#FirstCON24

Building up a PSIRT team for an open source project: Lessons learned from Zephyr

36TH ANNUAL FIRST CONFERENCE

9-14, 2024 JAPAN

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Who am I?

VP Dependable Embedded Systems The Linux Foundation

- Zephyr Project: $2016 \rightarrow$
- ELISA Project: 2018 \rightarrow

Volunteer:

#FirstCON24

- SPDX: 2009 \rightarrow
- NTIA SBOM Formats & Tooling co-lead $2018 \rightarrow 2021$
- DHS CISA SBOM Tooling & Implementation WG co-lead 2022 \rightarrow

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36TH Annual FIRST Conference 🏟 BRIDGING SECURITY RESPONSE GAPS

Agenda

- Zephyr overview
- Security best practices focus from the start
- Lessons learned after becoming a CNA
- Summary and Looking forward



Zephyr Project



- **Open source** real time operating system
- Vibrant Community participation
- Built with safety and security in mind
- Cross-architecture with broad SoC and development board support.
- Vendor Neutral governance
- Permissively licensed Apache 2.0
- Complete, fully integrated, highly configurable, modular for flexibility
- Product development ready using LTS includes security updates
- Certification ready with Auditable

Open Source, RTOS, Connected, Embedded Fits where Linux is too big



Products Running Zephyr Today







Proglove

Ruuvi Tag



PHYTEC Distancer



Keeb.io BDN9



Hati-ACE



Oticon More



Adhoc Smart Waste



GNARBOX 2.0 SSD



Framework laptop



Safety Pod



BLiXT solid state circuit breaker



Moto Watch 100



Lildog & Lilcat pet tracker



Rigado IoT Gateway



Livestock Tracker



Laird Connectivity sensors & gateways



BeST pump monitoring



Vestas Wind Turbines



zephyrproject.org/products-running-zephyr





700+ supported boards... and growing





Arduino Portenta H7



ESP32



Sipeed HiFive1



nRF9160 DK



STM32F746G Disco



M5StickC PLUS



TDK RoboKit 1



BBC micro:bit v2



Blue Wireless Swan



Arduino Nano 33 BLE



Intel UP Squared



Dragino LSN50 LoRA Sensor Node



Microchip SAM E54 Xplained Pro Evaluation Kit



Raspberry Pi Pico





docs.zephyrproject.org/latest/boards

NXP i.MX8MP EVK



Adafruit Feather M0 LoRa



u-blox EVK-NINA-B3

190+ Sensors Already Integrated



amg88xx









sm351lt ti_hdc ti hdc20xx tmp108 tmp116 v15310x

github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/tree/main/drivers/sensor

Architecture



High-level API (ex. Smart Objects)

Application



Supported Hardware Architectures







Cortex-M, Cortex-R & Cortex-A



x86 & x86_64



docs.zephyrproject.org/latest/hardware/index.html#hardware-support

Vibrant Ecosystem





Development Tools





Applications & Middlewares



Training & Consulting



Firmwares & Libraries

Linux Foundation Project Velocity





Source: <u>https://github.com/cncf/velocity</u>

Linux Foundation Project Velocity





Source: <u>https://github.com/cncf/velocity</u>

And as of 2024-06-12?





And as of 2024-06-12?





Code Repositories





Long Term Support (Zephyr 2.7.x)



- Product Focused
- Current with latest **Security Updates**
- Compatible with new hardware
 - Functional support for new hardware is regularly backported
- **Tested**: Shorten the development window and extend the Beta cycle to allow for more testing and bug fixing
- <u>Supported for 2+ years</u>

1 Doesn't include cutting-edge functionality



- Zephyr overview
- Security best practices focus from the start
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Security Focus From the Start



Exhibit B

Zephyr Project Charter (the "Charter") The Linux Foundation Updated August 21, 2023

1. Mission of the Zephyr Project ("Zephyr," or, alternatively, the "Project").

The mission of the Project is to:

- a. deliver the best-in-class RTOS for connected resource-constrained devices, built to be secure and safe.
- b. maintain an auditable code base, while taking advantage of community participation; this auditable code base is open source;
- c. include participation of leading members of this ecosystem, including microcontroller manufacturers, hardware developers, software developers and other members of the ecosystem; and
- d. host the infrastructure for the open source Project and sub-projects, establishing a neutral home for community meetings, events and collaborative discussions and providing structure around the business and technical governance of the Project.

