

The missing link between cybercrime gangs



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Agenda - overview

Episode 1: The quest begins

- Overview and abstract: Neverquest?
- Code and protocol analysis
- Prevalence and geographic spread

Episode 2: Dead in the waters

- 3 million credentials in the water from PONY to Neverquest
- What's PONY about? (demo)
- Web injects (search and replace)

Episode 3: Glimpse at infrastructure


- Server infrastructure
- Panel and money mule accounts, potential loss of millions

Episode 4: The Missing Link ...

Abstract

- Neverquest is also known as Vawtrak/Snifula
- Yet another Crime as a Service
- Ursniff was the foundation which later evolved into Gozi
- Gozi reemerged as “Gozi Prinimalka” (Hang Up)
- Neverquest was born based on that evolution in Trojan banking development
- It was first discovered in mid 2013
- In December 2014 we found Neverquest to implement Tor2web to hide C&C

Overview: Neverquest



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Abstract

- Upon execution of %ProgramData%\VuroWapze\OowupTumwo.uww into
- Neverquest then adds a registry entry including a run key to
- Next it enrolls the user with a decoded cookie value
- Neverquest proceeds to download and execute trojan bankers.

CIRK Analysis

Criticality: ▲ High

Investigator: [REDACTED]

Customer:

State:

Investigator Comment:

[Save analysis](#)

Related ticket:

Incident 2242474-20150807-4OD4Z-3861

[Edit](#) [Delete](#)

Date: 2015-07-30 20:17:00

Criticality: ▲ High

Still Infected: Yes

Infection Type: Malware

Infection Vector: N/A

Malware Family: Neverquest

Indicators of Compromise	Malicious File	File Type:	Malware Binary
		File Path:	C:\ProgramData\VuroWapze\
		File Name:	OowupTumwo.uww
Malicious Registry Entry		Registry Hive:	NTUSER
		Registry Key Path:	\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
		Registry Item Name:	VuroWapze
		Registry Item Value:	regsvr32.exe "C:\ProgramData\VuroWapze\OowupTumwo.uww"

Comment: UK Neverquest campaign

Abstract

- Some weeks back (mid February 2016) it added several new targets related to banks in Israel: bankleumi.co.il, bankhapoalim.co.il, telebank.co.il.
- Several Neverquest campaigns have recently pushed the Point of Sale (PoS) malware “Abaddon” (small binary approx. 5-6KB)
- Latest new project/campaignID is Project 238
- Yet again we see new targets, including investment retirement services such as Vanguard and Paychex.
- **Infected users should fear for their entire retirement savings being stolen.**

Binary

Current versions of Neverquest uses several layers to protect itself from detection and to trouble analysis e.g.:

- Anti-Emulator
- Anti-Debugger
- Anti-Analysis
- Anti-Antimalware
- Garbage Collection
- Hashing
- Encryption/Decryption
- Code injection
- Compression/Decompression

Protocol

- The C&C responds with a list of items. After the first HTTP request from the infected client the server will typically respond with a configuration file and may also respond with a list of commands that the client will then execute.


Offset	Value
x00\x10	OK Download + Execute
x03	Download Module
x1C	Update
X05	Search files

- For some time Neverquest makes use of a linear congruential generator (LCG) method added a pseudo random number generator (PRNG) to produce the key used to encrypt the data.
- On top of that data, it's now being compressed with LZMAT library.


```
0054F978 -> {%EMAIL%}
0054F984 -> {%ACCOUNT%}
0054F990 -> {%DOMAIN%}
0054F99C -> {%ACCOUNT%}
0054F9A8 -> {%DOMAIN%}
0054F9B4 -> {%MAILLISTCOLUMN}
0054F9C8 -> "%s" <%s>
0054F9DC -> {%FROM%}
0054F9E8 -> {%FROMEMAIL%}
0054F9F8 -> {%FROMNAME%}
0054FA08 -> {%FROMACCOUNT%}
0054FA18 -> {%FROMDOMAIN%}
0054FA28 -> {%PROXYIP%}
0054FA34 -> {%BEGIN_HIDEBADWORDS%}
0054FA52 -> {%END_HIDEBADWORDS%}
0054FA68 -> {%BEGIN_HIDEBADWORDS%}
0054FA84 -> {%END_HIDEBADWORDS%}
0054FA9C -> {%BEGIN_RANDHTML%}
0054FAB6 -> {%END_RANDHTML%}
0054FAC8 -> {%BEGIN_RANDTEXT%}
0054FAE2 -> {%END_RANDTEXT%}
0054FAF4 -> {%BEGIN_BASE64%}
0054FB18 -> bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz
0054FB30 -> aeiouy
0054FB38 -> charset=
0054FB4C -> {%END_BASE64%}
0054FB5C -> {%BEGIN_QUOTEDPRINTABLE%}
0054FB7A -> {%END_QUOTEDPRINTABLE%}
0054FB94 -> bcdfghjklmnpqrstvwxyz
0054FBAC -> aeiouy
0054FBB4 -> {%BEGIN_SPLIT76%}
0054FBCA -> {%END_SPLIT76%}
0054FBDC -> {%BEGIN_MORPHIMAGE%}
0054FBF6 -> {%END_MORPHIMAGE%}
```

