

Keeping Eyes on Malicious Websites"ChkDeface" against Fraudulent Sites

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Agenda

- Background
 - Increase and changes in website defacements
- Internal operations when a defacement is discovered
 Hiroshi KOBYASHI
- System Development—chkdeface
- Going Forward

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Takayuki UCHIYAMA


Taki is a Information Security Analyst at JPCERT Coordination Center, National CSIRT in Japan.

He is in charge of handling vulnerability reports.

BACKGROUND

Increase and Changes in Website Defacements

- Recently, 300 500 / month, June July 2013 over 1,000
 - -2009 2010 Gumblar
 - —June, 2012 .js file defacements (Plesk?)
 - February, 2013 iframe insertions
 - May, 2013 Obfuscated JavaScript insertions
 - October, 2013 See decrease trend, but still high numbers



Reasons for Defacing a Website

- To infect with malware
 - —"Guide" to an Exploit Kit
- "Guide" to a fake shopping site (Spamvertising)
 - Pharmacy, Supplements
 - —Selling fake products, etc.
- To use for SEO poisoning
- Exhibit power or make a political stand
 - —Hacked by / Pwned by
 - Display country flag or organization log
- To leverage in DDoS attacks

Causes that allow for defacements

- Account information for servers are stolen
 - —By brute force
 - —Use account information stolen from a PC by malware
- Leveraging a web application vulnerability
 - —CMS(WordPress(plugin),Joomla!,Movable Type,...)
 - —Custom PHP (written from scratch)
- Leveraging a server management software vulnerability
 - —Plesk, cPanel, etc.
- Leveraging a middleware vulnerability
 - —GNU Bash, Struts, etc.

INTERNAL OPERATIONS WHEN A DEFACEMENT IS DISCOVERED

Flow for Checking Website Defacements

Receive Report

> Check site w/ browser Identify alteration by checking source code Identify site administrator from IP Address and WHOIS

Created tool to perform operations mentioned in the dotted box

Contact site administrator

Things to keep in mind when checking Website defacements

- Check websites with an environment that will not be affected by malicious contents
- Conserve the website contents
 - —Data for contents that make up the site (html, images, CSS, JS)
 - —Screenshot of the website
- Record website information
 - —IP address of the site
 - WHOIS information on the IP address and domain

SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT

Requirements

- Obtain contents and a screenshot in one access attempt
 - —Some sites change behavior when accessed again
- Does not get infected when obtaining source code
 - Both the checker and tool
- Record the time of the check
 - Investigative organizations ask for this information
- Relatively easy to troubleshoot when there is an overload or an issue
- Importance on 'real-time'


Become more efficient by using a tool

- Developed a Django based Web application
 - —Chkdeface
- Main operations
- 1. Register the website URL
 - —Handles HTTP, HTTPS, FTP
 - —Handles PROXY
 - —Handles both Referer and user-agent
- 2. Contents for the registered website are obtained
 - Source code for the webpage that is displayed in the browser
 - —Contents that make up the webpage
 - —Screenshot of the webpage

Improving efficiency by developing and using a tool

- 3. Using jsunpack-n, check if the signature matches with any existing signatures
 - Used a custom set of previously collected signatures
- 4. Record various data on the site
 - http_status
 - content_type
 - http_erver
 - wappalyzer
- 5. Record information on the website
 - —IP address
 - —WHOIS information (domain, IP address)

Structure



Main Modules


- Ghost.py
- Django
- Celery
 - -redis
- jsunpack-n
 - -Yara
- wappalyzer

Going Forward


- Would like to open source
 - —Plan to put on github.com/JPCERTCC
- Using this system, would like to collaborate with domestic community on incident response
 - Would like to provide feedback on results at next year's FIRST Conference

APPENDIX


Screen Image (top page)




Screen Image (Check in progress)




Screen Image (Check Result)




Screen Image (Screenshot)




Screen Image (Source code)



Screen Image (List contents)



Screen Image (Search)




Screen Image (Search)

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Screen Image (Search)


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Screen Image (WHOIS)




User: kobayashi log out

Screen Image (WHOIS)



Screen Image (DNS)



Screen Image (syn)

