CIP A Business View Rolf Schulz CEO		Global Network Security GmbH	-	
Rolf Schulz			-	
	GU7 🕞			
			-	

Definition

✓ critical infrastructure:

>1. Elements of a system that are so vital that disabling any of them would incapacitate the

- disabling any of them would incapacitate the entire system.

 >2. [In security.] those physical and cyber-
- ▶2. [In security.] those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. [INFOSEC-99]

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
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The Battlefield

Slide No.:

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Base infrastructure

- ✓ Vulnerabilities ➤ Only major incidents, like
 - Dam failure
 - environmental causes
 engineering causes
 Natural disaster
 - Sabotage
 - Terrorism large scale attacks
 - ABC attacks
 - War

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Electrical Power Infrastructure

√ Vulnerabilities

- > Natural disaster
- same as to base infrastructure
- ➤ Sabotage
- > Engineering causes
- ➤ Construction Work
- > External, IT based attacks against control software (even via Internet)
 - COTS commercial off the shelf software
- > Terrorism medium to small scaled attacks
- > WAR

Slide No.: 6

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Network Infrastructure ✓ Vulnerabilities ➤ Natural disaster • same as to base infrastructure ➤ Construction Work !!!! • 50% of Frankfurt City Net down due to a digger ➤ Sabotage • 1999, the glass fiber cables of Lufthansa were cut by a unknown person. ➤ Terrorism - medium to small scaled attacks ➤ War Global Network Security GmbH Generell Infrastructure Risk ✓ Who is the real owner of the infrastructure ➤ More and more Infrastructure is sold to foreign companies • Glass fiber • Power lines • Telecommunication lines • Water ✓ Reason: Savings
> Natural disaster
> Natural disaster
■ same as to base infrastructure Construction Work !!!! ■ 50% of Frankfurt City Net down due to a digger Sabotage ■ 1999, the glass fiber cables of Lufthansa were cut by a unknown person. Terrorism - medium to small scaled attacks War Global Network Security GmbH Generell Infrastructure Risk ✓ Who is the real owner of the infrastructure More and more Infrastructure is sold to foreign companies ■ Glass fiber ■ Power lines ■ Telecommunication lines ■ Water
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✓ Who is the real owner of the infrastructure ➤ More and more Infrastructure is sold to foreign companies • Glass fiber • Power lines • Telecommunication lines • Water
 More and more Infrastructure is sold to foreign companies Glass fiber Power lines Telecommunication lines Water
 More and more Infrastructure is sold to foreign companies Glass fiber Power lines Telecommunication lines Water
companies • Glass fiber • Power lines • Telecommunication lines • Water
 Power lines Telecommunication lines Water
Water
> Lease-Back
✓ No control on Hard- and Software
✓ And in an emergency case ???
➤ National impact ???
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Some Cotto Smart.
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Transport Service Infrastructure
() (-1
✓Vulnerabilities
≻IT Layer 2-4 attacks
➤IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc
➤IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ➤ Maintenance & Administration
 ►IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ➤ Maintenance & Administration ■ Broadcast Storm renders corporate network
➤IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ➤ Maintenance & Administration ■ Broadcast Storm renders corporate network useless during main business hours
 ►IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ➤ Maintenance & Administration ■ Broadcast Storm renders corporate network
 ▶IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ▶ Maintenance & Administration ■ Broadcast Storm renders corporate network useless during main business hours • wrong Port configuration on a switch ▶ Hardware Failure
➤IT Layer 2-4 attacks ■ DoS, ARP-Spoofing, etc ➤ Maintenance & Administration ■ Broadcast Storm renders corporate network useless during main business hours ■ wrong Port configuration on a switch

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Slide No.: 9

Service Layer

✓ Vulnerabilities

➤IT Layer 5-7 attacks

- E.g. manipulation of data , attacks of e-commerce systems etc.
- (Global) DNS attacks
- Backdoors
 - · hostile programmers
 - "official" backdoors

➤ Manipulation of Services

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
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And the Enemy?

