



**Hewlett Packard**  
Enterprise

# **Usability and Incentives for Threat Information Sharing Technology**

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Seoul, Korea  
June 14, 2016

# Starting point



**Dr. Anton Chuvakin**  
@anton\_chuvakin

Why so many security vendors are such fans of 1980s-style UIs?


RETWEETS	LIKES
3	6

1:33 PM - 9 May 2016



Human interaction is critically important at all stages of the threat intelligence lifecycle.

# Threat Information Sharing Platform (TISP)



# Overview

## Encouraging users to contribute quality content



Who are TISP users?

What data can/do they contribute?

What motivates them to contribute?

What are the obstacles to sharing (and how do we remove them)?

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# TISP UX research

## UX

Puts users and human behavior at the forefront of any design activities

Vastly underutilized in enterprise software, including security platforms

## HCI and UX methods can

Provide insight into the issues with TISPs for Analysts


Validate potential solutions, directing development strategy

## Our research

Initiate the systematic study of (some) UX and HCI aspects of TISPs

T. Sander and J. Hailpern.  
*UX Aspects of Threat Information Sharing Platforms: An Examination & Lessons Learned Using Personas.*

In Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Information Sharing and Collaborative Security (WISCS '15)



# Understanding TISP users

# Our approach: Personas

Fictionalized representation of users

Create relatable characters

Help prioritize and guide features

## Clark Andrews


AGE 26  
OCCUPATION Software Developer  
STATUS Single  
LOCATION San Jose, CA  
TIER Experiment Hacker  
ARCHETYPE The Computer Nerd

Friendly Clever Go-Getter



"I feel like there's a smarter way for me to transition into a healthier lifestyle."

### Motivations



### Goals

- To cut down on unhealthy eating and drinking habits
- To measure multiple aspects of life more scientifically
- To set goals and see and make positive impacts on his life


### Frustrations

- Unfamiliar with wearable technology
- Saturated tracking market
- Manual tracking is too time consuming


### Bio

Aaron is a systems software developer, a "data junkie" and for the past couple years, has been very interested in tracking aspects of his health and performance. Aaron wants to track his mood, happiness, sleep quality and how his eating and exercise habits affects his well being. Although he only drinks occasionally with friends on the weekend, he would like to cut down on alcohol intake.

### Personality



### Technology



### Brands



# Persona: Chris Meyer - SOC analyst



## BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

- BC.1 Age: 26
- BC.2 Education: BS in Anthropology
- BC.3 Experience: Self-taught and some classes
- BC.4 Housing: Renting with roommate in Mountain View, CA
- BC.5 Relationship: Single. Dating
- BC.6 Hobbies: Photography
- BC.7 Values: Personal growth, creativity
- BC.8 Other: Grew up and went to school in the Midwest

## GOALS

- GC.1 Build a successful career in IT security
- GC.2 Would like to manage his own team eventually
- GC.3 Contribute something good to society by making cyber space safer
- GC.4 Opportunities to grow and advance personally and professionally
- GC.5 Be more creative and artistic in life and work

## PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY USE

- PC.1 Uses Apple product suite as everything works well together
- PC.2 Loves social networks
- PC.3 Shares his photos via Instagram
- PC.4 Enjoys learning from YouTube and other online sources

## WORKFLOW

- WC.1 Performs triage on alerts by ArcSight SIEM
- WC.2 Accesses research sites on the Internet, commercial portals and internal asset management tools to determine criticality of events

## FRUSTRATION & CHALLENGES

- FC.1 Too much repetitive activity of manual indicator look ups wastes time
- FC.2 Time pressure
- FC.3 Unvetted intel
- FC.4 Out-of-date intel

Table 1: Chris Meyer | SOC Analyst

*“Security tools are inconvenient to use compared to most consumer technology”*


# Persona groups



CISO/Managers



SOC Analysts



Power users



CTI Analysts



Incident Responders

# Power users



Fuse intel from various sources

Create or enrich cases


Import third party reports

Create detailed profiles



# Data contribution by users

# TISP user contributions



## SOC Analyst

- Feedback on indicators he does triage on.
- Annotations

### Benefits:

- Lower FP rate
- Enhanced context for basic indicators



## Incident Responders

- New IOCs, cases, malware samples
- In depth analysis results from IR with deep knowledge in malware analysis, log analysis or forensics
- Tools and methods relevant to an investigation
- Contributions to cases from others

### Benefits:

- Live IOCs
- Can add more context during attack investigation



## CTI Analyst

- Gatekeeper for in and outgoing intel
- Enriches data with context
- Links between intel pieces
- Detailed feedback on intel and sources

### Benefits:

- Evaluates quality and relevance of intel and how to improve it
- Has trusted personal relationships necessary for sensitive data sharing

# TISP user contributions



## Power Users

- Original threat research
- External research reports
- Detailed analysis results for customer cases and queries
- Research derived from a number of sources and tools

### Benefits:

- Contribute large amounts of high quality content



## CISO/Managers

- Decision makers when sharing highly sensitive data, e.g. APT related.
- Set overall sharing policy and culture for sharing in organization

### Benefits:

- His/her buy-in critical for more than occasional analyst driven sharing to take place

# TISP user needs

## SOC Analyst

- Minimal indicator context
- Vetted intel, low false positive rates
- Automatic data enrichment to reduce repetitive work
- Good integration with SIEM tools



## Incident Responders

- Detailed IOCs, TTPs etc
- Detailed context and enrichment
- Tailored responses that support their workflow



## CTI Analyst

- One-stop TI management capability
- Unified relationship management
- Strategic threat intelligence
- Non-attribution for (most) data contributed to platform
- Development of mutually trusted peer-relationships to ensure access to important information



# TISP user needs

## Power Users


- API support for importing data streams into tools of their choice
- Ability to customize UI to support their particular workflows, e.g. showing far greater level of detail than to average analyst
- Automated, intelligent support for bulk upload of IOCs.