Distribution and prevalence – all campaigns (1 month)

NEVERQUEST INFECTIONS




Distribution and prevalence – all campaigns (1 year)



Credentials lost PONY


DATA STOLEN BY PONY THE PAST 6 MONTHS




- Requirements should be authenticated for the user to be logged in the system
- Bug in auth_cookie generation

```
function authenticate($login, $password)
{
.....
    $this->user_id = $row['user_id'];
    $this->update_auth_cookie($row['user_id'], mixed_sha1(12345*microtime()));
    $this->login = $login;
    return true;
.....
}

echo microtime();
0.92580500 1445414565
```



```
!php
*
url for test
https://[redacted]/c_api/v1/bot/60/3836567439/info?client=test_2&token=[redacted]9ba34a544e

sample answer:
{"isBotOnline":0,"Browser":"Firefox 31","arch":"x86 32bit","last_time":"2015-03-30 06:03:02","

https://[redacted]/c_api/v1/bot/85/2145880484/info?client=asket&token=4755b8a0ac8e8fdca853c7e27f69d

https://[redacted]/c_api/v1/bot/283/4045932770/info?client=asket&token=86c940572132fa1f4d6e099cf9f1

/

define('SERVER_BASE_URL', 'https://[redacted]');
define('BASIC_AUTH', 'root:[redacted]');
define('CLIENT_ID', 'asket');
define('SERVER_TOKEN', '2fcdb2d25d22e[redacted]');
```

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[Users](#)
 Autoskip ✖

ID	Login info	Bank	IP	Last activity	Assigned	Action	Comment
1061	502397167	TSB (business)	86.156.47.30	00:12:15 (01.12)	-	+	
1096	stoyan.kuman	HSBC (business)	77.102.236.220	22:11:54 (30.11)	-	+	
1103	3450703753	Santander (business)	86.26.196.208	19:11:57 (30.11)	-	+	
1107	rjazancevs	TSB (business)	80.43.21.14	18:11:31 (30.11)	-	+	
1085	dancer99	HSBC (business)	87.102.6.206	18:11:19 (30.11)	-	+	
1106	shanpaul	HSBC (business)	86.156.47.30	18:11:12 (30.11)	-	+	
1016	8143429637	Santander (business)	2.24.168.121	11:11:12 (30.11)	-	+	
1105	hox172	HSBC (business)	109.170.200.48	20:11:04 (29.11)	-	+	

```

86080|fbhatti (Business) ;83.244.197.194 ;14:07:15 (10.07); 18?? GBP, try send 2kk to China
117557|rachs ;usiness) ;91.206.177.8 ;11:07:57 (13.07);- ;40kk
86080|fbhatti Business) ;83.244.197.194 ;14:07:15 (10.07);- ; 18??
407851|logoslin (Business) ;46.182.58.1 ;13:07:20 (09.07);- ;15kk
16410|voltaire est (Business) ;77.233.151.78 ;16:07:43 (07.07);- ;2kk
172794|ssahota (Business) ;145.78.21.6 ;14:07:42 (07.07);- ;30kk ;
30585|simonp ;usiness) ;37.252.30.41 ;17:06:57 (19.06);- ;2kk
25637|glenda43 twest (Business) ;217.45.218.37 ;11:06:36 (08.06);- ;5kk balance ;
37183|sheila ;usiness) ;134.36.21.217 ;13:06:40 (05.06);- ;6kk
    
```

514	176082 dianneh	RBS (Business)	86.188.160.194	13:11:36 (24.11)	-	+	500k balance. inter -UK. pod chaps dropov pod krupnoe net.skip poka
1087	firewolf1	HSBC (business)	81.154.53.172	11:11:47 (24.11)	-	+	
1098	0909510588	Santander (business)	82.27.47.55	15:11:40 (22.11)	-	+	
262	616111787	TSB (business)	94.197.113.24	22:11:29 (21.11)	-	+	17k на борту,не дал данные,для добавить дропа
795	jfkleebb	coutts.com	86.140.203.22	18:11:23 (21.11)	-	+	-25k Balance
1084	942990336	lloydsbank.co.uk (Business)	78.33.152.124	13:11:27 (18.11)	-	+	
1097	3191896990	Santander (business)	50.203.97.190	06:11:37 (18.11)	-	+	
1095	kirtontc	HSBC (business)	86.157.73.72	15:11:41 (17.11)	-	+	

The Missing Link (Gootkit, Tinba and Neverquest)

- At least two campaigns related to Neverquest shares infrastructure with Shifu, Tinba and Gootkit
- In those two campaigns we have a 100% identical list of corporate banking targets with primary focus on the UK but also on Qatar, Hong Kong, and United Arab Emirates

	Tinba	Gootkit	Neverquest
Hash	4d1ad74191725927d76b44b0388b6de6	4d86ae4acf5bec6939e6270bfc9216e8	67EED9D7AAB4C7E32343CE8CD1EF0F54
Domain	https://sslanalytics.com/ful/	https://sslanalytics.com/ful/	https://sslanalytics.com/tyt/
Corporate targets	100%	100%	100%
All targets	52,20%	41,90%	100%