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	Global Network Security GmbH The Hacker
	-
✓ Had	kers World
	rdinary hacker
	 very active, sometimes annoying, sometimes helpful
	acker by chance
	 more than annoying, often dangerous – he does not know, what he's doing
	olitically motivated hacker
	a worldwide problem – not to be ignored
	rofessional hacker
	works accurately, mostly invisibly, a mercenary
	rganized crime hacker
	 very dangerous, with company, high skilled
Slide No.: 13	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /
GIGG 190 13	/ Roll Schulz / CEO / GNS GMDH /
	Global Network Security GmbH
	Internal Risks
	<u>I</u>
√ The	e employee
	A trusted person
	ives from 8 to 5 – no private background visible
	Anonym to his superior
	Mostly) no background checks possible
	Often popular to his comrades
	Knows the company
	Knows the company
	Knows the assets Knows all vulnerabilities
71	tiows all vulliciabilities
√ Th	norfoot Dick @
* IU6	e perfect Risk ☺
or: :	
Slide No.: 14	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /
	Global Network Security GmbH
	Cybercrime
/Def	inition
✓ Def	
≻Ğ	yber Crime refers to all the activities done with
C 1.	riminal intent in cyberspace or using the medium of sternet. These could be either the criminal activities in
	nternet. These could be either the criminal activities in the conventional sense or activities, newly evolved
W	rith the growth of the new medium.
≻C	ften combines "traditional" crime
W	ith IT related crime (blended attack)
≻ N	lostly controlled by the organized crime
✓ Mot	ivation
	nrichment
	errorism
	evenge
<i>F</i> IV	
Slide No.: 15	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /

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	C4I		
, -			
	means Command & Control. Communications.		
(Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence – or Information Warfare Military playground for IT related attacks		
	argets:		
	 infrastructure of a nation, society, community military infrastructure 		
> (One goal is to destroy the critical infrastructure like energy, transport, ommunication, financial business, etc. by the use of IT related		
á	ttacks.		
> E	ixamples are viruses, worms or DoS/IDDoS attacks nother goal is to manipulate or destroy military structures ke Command & Control or Communications		
É	longside the use of IT related attacks also weapons like MPs or High Power Microwave (HPM) Systems vill be part of the attack scenario		
•			
Slide No.: 16	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /		
	Global Network Security GmbH	1	
	Global Network Security GMDH		
I	ntallinana o		
	ntelligence?		
•			
Slide No.: 17	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /	Į.	
	Global Network Security GmbH		
	Who's the enemy ??		
√Kr	low your enemy		
	Who is your enemy?		
	What are the attackers' goals ?		
	How is his skill?		
	What are his weapons?		
	What is his motivation?		
	How is his internal communication organized?		
>	What does he knows about you ????		
Slide No.: 18	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /		

		_	
	Global Network Security GmbH Some definition's		
✓ Inte	lligence		
≻Pı	rovision of information about the enemy and his possibilities		
	ttlefield" Intelligence		
	rovision of information about the enemy during a attle – his resources, tactics etc.		
≻M	ap out your own strategy		
≻W	orks hand in hand with Intelligence (Well)		
Slide No.: 19	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /	1	
	Global Network Security GmbH	1	
	The Reality		
	hat do we know about an IT attack and the	1	
pe	cople behind it? And when do we have the formation?		
	ormation ? Intelligence		
	negative	<u> </u>	
>	(rumors, black hat talking, so called insider information, etc.) Battlefield intelligence		
	minimum, but you cannot expect more	<u> </u>	
>	Defense strategy		
>	 uncoordinated Efficiency 		
	• nonexistent		
Slide No.: 20	/ Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /	,	
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		1 —	
1 ~	occonc		
L	essons		
		1	

