Component	DEFAULT; Authorization granted by component itself or same authority used to authorize component capabilities
Decreased	Authorization from source controlled by component, or subordinate to component



#### Impact Scope (A-Cisco-1) Approved

- Second of two metrics used to answer the "Scope" problem
  - Where is the attacker effecting an impact?
- Measure the scope of the attacker's impact, relative to the vulnerable component and its scope of control
- Removes host-centric vulnerability scoring
- Design agnostic
  - Measures impact to the Vulnerable Component
  - Permits measurement of Complete control over an application, host, virtual infrastructure, etc
  - Permits measurement of impact to direct, non-device resources (network, etc)



#### Impact Scope (A-Cisco-1) Approved

Metric Value	Description
Increased	Information resources controlled by an authority that is independent of the vulnerable component are primarily impacted
Component	DEFAULT; Resources controlled by component itself or same authority are primarily impacted
Decreased	Resources controlled by component, or subordinate to component are primarily impacted



### Temporal Metric Group, v3

Exploitability


**Remediation Level** 

**Report Confidence** 

Exploitability Subscore



#### Environmental Metric Group Changes, v2 -> v3





### Mitigated Environmental (C-Citi-1) Approved

- All BASE metrics would have an associated Mitigated Environmental metric.
- Functions similar to the Security Requirements
- Recalculates the Base metrics according to environmental mitigations
- Allows for suggested mitigations to be expressed / calculated within CVSS
- E.g. Closing a port but leaving a vulnerability unpatched; reducing effective privileges of a running service; requiring increased privileges to perform an action, etc.



#### Remove Collateral Damage / Target Distribution (C-Citi-2, -3) Proposed

- Legacy CVSSv1 metrics
  - Difficult to measure
  - Do not scale well to large organizations
  - By all accounts unused
- Mitigated Environmental has shifted focus of environmental
  - Modify impact and exploitability specific to the end-user environment



#### Severity Categories (C-Intel-1) Proposed

- Based on the Unofficial NIST NVD range-based assignments
  - − Low: 0−3.9
  - Medium: 4.0 6.9
  - − High: 7.0 − 10.0
- Adds "None" and "Critical"
  - None: 0.0
  - Low: 0.1-3.9
  - Medium: 4.0 6.9
  - − High: 7.0 − 8.9
  - Critical: 9.0 10.0



### Vulnerability Chains (C-Romanosky-1) Proposed

- CVSS v3 still focused on scoring vulnerabilities individually
- Optional capability that removes the restriction for combining chained effects
- Requires individual vulnerabilities to have their own CVSS scores first
- Used to express 1..N vulnerabilities in order to achieve the impact of vulnerability N
- Chain has its own CVSS score
  - Exploitability is re-scored from logical combination of exploitability subscores
  - Impact is impact subscore of vulnerability N



### Vulnerability Chains (C-Romanosky-1) Proposed

	Vuln 1	Vuln 2	Vuln 3	Chain
Access Vector	N	L	L	N
Access Complexity	L	M	L	M
Privileges Required	N	L	L	N
User Interaction	N	S	N	S
Authorization Scope	C	С	С	C
Impact Scope	С	С	С	С
Confidentiality	Ν	Р	С	С
Integrity	Р	Р	С	С
Availability	Ν	Р	С	С
Exploitability	F	Н	U	U
Remediation Level	OF	OF	W	W
Report Confidence	С	С	UR	UR



# Further work

- Ongoing / concurrent through Nov 30, 2013
  - Document completed work
  - Collect example vulnerabilities and v2 "hard" cases
  - Plan training materials
- May 1, 2013
  - Begin Scoring Algorithm work
- Sep 1, 2013
  - Begin machine readability / presentation layer work
- Nov 30, 2013
  - First draft / public comment; FIRST approval
- June 2014
  - Release CVSS v3



# How can I help?

- Need example vulnerabilities / v2 "hard" cases
- Need examples of how you might use Vulnerability Chaining
- Contact <u>seth@first.org</u>
  - Subscribe to read-only <u>cvss-sig@first.org</u>
  - Subscribe to read / write <u>cvss-v3@first.org</u> (requires signed Intellectual Property Rights agreement from you / your organization)
  - Submit comments / questions
- Read and comment on the forthcoming draft
- Express interest in joining the upcoming v4 SIG



#### Thank you!

