

# The Role of Non-State Stakeholders in the Implementation of Norms

Non-State Actors, the UN Framework  
and Critical Infrastructure

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# Geneva Dialogue

ON RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOUR IN CYBERSPACE

The Geneva Dialogue endeavours to:

**Facilitate an inclusive global dialogue on the roles and responsibilities in cyberspace**

PRIVATE SECTOR AND  
INDUSTRY

ACADEMIA

4

STAKEHOLDER  
GROUPS

CIVIL SOCIETY

TECHNICAL COMMUNITY

(including open-source community, cybersecurity  
researchers and incident response experts)

## FACILITATING AN INCLUSIVE GLOBAL DIALOGUE TO MAP ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITY OF NON-STATE STAKEHOLDERS IN CYBERSPACE AND IMPLEMENT AGREED CYBER NORMS

69

CONTRIBUTORS  
IN 2023-2024

to the Geneva Dialogue representing both  
organisations and individual experts from

21 COUNTRIES

and

ALL REGIONS

2

CHAPTERS OF

the Geneva Manual on Responsible Behaviour  
in Cyberspace focused on

5 AGREED UN GGE

CYBER NORMS:

● supply chain security  
(Norm I)


● responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities  
(Norm J)

● protection of critical infrastructure  
(Norms F, G, and H)




Inauguration

First discussions to explore responsibilities of States and other actors in cyberspace.



Geneva Manual: Chapter I

Focus on the two norms on **ICT supply chain security and vulnerabilities.**



2025


2023

2020

2018

Output report


Focus on **industry responsibilities** to reduce vulnerabilities and build secure products.



Geneva Manual: Chapter II

Implementation of the norms and CBMs to **protect critical infrastructure.**

# **Who is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure?**




# UN Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace




A

INTERSTATE  
CO-OPERATION  
ON SECURITY




B

CONSIDER ALL  
RELEVANT  
INFORMATION




C

PREVENT MISUSE  
OF ICTS IN YOUR  
TERRITORY




D

COOPERATE TO  
STOP CRIME AND  
TERRORISM




E

RESPECT  
HUMAN RIGHTS  
AND PRIVACY




F

DO NOT DAMAGE  
CRITICAL  
INFRASTRUCTURE




G

PROTECT  
CRITICAL  
INFRASTRUCTURE




H

RESPOND TO  
REQUESTS FOR  
ASSISTANCE




I

ENSURE SUPPLY  
CHAIN  
SECURITY




J

REPORT ICT  
VULNERABILITIES




K

DO NO HARM  
TO RESPONSE  
TEAMS




Voluntary norms


NATIONAL POINTS  
OF CONTACT




EXCHANGING  
NATIONAL VIEWS




SHARING INFORMATION  
ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS




COOPERATIVE  
EXERCISE OF CBMs




CAPACITY BUILDING  
IN ICT SECURITY




REGULAR SEMINARS,  
WORKSHOPS AND  
TRAINING PROGRAMMES  
ON ICT SECURITY



EXCHANGING INFORMATION  
ON THE PROTECTION  
OF CI AND CII



PUBLIC-PRIVATE  
PARTNERSHIPS  
ON ICT SECURITY



Confidence-building measures

A

INTERSTATE  
CO-OPERATION  
ON SECURITY

B

CONSIDER ALL  
RELEVANT  
INFORMATION

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PREVENT MISUSE  
OF ICTS IN YOUR  
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PUBLIC-PRIVATE  
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ON ICT SECURITY

Voluntary norms

Confidence-building measures



**How do cyber norms guide actors in  
protecting CI?**

**How are non-state stakeholders expected  
to implement the norms?**

**How do non-state stakeholders  
understand the implementation of the  
cyber norms and CBMs to protect critical  
infrastructure?**



**Responsibilities**

**Incentives**

**Challenges**

**Good practices**



CI operators/owners



Open-source software (OSS)  
community




Product vendors and service providers




Cybersecurity researchers,  
Incident response experts



Civil society



# Key messages





## #1

More international action is needed to understand and protect cross-border interdependencies in certain critical infrastructure sectors that have regional and global impact.

## #2

Secrecy in defining CI for national security reasons limits the awareness of stakeholders to support states' efforts in CIP.

## #3

The absence of common minimum cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure limits progress toward cyber resilience.

## #4

Challenges in managing vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) leave critical infrastructure exposed to hidden cybersecurity risks.

## #5

Cybersecurity experts and technical teams increasingly struggle to stay politically neutral, creating risks for protecting critical infrastructure and securing ICT across borders.

## #6


UN GGE norm F mainly focuses on intentional damage and may not fully cover other risks to critical infrastructure security.

## #7

Rising inter-state conflicts highlight the need for governments to give clear legal guidance to private actors involved in protecting critical infrastructure.

## Key message #1

More international action is needed to understand and protect cross-border interdependencies in certain critical infrastructure sectors that have regional and global impact.





## Key message #7

The increase in inter-state conflicts underscores the need for states to provide clear legal guidance to private entities, helping to protect them and support their efforts in CIP.

[Armed Conflict](#) [Cybersecurity & Tech](#) [Foreign Relations & International Law](#)


### The Business of Battle: The Role of Private Tech in Conflict

Jonathan Horowitz | Tuesday, September 17, 2024, 1:00 PM

Share On:      

Tech companies involved in armed conflict need to engage in dialogue with governments to understand the risks of wartime support.

**Contribute!**  
**<https://genevadialogue.ch/>**





# Thank you!