Security Focus From the Start



Exhibit B

Zephyr Project Charter (the "Charter") The Linux Foundation

6. Security Committee

a. Composition - the Security Committee members shall consist of:

- i. one appointed voting representative from each Platinum Member, plus
- ii. non-voting Silver Member representatives who shall not count towards quorum.
- b. Responsibilities the Security Committee shall be responsible for:
 - i. the definition of the processes to ensure an auditable code base, as well as any associated certification artifacts ("Security Artifacts");
 - ii. annually elect a Representative on the Security Committee to serve as chair of the Security Committee; and
 - iii. annually elect a security architect (the "Security Architect"), who may be different from the chair of the Security Committee.

1. Mission of the Zephyr

The mission of the Project is

- a. deliver the best-i to be secure and
- b. maintain an aud participation; th
- c. include participat controller manuf members of the e
- d. host the infrastruc neutral home for providing structu

Starting Point: Adopt Known Best Practices





https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org

Best Practices Badge

Identified best practices for OSS projects

- For *production* of OSS
- Based on practices of well-run OSS projects
- Increase likelihood of better quality & security
- Criteria designed for any OSS project

Web application: OSS projects self-certify

- If OSS project meets criteria, it gets a badge
- No cost
- Self-certification mitigated by automation, public display of answers (for criticism), spot-checks, and can be overridden if false



⇒ moved under Open SSF in 2021



OpenSSF Best Practices Badge Program

Get Your Badge Now!

The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Best Practices badge is a way for Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) projects to show that they follow best practices. Projects can voluntarily self-certify, at no cost, by using this web application to explain how they follow each best practice. The OpenSSF Best Practices Badge is inspired by the many badges available to projects on GitHub. Consumers of the badge can quickly assess which FLOSS projects are following best practices and as a result are more likely to produce higher-quality secure software.

You can easily see the criteria for the passing badge. More information on the OpenSSF Best Practices Badging program is available on GitHub. Project statistics and criteria statistics are available. The projects page shows participating projects and supports queries (e.g., you can see projects that have a passing badge). You can also see an example (where we try to earn our own badge). This project was formerly known as the Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) Best Practices badge, and was originally developed under the CII. It is now part of the OpenSSF Best Practices Working Group (WG). The OpenSSF is a foundation of the Linux Foundation (LF). The project was formally renamed from "CII Best Practices badge" on 2021-12-24.



Some badge earners:



Criteria

Three badge levels (passing, silver, gold)

- Any level is an achievement
- For higher levels, must meet previous level
- Based on real projects
 - Not "people should do X, but no one does that"
- Gold requires multiple developers
 - bus factor > 1*, 2-person review

More info at: <u>https://github.com/coreinfrastructure/best-practices-badge</u>

* A "bus factor" is how many people would have to be hit by a bus before a project stalls (e.g., due to lack) knowledge)





cii best practices passing



Statistics about Criteria & Levels



Criteria Statistics

Level	Total active	MUST	SHOULD	SUGGESTED	Allow N/A	Met justification required	Require URL	Met justification or URL required	Includes details	New at this level	Future
Passing	67	43	10	14	27	1	8	9	52	67	0
Silver	55	44	10	1	41	38	17	54	39	48	0
Gold	23	21	2	0	9	13	9	22	16	14	0

The "active" criteria are criteria that are included in the percentage calculations (as opposed to "future" criteria). The next columns identify the number of active criteria in each level that are MUST, SHOULD, SUGGESTED, allow a "N/A" as an answer, require justification when "met" is the answer, require a URL, require justification when "met" is the answer or a URL, include details, or are new at this level. "Future" criteria are shown on the form, and are expected to be added as active criteria to some level in the future, but are not included in completion calculations.

You can see statistics about projects over time at the project stats page.

You may also see the actual criteria.

- There are not a lot of gold criteria, but they are challenging.
- Source: https://www.bestpractices.dev/en/criteria

Zephyr's Path - Initial Passing Badge

Zephyr Launched 2016/2

• Initial security team was composed of device security experts or either open source embedded experts from our members, but limited knowledge domain overlap and understanding of issues in either space.

