BGP Ranking & IP-ASN History Making Something Useful Out of Old Massive Datasets



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Objectives of the presentation

- Why do we need tools like BGP Ranking and IPASN History
- How to effectively aggregate big datasets of malicious IPs
- Show the integration of IP ASN History and BGP Ranking
- Explain how to use the respective APIs
- Discuss the future developments

History

- Owners of IP prefixes evolve in time
- Investigations can happen late
- BGP views may vary depending on source
- RIPE has a very comprehensive interface, but doesn't scale for thousand IPs

- Many vendors propose lists of malicious IP addresses
- Malicious IP addresses evolve in time
- Many small providers are owned by malicious actors
- No simple way to track them over months/years

IP ASN History

- BGP Routing tables: IP Prefix \rightarrow AS number
- Currently supported sources: CAIDA and Ripe (RRC01)
- Future: CIRCL

- Load one BGP routing table per day per source
- Lookup services using patricia trees loaded in memory
- Automatic update daily
- Automatic cleanup of old datased (default: > 180 days)
- Accessible as a web service

Features

- Fast Lookup
- Find daily ownership for an IP
- Multiple IPs lookup at once
- Import your own BGP routing table
- Run the tool in-house

BGP Ranking

- Public lists containing IP addresses (Abuse.ch, Dshield, Bambenek Consulting, blocklist.de, ...)
- Shadowserver (fetches the list from the web interface, requires an account)
- Future: MISP instances, DNS lookup, other private sources(?)

- Hourly fetch of data sources, aggregation by day
- Prefix and ASN lookup against IP ASN History
- Computation every 8 hours (ASN and prefix in AS)

$$\frac{\sum (IP \ Address \times source \ weight)}{\sum IP \ announced \ by \ AS}$$
(1)
$$\frac{\sum (IP \ Address \times source \ weight)}{\sum IP \ in \ prefix}$$
(2)

- Follow the evolution of an AS over time
- Discover suspicious IPs in the neigourhood
- Ranking by country
- Run the tool in-house, on your own feeds

Current use-case: D4 Project

- CSIRTs (or private organisations) build their own honeypot, honeynet or blackhole monitoring network
- Designing, managing and operating such infrastructure is a tedious and resource intensive task
- Automatic sharing between monitoring networks from different organisations is missing
- Sensors and processing are often seen as blackbox or difficult to audit

Objective

- Based on our experience with MISP¹ where sharing played an important role, we transpose the model in D4 project
- Keeping the protocol and code base simple and minimal
- Allowing every organisation to control and audit their own sensor network
- Extending D4 or **encapsulating legacy monitoring protocols** must be as simple as possible
- Ensuring that the sensor server has **no control on the sensor** (unidirectional streaming)
- Don't force users to use dedicated sensors and allow **flexibility of sensor support** (software, hardware, virtual)

¹https://github.com/MISP/MISP 18 of 24

- Use data from D4 as a source
- Lookup DDoS data against BGP-Ranking
- Correlate DDoS datasets with other type of malicious activities



IP ASN History

- curl https://bgpranking-ng.circl.lu/ipasn_history/?ip=8.8.8.8
- With Python client: ipasn.py -ip 8.8.8.8

- curl -X POST -d '{"asn": "5577", "date": "2019-05-19"}' https://bgpranking-ng.circl.lu/json/asn
- With Python client: bgpranking -asn 5577



References

- https://bgpranking-ng.circl.lu/
- https://www.d4-project.org/
- https://github.com/D4-project/IPASN-History
- https://github.com/D4-project/BGP-Ranking/