## CISO/Managers

- Overview of top threats and (changing) threat landscape relevant to their organization
- Successful investigations and metrics showing ROI for intel investments
- Metrics and evidence showing ROI of outward sharing
- Assurance that outward sharing does not create risks for company





# Motivation and gamification

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# General findings



**Threat information sharing, as a concept, is universally considered beneficial.** Analysts would like to actively participate so the platform needs to support this and remove barriers



**Opinion on gamification and badges was mixed.** Half of younger and earlier career respondents were positive to enthusiastic. The rest of the younger respondents had at least some reservations, while older and more advanced respondents were less interested in badges overall.

# Design Idea: Full User Profile

A Threat Information Sharing Platforms (TISP)

http://

Search New Case



## Phil Baker

British Private Telecom

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Communications Industry London (UK)  
Larger than 100.000 Joined September 2015  
2056 Profile Views  
500 Followers

345 Cases	4,987 Indicators	2 Incidents	8,237 Observables	12 Actors	120 CoA	8 TTP	12.6K Comments
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Certifications	Skills	Awards	Contact me
 	 Secure Networking  OSINT  IOC Hunter  YARA	 Forensics Mentor  Money Saver  Trusted Sharer	@philb philb@exploit.im

# TISP common badge types



**Skill based Badges**  
Recognize demonstrated skills



**Award Badges**  
Recognize community contributions



**Certification Badges**  
Recognize completion of trainings & exams



Malware Analyst



Secure Networking



OSINT



Hacktivism



Forensics Mentor



IOC Hunter



YARA



Trusted Sharer



Money Saver



MASTER




# Points, badges, leaderboards (PBL)

## Points

Level	Required Points
Beginner	50
Intermediate	100
Advanced	250
Master	800
<b>UBER</b>	<b>1500</b>

## Badges



## Leaderboards

- Recognize top contributors
- Personalized for peer comparison

# Badges – Findings

- Skill based badges most favored by younger/early career analysts
- Mission badges also appealed to advanced professionals
- Badges should measure quality, not just quantity.
- Being a good collaborator should be rewarded; one-upmanship is a concern
- Analysts less favorable about extending badges to everyday SOC work
- Some users liked badges linked to real world rewards
- SOC teams can pool badges for use in self-marketing/recruitment



# Mission Badges



# Gamification beyond PBL

Can leverage social incentives: introducing users, who made good contributions or gained certain badges.



Early career and advanced users interested in TISP helping them achieve social goals.

## Younger users

- like features such as commenting and up-voting of posts which makes for more lively interaction

## Advanced users

- expanding their professional network
- building more mutually trusted peer-relationships
- it provides better access to information

# Badges useful for evaluating credibility of contributions

Contributors can tag their anonymous messages to allow recipients to judge credibility without knowing the source.

Badges suitable for establishing credibility of information

- Most of the previous badges.
- Recognized team, role and length of service
- Company badges (size, vertical etc.)



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# Profile privacy

Disclosing full profile *within* organization OK, but not without

Contributor organization specifics should not be shared

Organization's vital statistics are OK

Opening full profile to selected collaborators is a valuable trust-building tool



# Sanitized User Profile

A Threat Information Sharing Platforms (TISP)

Search [ ] New Case [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

**Phil Baker**  
British Private Telecom  
London (UK)  
Joined September 2015  
2056 Profile Views  
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345 Cases | 4,987 Indicators | 2 Incidents | 8,237 Observables | 12 Actors | 120 CoA | 8 TTP | 12.6K Comments

**Certifications**  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

**Skills**  
Secure Networking | OSINT | IOC Hunter | YARA

**Awards**  
Forensics Mentor | Money Saver | Trusted Sharer

**Contact me**  
@philb  
philb@exploit.im

A Threat Information Sharing Platforms (TISP)

Search [ ] New Case [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

[Redacted Profile Picture]

[Redacted Name]

[Redacted Company]

[Redacted Location]

[Redacted Join Date]

[Redacted Profile Views]

[Redacted Followers]

[Redacted Statistics]

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
**Contact me**  
[Redacted]



# Removing obstacles

Sharing policies, processes and workflow

# Key findings



Processes and policies do not support sharing as well as they could!

Senior-level interviewees perceived lack of adequate sharing policies as THE major obstacle for effective sharing

## Perceived risks

- Inappropriate sharing may result in exposure for organization
- Less experienced analysts may not always fully understand what they are sharing
- Not everyone in IR/SOC has complete information about sensitive cases

# Information sharing policies


## Organizational sharing policies need to govern (partial list)

- Who can share?
- Provide practical criteria to distinguish between sharable and non-sharable information
- With whom data can be shared
- Under which conditions
- If/when approvals are required and by whom

Interviewees saw value for the community creating policy templates that organizations can adapt to their needs



# Approval workflows




Level 1 Analysts cannot share

Level 2, IR, and CTI are automatically trusted to share

Level 1 Analysts and IR submit request to share

Senior Analysts, Power users and Managers approve



# Conclusions


UX perspective provides novel insights




TISP users differ significantly



Profile/gamification approach shows promise




Integrating sharing into SOC/IR processes helpful to increase sharing



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# Next steps



Refine personas

Build and test new designs for specific personas (power users)

Explore cross-organizational aspects of badges/profiles

Share suitable sharing policy templates and guidance



**Hewlett Packard  
Enterprise**

**Thank you**

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[bhein@hpe.com](mailto:bhein@hpe.com)

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