CII badge program launched 2016/5

- Looked through the criteria and decided to aim for passing badge.
- 75% was straight forward to fill out and was done within first week.
- Security and Analysis sections served as a focus to start organizing knowledge from diverse participants in the security team.

Zephyr achieved "Passing" badge 2016/11

• Some criteria we met fairly easily, other criteria caused significant discussion, and took a while to create the documentation (which we needed to do!)







Project Security Documentation



• **<u>Project Security Overview</u>**

- Started with documents from other projects
- Built around Secure Development, Secure Design, and Security Certification
- Ongoing process, rather than something to just be accomplished



Docs / Latest » Security » Zephyr Security Overview Open on GitHub 🕱 Report an issue with this page

This is the documentation for the latest (main) development branch of Zephyr. If you are looking for the documentation of previous releases, use the dropdown menu on the left and select the desired version.

Zephyr Security Overview

Introduction

This document outlines the steps of the Zephyr Security Subcommittee towards a defined security process that helps developers build more secure software while addressing security compliance requirements. It presents the key ideas of the security process and outlines which documents need to be created. After the process is implemented and all supporting documents are created, this document is a top-level overview and entry point.

Overview and Scope

We begin with an overview of the Zephyr development process, which mainly focuses on security functionality.

In subsequent sections, the individual parts of the process are treated in detail. As depicted in Figure 1, these main steps are:

- Secure Development: Defines the system architecture and development process that ensures adherence to relevant coding principles and quality assurance procedures.
- Secure Design: Defines security procedures and implement measures to enforce them. A security architecture of the system and relevant sub-modules is created threats are identified, and countermeasures designed. Their

Zephyr's Path - Oops... Passing Regained

Zephyr stopped "Passing" 2017/2

- Zephyr project infrastructure underwent significant transition in 2017 (JIRA \rightarrow Issues, Gerrit \rightarrow github)
- Prior data was inaccurate, and we had forgotten to update it.
- Badge app notified us we were not longer "passing"

Zephyr regains passing 2017/8

- After all transitions done, updated documentation to reflect the infrastructure and we were passing again.
- Decided to try for Silver but there were some big lifts for the project: key roles and responsibilities documented, longer roadmap than we'd been keeping, TLS certificate verification

cii best practices in progress 85%

cii best practices passing



Zephyr's Path - Become a CNA?



A CNA allows Zephyr Project to manage vulnerabilities, assign them CVE IDs, and handle the disclosure of information pertaining to those vulnerabilities.

- Zephyr Project CNA determines the validity of issues/vulnerabilities,
- whether or not they will be publicly disclosed,
- the amount of information that will be disclosed,
- the timing for that disclosure.

Changes made by the Zephyr Project to become a CNA:

- Zephyr Project security **documentation was be reviewed and modified** to handle the new requirements levied by the CNA process.
- New email lists were created to be used as points of contact for external entities (provided to MITRE to be used for contact and also will be added to Zephyr Project websites.
 - <u>vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org</u> (used as primary contact for external entities)
 - <u>zephyr-psirt-request@lists.zephyrproject.org</u> (internal project list for CNA communications)

Zephyr's Path - Become a CNA? Yes!



Four things required* for getting a CNA in place:

1. Definition of scope:

All Zephyr project components and vulnerabilities discovered by Zephyr project participants that are not covered by another CNA.

2. Public point of contact:

<u>vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org</u> was listed on websites (both Zephyr project and MITRE).

- 3. Direct point of contact for backdoor communications from MITRE: <u>zephyr-psirt-request@lists.zephyrproject.org</u>
- 4. A list of email addresses that will be added to the MITRE announcement: <u>zephyr-psirt-request@lists.zephyrproject.org</u>

Sent email with above in August 2017, and MITRE announced Zephyr as CNA

*per phone discussion with MITRE, July 2017

Zephyr Listed as CNA in NVD in 2017



Product, Vendor, or Product Category Name	Scope	CNA Contact Email and/or Webpage (if applicable)	CNA Type*
MITRE Corporation	All vulnerabilities not already covered by a CNA listed on this page	MITRE CVE Request web form	Primary CNA

Zephyr Project	Zephyr project components and vulnerabilities that are not covered by another CNA	vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org	Vendors and Projects
Zero Day Initiative	Products and projects covered by its bug bounty programs not already covered by another CNA	zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com ZDI contact page	Bug Bounty Programs
ZTE Corporation	ZTE products only	psirt@zte.com.cn	Vendors and Projects

* Key for CNA Types:

Bug Bounty Programs - assigns CVE IDs to products and projects that utilize the Bug Bounty service's product offerings. **National and Industry CERTs** - performs incident response and vulnerability disclosure services for nations or industries. They may assign CVE IDs as part of their role and scope.