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	Global Network Security GmbH Germany and the RAF
√T	The activities of the terrorist group "RAF"
	Rote Armee Fraktion) were crucial for the
	German banks to take measures in
-	protecting their infrastructure
)	In the late 80's, after the assassination of
	Alfred Herrhausen (Speaker of the Board, Deutsche Bank), a van filled with explosives,
	was found close to the IT Center of a German
	bank. The explosion would have destroyed the
	whole building.
	ŭ
Slide No.: 22	2 / Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH
	Global Network Security GmbH
	Germany and the RAF
	Connainy and the IVAI
√ Seve	eral attacks against Financial Institutions in Germany
	veen 1970 and 1990
	somb attacks
	ssassinations
	idnappings
	extortions
	ank robbery
	the reaction ?
	ligh availability for all critical systems and networks
	Contingency organization and exercises
	Rules and regulations from financial associations and the Ministry of
Fi	inance (e.g. backup regulations, MaH – Minimum requirements
Tı	rade) etc.
Slide No.: 23	3 / Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH
	Global Network Security GmbH
	Typical Infrastructure today
	. Jp
✓ N.	Ainimum of two IT centers (primary and backup)
* IV	Redundant glass fiber rings with separate routing
* F	city net)
V IV	Ainimum of two separate house connections or data and power
	or data and power Fwo separate power links
· I	wo soparate power mins

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✓ Backup Locations✓ Continuity center

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✓ Minimum of two separate risers for the backbone inside a building, armored tubes for the cables ✓ Emergency workplace

Global Network Security GmbH Typical Infrastructure today ✓ Minimum of three access points for the national and international network ✓ Minimum of 3 Pop's from different carriers and on different locations √ Three redundant basis services like ATM, Gigabit Ethernet und Dark Fiber √ Emergency power generator system ✓ UPS for all systems in IT center Slide No.: 25 Global Network Security GmbH Examples ✓ Bank lost Branch in WFC on 9/11 > No losses, only minor injuries > Bank was back to business 24h later via backup location in Rye / New York (20 miles) √ Flood disaster in Prag > All major carrier lost equipment > Lot's of outages in the town over several days > Business restarted 24h later via backup location Slide No.: 26 / Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH / Global Network Security GmbH

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Except from: THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERS PACE	
✓ In general, the private sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat	
✓Public-Private engagement is a key component to secure cyberspace	
✓ A federal role in these and other cases is only justified when the benefits of intervention outweigh the	
associated costs. This standard is especially important in cases where there are viable private sector solutions for addressing any potential threat or	
vulnerability.	
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Government's Role	
✓ International Coordination	
➤ International cooperation, political preparation	
✓ National Coordination	
Single Points of contacts (Cyber Squat, Alerting Service, National	
CERT for Support for non Cert Constituencies)	
✓ Attack assessment	
Classification of attacks	
 ✓ Forensic / Analysis ➤ something like a National Forensic Center 	
> Research Activities	
➤ Sponsoring of initiatives	
➤ Support of Universities	
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Government's Role	
(Aletined Alexades One)	
✓ National Alarming Service	
✓ Intelligence	
Information is a crucial factor. The government has the resources for such a "cyber-	
intelligence-service"	
✓ Research	
Support of Universities, Sponsoring (together with industry)	
✓ Awareness Programs	
✓ Exercises	
> CERT Coordination	

Slide No.: 30

➤ contingency training

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Global Network Security GmbH The private industrie's role √ Technical (know how) and organizational support > Private Industry has the know how, the experience, and the key technology ✓ Information Exchange > Private industry could provide different kinds of information. A good starter can be statistical information on attacks from network IDS ➤ Awareness Training ✓ Research, Training and Education ✓ CERT Team > Contact to national and international Certs ➤ Know How Pool Slide No.: 31 / Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH Global Network Security GmbH How can this work? √ Establish communication ➤ Make sure, to understand the different cultures between government and industry Involve not only the upper management, talk to the experts and convince them >Show the benefit for all involved partners >Make sure to have an open communi-cation don't classify everything Slide No.: 32 / Rolf Schulz / CEO / GNS GmbH /