Primary CNA - oversees the CNA program.

Root CNA - manages a group of sub-CNAs within a given domain or community.

Vendors and Projects - assigns CVE IDs for vulnerabilities found in their own products and projects.

Vulnerability Researchers - assigns CVE IDs to products and projects upon which they perform vulnerability analysis.

* https://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html#cna_participants

Zephyr CNA Entry Today



	Zephyr	· Project				
		-	ill opon o now window or tob dor	onding on the wel	b browner used	
			ill open a new window or tab dep ity or Request a CVE	-	o browser used.	
[Step 1: Read disclosu	re policy	Step 2: Contact		
		View Policy			Email	
	Scope	Zephyr project	components, and vulnerabil	s, and vulnerabilities that are not in another CNA's scope		
	Program Ro	le CNA				
	Top-Level R	oot MITRE Corpo	ration			
	Security Advisories	View Advisori	ies			
	Organization Type	n Vendor Open Source				
	Country*	USA				

Source: https://www.cve.org/PartnerInformation/ListofPartners/partner/zephyr

Zephyr PSIRT Today



Project Security Incident Response Team

- Led by Zephyr Security Architect (elected annually from peers)
- Volunteers from Security Committee (Zephyr Project Members) do initial triage
- Manage embargo windows and interaction with maintainers for fixes into upstream and then backports to LTS
- Responsible for satisfying evolving CVE Program & CNA Process Requirements.



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Zephyr's Badge Path Continues...

Zephyr almost at "Silver" 2018/4

- Zephyr addressed all issues except "TLS certificate verification", we had a TLS library, but Zephyr is an OS, not an App.
- Threat model and justification documents that security requirements are met had to be created, again issue not an App.

Zephyr gets Silver 2018/9

• After implementing a separate application as a sample for TLS issue

cii best practices passing





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Zephyr's Gold Badge - Feb 2019!





First Bulk Security Report (2019)



- <u>NCC Group reported</u> ~26 issues
- Critical, High and Medium made into JIRA tickets (we used JIRA before transitioning private github we use today)
- All were addressed
- After embargo, everything updated in the <u>vulnerability report</u> page
- Most resulted in 1 or more CVEs being reported


Results from the NCC Report



- Most issues were fixed in reasonable time and included in releases
- One issue, recommendation is to disable
- Increased embargo from 60 to 90 days
 - Zephyr isn't an end product, vendors need time to incorporate fixes into products
 - Zephyr needs alert system to notify vendors
- Continue to improve processes



Improving Processes...

- Highlighted need to better document process
- Added <u>vulnerability reporting</u> to project docs
- Added <u>security section</u> to main project page
- Process:
 - Embargo period extended
 - Stages issue goes through
 - Working with maintainers to see issues fixed
 - Public disclosure at end

< Zaby	৭ ≡
Security	
Security Communications	(+)
Report a Vulnerability	(+)
When Should I Report a Vulnerability?	(+)
When Should I NOT Report a Vulnerability?	(+)
Security Vulnerability Response	(+)
Public Disclosure Timing	(+)
Embargo Policy	(+)
Product Creator Notifications	(+)



Better Support for Product Makers



- For an embargo to work, product makers need to be notified early so they can remediate.
- Created <u>Vulnerability Registry</u> for **vendors to register** to receive these alerts for **free**
- Goal: Zephyr to fix issues within 30 days to give vendors 60 days before publication of vulnerability

Product Creators Vulnerability Alert Registry

If you believe your organization meets the criteria to be eligible to receive vulnerability alerts please fill out the form below.

Criteria for Participation

- Have a contact who will respond to emails within a week and understands how Zephyr is being used in the product.
- Have a publicly listed product based on some release of Zephyr.
- Have an actively monitored security email alias.
- Accept the Zephyr Embargo Policy that is outlined below.

Removal: If a member stops adhering to these criteria after joining the list then the member will be unsubscribed.

More information on Zephyr's Security and Disclosure practices can be found at Security.

Source: <u>https://www.zephyrproject.org/vulnerability-registry/</u>

What we had to do before VEX...





Advisory Issued by project on 20201208:

Zephyr current release (2.4) does **not use** Fnet or other stacks.

The Zephyr LTS release 1.14 contains an implementation of the TCP stack from Fnet.

- Of the vulnerabilities reported in Fnet, 2, CVE-2020-17468, and CVE-2020-17469, are in the IPv6 Fnet code, one, CVE-2020-17467, affects Link-local Multicast Name Resolution LLMNR), and 2, CVE-2020-24383, and CVE-2020-17470 affect DNS functionality.
- None of the affected code has been used in the Zephyr project, while 1.14 does use the Fnet TCP, it does not use the affected IPv6, DNS or LLMNR code.

https://www.zephyrproject.org/zephyr-security-update-on-amnesia33/

SBOM generation added in 2021





Learn more at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYC3YpSu9zs

Automating SBOM Generation During Build!

- 1. Create a build directory with CMake file API enabled
- 2. Build project with "build metadata" enabled
- 3. Compute SBOM(s)

```
west spdx --init -d BUILD_DIR
west build -d BUILD_DIR -- -DCONFIG_BUILD_OUTPUT_META=y
west spdx -d BUILD_DIR
```

\Rightarrow

zephyr.spdx	SBOM for the Zephyr source files actually used by your application
app.spdx	SBOM for the source files of your application
build.spdx	SBOM for all the build objects , inc. of course your final image

SBOM's at Scale...Automatically



708 boards

13 apps

All BUILT, PASSED, GENERATED have **3 SBOM**s available to download & inspect

→ C 25 zephyr-dashb	oard.renode.io				☆ 🖸 📲	G Finish up
Bookmarks 🔇 MARC: Mailing list	📀 cheat sheets 🛛 🕅 Groundswell Buil 🔲 Marketing C	ollater 📓 Linux.com - Blog	🗅 Recipes 🛛 🚏 LAVA	🛛 Scheduler 🛛 M o		» 🗋 All Bo
RENODE	Q Search	11 PASSED	7 PASSED	8 PASSED	11 PASSED	6 PASSED
ZEPHYR DASHBOARD	BOARD NAME	HELLO WORLD	PHILOSOPHERS	SHELL MODULE	TENSORFLOW LITE MICRO	MICROPYTHON
ARCHITECTURE	ARC (20) ^					
A R M 3 2 A R M 6 4	ARM32 (529) 🔨					
MIPS NIOS2	ARM64 (26) ^					
RISCV32 RISCV64	NIOS2 (2)					
SPARC X86	RISCV32 (35) 🗸					
X86-64 XTENSA	Andes ADP-XC7K AE350	PASSED	GENERATED	PASSED		PASSED
JILD DETAILS	ESP32-C3	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUI Download	SBOM BUILT
E017006BE4	ESP32C3 LuatOS Core	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT
RE 9D46C2F8BE	ESP32C3 LuatOS Core USB	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT
D YOU WANT YOUR BOARD JPPORTED IN RENODE?	GigaDevice GD32VF103C-STARTER	GENERATED	GENERATED	GENERATED	GENERATED	NOT BUILT
CONTACT US FOR RENODE SUPPORT SERVICES	GigaDevice GD32VF103V-EVAL	GENERATED	GENERATED	GENERATED	GENERATED	GENERATED
	ICE-V Wireless	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT	BUILT

Source: <u>https://zephyr-dashboard.renode.io/</u>

Dashboard SBOM

\$PDXVersion: SPDX-2.3
DataLicense: CC0-1.0
SPDXID: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT
DocumentName: app-sources
DocumentName: co: http://soc

blinky-app.spdx

OccumentNamespace: http://spdx.org/spdxdocs/zephyr-ab992a5d-47b4-44ee-8357-1b68719b389b/app Creator: Tool: Zephyr SPDX builder Creatod: 2042-d6-07T011:2:51Z

Relationship: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT DESCRIBES SPDXRef-app-sources

Package: app-sources

PackageVame: app-sources SPXDID: SPXNEr-app-sources PackageDownLoadLocation: NQASSERIION PackageLicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0 PackageLicenseDeclared: NQASSERIION PrimaryPackagePurpose: SOURCE PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: Apache-2.0 FileSAnalyzed: true PackageLicenseInfoFromFiles: Apache-2.0

FileName: ,/src/main.c SPOXID: SPOXRef-File-main.c FileChecksum: SHA1: d71a9d7b80f5eac4b749b84c57297614ef8e3899 FileChecksum: SHA256: cdc42b14891c38dfc131eb3dea80986698289496a18c7e76e9945f2e3dd17152 LicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0 LicensElnfoInFile: Apache-2.0

 DB/DEVErsion:
 SPDX-2-3

 DataLicense:
 CC0-1.0

 SPXDID:
 SPXXE1-90CUMENT

 DocumentName:
 zephyr-sources

 DocumentNamespace:
 http://spdx.org/spdxdocs/zephyr-ab992a5d-47b4-44ee-8357-1b68719b389b/zephyr

 Creater:
 Tool:

 Zephyr
 SPDX builder

 Creater:
 Tool:

 Zephyr
 SPDX

Relationship: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT DESCRIBES SPDXRef-zephyr-sources

Package: zephyr-sources

Packagekame: zephyr-sources SPXDID: SPXDKef-zephyr-sources PackagelownloadLocation: NQASSERTION PackagelicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0 PackagelicenseDeclared: NQASSERTION PackageLicenseInformFiles: Apache-2.0 FilesAnalyzed: true PackageVerificationCode: f10da9dec03dd29bb556c72963bf33ae9f840643

FileName: ./zephyr/arch/arm/core/cortex_m/__aeabi_read_tp.S SPMID: SPOKRF-File-__aeabi_read-tp.S FileChecksum: SHA1: 62d0921844d538be8c28eae5bc4c0b9f87692bd3 FileChecksum: SHA2: 62d092184d538be8c28eae5bc4c0b9f87692bd3 LicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0 LicenseInfoInFile: Apache-2.0 FileCopyrightText: MyASERION

blinky-build.spdx

SPDXVersion: SPDX-2.3
DataLicense: CC0-1.0
SPDXID: SPDXRef-DoCUMENT
DocumentName: build
DocumentNamespace: http://spdx.org/spdxdocs/zephyr-ab992a5d-47b4-44ee-8357-1b68719b389b/build
Creator: Tool: Zephyr SPDX builder
Created: 2024-06-07T01:12:51Z

-ExternalDocumentRef: DocumentRef-app http://spdx.org/spdxdocs/zephyrab992a5d-47b4-44ee-8357-1b68719b389b/app SHA1: 594de9d45188c55bdb059a2b0045987bb87e79be /ExternalDocumentRef: DocumentRef-zephyr http://spdx.org/spdxdocs/zephyrab992a5d-47b4-44ee-8357-1b68719b389b/zephyr SHA1: 4ae97af97a0e9fbc050f72ea71ad3bf2f9caffa7

Relationship: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT DESCRIBES SPDXRef-zephyr-final

...

FileAme: ./zephyr/arch/arch/arm/core/cortex_m/libarch_arm_core_cortex_m.a SPDXID: SPDXRef_File_libarch_arm-core_cortex_m.a FileChecksum: SHA1: 310c7abd765821c8e8df8ceblac8bae330f371b1 FileChecksum: SHA256: <u>Scf@a524dd3a48e7cf0d637966a4f6fffa60119f4ab2b2b2f3ec4d924f5ea2a</u> LicenseConcluded: <u>NOA55ERTION</u> LicenseInf0InFile: <u>NOA55ERTION</u>

Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_exc_exit.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_fault.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_fault.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_fault.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_sch.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_sch.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_sch.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file_sch.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=sch.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=sch.cs.c Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=sch.cs.cs Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=sch.cs.cs Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=sch.cs.cs Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef_zepbyr:SPDXRef_file=core.cs.cs Relationship: SPDXRef_file_libarch-arm-core-cortex-m.a GENERATED_FROM D

Zephyr®

...

FileName: ./zephyr/zephyr.elf
SPDXID: SPDXRef-File-zephyr.elf
FileChecksum: SHA1: 2e80741d3c373bd7626bc49625783ea8fd1bcacb
FileChecksum: SHA256: 7a838128652e85835f9167be429d41559701533fbd0d09b6bab9176a289fdc5e
LicenseConcluded: NOASSERTION
LicenseInfoInFile: NONE
FileCovrightText: NOASSERTION

Relationship: SPDXRef-File-zephyr.elf GENERATED_FROM DocumentRef-zephyr:SPDXRef-File-empty-file.c Relationship: SPDXRef-File-zephyr.elf GENERATED_FROM SPDXRef-File-libapp.a Relationship: SPDXRef-File-zephyr.elf STATIC_LINK SPDXRef-File-libapp.a Relationship: SPDXRef-File-zephyr.elf STATIC_LINK SPDXRef-File-libapp.a

Vulnerability Infrastructure → Github 2021



Why Transition?

Private repos became available. Better integration with rest of code. No additional ids to manage. Improved analysis capabilities

Total of CVEs published : 68 (since we started using github)



CWE Breakdown





Scoring & Code Area Breakdown





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Security Working Group added March 2022



Security Committee

- **Restricted** to one representative from each platinum member, an architect (Flavio Ceolin), and a chair (David Brown)
- Meeting: Every 2 weeks
- Topics:
 - Vulnerabilities
 - PSIRT processes
 - Financial/contracts
 - Other sensitive information

Security Working Group

- **Open** to any participant
- Meeting: Every 2 weeks
- Topics:
 - Security Standards
 - ETSI EN 303-645
 - FIPS 140-3
 - SP 800-128
 - Annex K (C11 standard)
 - Evolving Security Processes
 - Code Analysis Tools
 - Documentation

Work on ETSI EN 303-645 in 2023





Docs / Latest » Security » Security standards and Zephyr » ETSI 303-645

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This is the documentation for the latest (main) development branch of Zephyr. If you are looking for the documentation of previous releases, use the drop-down menu on the left and select the desired version.

ETSI 303-645

ETSI EN 303 645, also known as "Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements," is a standard developed by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

The standard includes provisions for secure software updates, data protection, secure communication, and the minimization of exposed attack surfaces, among other things. It is part of a broader effort to address the challenges and risks associated with IoT devices.

Full version of the standard can be found here &.

Source: https://docs.zephyrproject.org/latest/security/standards/etsi-303645.html

Work on ETSI EN 303-645 in 2023



Hardening Tool

Kconfig

Security Overview

Memory protection

auidelines

Overview

Security Overview and Coding

Functionality provided by MCUboot

<https://github.com/zephyrproject-

rtos/mcuboot>. Also see Security

Kconfig and Hardening Tool

Kconfig and Hardening Tool

page

Zephyr	Docs / Latest » Security » Security standards and Zephyr » ETSI 303-645 Open on GitHub 🟦 Report an issue with this p					
3.6.99	This is the documentation for	Provision 5.6-3	Device hardware should not unnecessarily expose physical interfaces to attack.	R	Y	ł
Search docs (powered by Google)	documentation of previous re	Provision 5.6-4	Where a debug interface is physically accessible, it shall be disabled in software.	МС	Y	H
Project and Governance Security Zephyr Security Overview	ETSI 303-645 ETSI EN 303 645, also known a standard developed by the Euro The standard includes provision minimization of exposed attack challenges and risks associated Full version of the standard can	Provision 5.6-5	The manufacturer should only enable software services that are used or required for the intended use or operation of the device.	R	Y	ŀ
Security Vulnerability Reporting Secure Coding Sensor Device Threat Model Hardening Tool Vulnerabilities Security standards and Zephyr ETSI 303-645		Provision 5.6-6	Code should be minimized to the functionality necessary for the service/device to operate.	R	Y	ł
			Software should run with least necessary privileges, taking account of both security and functionality.	R	Y	S
		Provision 5.6-8	The device should include a hardware-level access control mechanism for memory.	R	Y	N
		Provision 5.6-9	The manufacturer should follow secure development processes for software deployed on the device.	R	Y	0,0

Provision 5.7-1

Source: https://docs.zephyrproject.org/latest/security/standards/etsi-303645.html#provisions-assessment

R

Y

The consumer IoT device

should verify its software

using secure boot

mechanisms.

2024 Security Audit with NCC Group



Why External Audit?

- Identifying Vulnerabilities
- Independent Assessment
- Best Practices
- Community Trust
- Reputation

Scope Definition

- Security Objectives
- Components
 - Narrow to something doable and that benefits most users
- Depth of Analysis
- Threat Model

Results from NCCGroup

- Target Zephyr 3.6 / 3.7
 02/2024 ~ 03/2024
- Three issues found
 - Two low severity caused by integer overflow and TOCTOU
 - One informational caused by integer overflow

Lessons Learned from the Audit



Defining the scope is hard

- Resource Constraints
- Depth and Breadth
- Future-Proofing
- Stakeholder Agreement

Threat model is useful

- Guiding the Audit Process
- Validating Security Controls
- Facilitating Communication

Comprehensive testing importance

• The audit make it clear the importance of comprehensive testing

Outcomes:

- Enhanced Security
 - The identification and subsequent remediation of even low-severity issues contribute to a more secure system
- Increased Confidence
 - Third-party auditor validated the security and quality of the code base increasing confidence among developers, stakeholders, and users
- Recommendations aligned with Zephyr plans
 - Guided Fuzzing of Libraries and Subsystems

More Details Available...





Details at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEG-Owv9TEs&list=PLzRQULb6-ipHnRUuy2UJpqZjTM9FPWtWx&index=22

Agenda

- Zephyr overview
- Security best practices focus from the start
- Lessons learned after becoming a CNA
- Summary and looking forward



Best Practice Adoption Over Time



- Established Security Committee at project launch in 2016 meets bi-weekly.
- Secure Coding Practices were publicly <u>documented</u> for project.
- Zephyr Project <u>registered as a CVE Numbering Authority</u> with MITRE since 2017.
- <u>"Gold" Best Practices Badge</u> criteria Core Infrastructure Initiative met in 2018
- Vulnerability Management Process in 2020
 - Vulnerability response criteria publicly documented
 - Product makers can register for free for embargo notifications Zephyr
- SBOM generation in 2021
 - Source SBOM's for releases and updates going forward from version 2.5
 - Ability to automatically generate SBOM for built images included in version 2.6
- Infrastructure transition to github in 2021, improved automation & interaction with CVE
- Security working group formation in 2022 to improve transparency with community
- Work on self attestation for ETSI 303-645 started in 2023
- Project funded Audit by NCC group in 2024

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Security Best Practices Evolve...



- PSIRT processes need to be updated to align with evolving CVE & NVD infrastructure
 - New API is helping with pulling the data, moving over to new infrastructure.
 - Improving consistency via scripting.
 - Open question on determining to what extent to should we assign for low issues, even if not critical to enforce static analysis.
 - Effective monitoring of vulnerabilities in modules is under investigation, as well as module interdependencies.
- Leveraging Automation to prevent security regressions:
 - Weekly Coverity Scans to detect bad practices in imported code have been in common use
 - MISRA scans being incorporated, to evolve to conformance and address issues. Challenge is staging the adoption of rules being enforced, so this can become part of commit testing.
- On Ramping others to help with security issues
 - Maintainers in problematic areas are responsive and effective at this point
 - Volunteers have different level of involvement and background Secure practices training?
 - Definition of bite size tasks is proving problematic

Interested in Learning More?









lists.zephyrproject.org
(https://lists.zephyrproject.org/g/security-wg)



chat.zephyrproject.org



Thank you どうもありがとうございます Danke 매우 감사합니다 Gracias Σας ευχαριστώ Grazie Merci Beaucoup आपका बहुत-बहुत धन्यवाद

Contact: kstewart@linuxfoundation.org





When the Zephyr project(https://zephyrproject.org/) launched in 2016, one of the goals was to apply known security best practices to make the S in IoT actually mean something.

This talk will go through the journey of the last 8 years of applying known best security practices to an open source project, including becoming a CVE Numbering Authority, and forming a PSIRT team from volunteers from different companies. Along the way we had to adjust embargo policies due to a bulk vulnerability report, in addition to the occasional vulnerability reported from the community.



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