




# CVE, CME ... CMSI?


Standardizing System Information

Bernd Grobauer  
Siemens CERT

## Standardization Efforts in Computer Security (I) CVE is orthogonal to other standards



## Standardization Efforts in Computer Security (II) System Information is orthogonal as well



## How System Information is treated in existing standards. Example: EISPP/DAF (I)

For internal use only!

Siemens CERT Security Telegram PC 005/04  
**ASN.1 Vulnerabilities**  
 Date: 2003-02-11    Priority: 1    sccs\_jdfr

<b>Title:</b> ASN.1 Vulnerabilities	<b>Risk:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> very high <input type="checkbox"/> high <input type="checkbox"/> medium <input type="checkbox"/> low <input type="checkbox"/> very low
<b>System:</b>	
<b>Description:</b>	
<b>Content Type:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> description <input type="checkbox"/> diagnostic ... <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>Solution:</b>	Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities in the Microsoft ASN.1 Library ...
<b>Reference:</b>	
<b>Ref. Type:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> vuln. id. <input type="checkbox"/> advisory ...	
<b>Issuer ID:</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CVE <input type="checkbox"/> BID ... <input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>Ref. Num:</b> CAN-2003-0818	

**PLATFORM:**  
 Microsoft Windows Server 2003  
 Microsoft Windows XP Professional  
 Microsoft Windows 2000  
 Microsoft Windows NT 4.0  
 Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition

**SOFTWARE:**  
 Microsoft ASN.1 Library

**DESCRIPTION:**  
 Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Windows ASN.1 parser library (msasn1.dll) could allow an remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.

**PATCHES/WORKAROUNDS:**

- Patch for Microsoft Server 2003 (32bit Version, English) Intranet  EN32\_PC00504\_0828028\_MS04007\_DS.EXE Intranet  WindowsServer2003-KB828028-x86-ENU.exe

**STANDARD VULN-IDS:**  
 CVE Number: CAN-2003-0818 →

## How System Information is treated in existing standards. Example: EISPP/DAF (II)

- EISPP/DAF treats system information as a list of free-text fields, each associated with a tag describing the content:

System:	
<b>Content Type:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> platform <input type="checkbox"/> software ... <input type="checkbox"/> _____
	Microsoft Windows Server 2003
	Microsoft Windows XP Professional
	Microsoft Windows 2000 (...)
<b>Content Type:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> platform <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> software ... <input type="checkbox"/> _____
	Microsoft ASN.1 Library

- As a result, no automated handling of system info. is possible
- What is needed is a **model of system information** that describes how to specify *machine-readable* system information
- Furthermore, a **common model of system information is needed**

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## This talk

This talk presents the results achieved by a working group of German CERTs (CERT-Bund, DFN-CERT, PreCERT, Siemens CERT) under the auspices of the “Deutscher CERT Verbund”

Structure of the talk:

- Definition of a Common Model of System Information (**CMSI**)
- Constraints on a CMSI
- Using the CMSI: process and examples
- Structure of the CMSI
- Closing remarks

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## Model of System Information -- A Definition

- **System Information must be provided consistently:**

What is called "**Microsoft Explorer v6.0**" in yesterday's advisory should not be called "**MS Internet Explorer (version 6.000)**" in today's advisory

- A "**Model of System Information**" specifies, how system information is provided.  
**Examples:**

- **Tacit Knowledge:** "Unwritten rules" (maybe supported by *copy and paste* from older advisories) regulate how affected systems are called
- **Tool support:** An authoring system for advisories constrains the way in which affected systems are specified, e.g., by providing a list to chose from
- **Definition:** **A model of system information consists of a dictionary of identifiers and (syntactic) rules for expressing information about computer systems (usually a combination of OS and application software).**

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## Constraints on a CMSI

- **Machine readable vs. human readable information**

Should the common model deal with machine-readable information, human-readable information, or both?

- **Relationship to existing models**

How should the common model relate to already existing, proprietary models?

- **Maintenance**

What are the dynamics of system information and how much effort is necessary to keep a common model up-to-date?

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## Constraints (I) Machine-readable vs. Human-readable Information

- Often, two models of system information are maintained:
  - Human-readable information
  - Machine-readable information
- Filtering and Correlation require machine-readable information
- Form and shape of human-readable information is highly constituency-dependent
  - ⇒ **Common model should include machine-readable information**

```

Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Workstation
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Workstation
SP1
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Workstation
SP2
- Microsoft Windows 95
- Microsoft Windows 98
+ Microsoft Windows 98SE
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP3
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP4
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP5
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP6
- Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 SP6a
Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0.1 SP3
Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0.1 SP2
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced
Server
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced
Server SP1
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Advanced
Server SP2
- Microsoft Windows 2000 Datacenter
Server
( ... )
  
```

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## Constraints (II) Relationship to Existing Models

- Models of system information exist (in some form) with any provider of system information
- A common model will not be able to satisfy all possible demands
  - ⇒ Proprietary models will continue to exist
  - ⇒ Use of common model requires mappings from/to proprietary models
- **Mappings are, by nature, proprietary, but structure and contents of model must facilitate mappings!**
  - Must be possible to give very "coarse" information (e.g., "Windows is affected")
    - some organizations do not keep much more precise information
  - some organizations may not want to put much effort into mapping a detailed proprietary model into the CMSI
- Must be possible to give very detailed information (e.g., "Apache 1.3.27 on Windows 2000 SP2 is affected") to allow more sophisticated applications

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## Constraints (III) Maintenance Issues

- **New products / new versions are issued on a daily basis**
- **Changes in the product landscape must be mirrored by the common model**
- **Effort necessary of maintaining a common model depends on**
  - level of detail contained in model
  - requirements on accuracy of data contained in model
  - processes/actors defined for maintaining the model
  - tool support provided for maintaining the model

⇒ **Maintenance issues must be considered as one of the prime design criteria for a common model**




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## Using CMSI (I) The process of using CMSI

- **CMSI is maintained at a central location**
  - a maintainer/group of maintainers handles change requests, additions, ...
  - the model's contents can be viewed online for reference
- **Organizations that want to use CMSI**
  - regularly download the most recent version (XML-based exchange format for communicating the model contents)
  - adapt their proprietary model:
    - either define mappings from proprietary model into CMSI and vice versa
    - or switch to the CMSI also for internal use
- **Organizations uses CMSI by communicating system information by filling in an XML-template with CMSI-compliant data**
  - XML-template already part of EISPP/DAF and could be easily integrated into other standards, as well.



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## Using CMSI (II) A very simple example

```
<system_list>
<system>
<system_part
  type="platform">
  <instance tag="os"/>
</system_part>
<system_part
  type="software">
  <instance
    tag="apache">
</system_part>
</system_list>
```

- **Message:** “Apache (on all platforms) is affected”
- CMSI provides identifiers “os” and “apache”

### Snippet from DAF-advisory

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## Using CMSI (III) A not so simple example

```
<system_list>
<system>
<system_part type="platform">
  <instance tag="w2k"/>
  <instance tag="wxp"/>
</system_part>
<system_part type="software">
  <instance tag="apache">
  <attribute value tag="version">
    <value>1.3.x</value>
    <value>2.x</value>
  </attribute_value>
</system_part>
</system>
<system_part type="platform">
  <instance tag="unix"/>
</system_part>
<system_part type="software">
  <instance tag="apache">
  <attribute value tag="version">
    <value>2.x</value>
  </attribute_value>
</instance>
</system_part>
</system_list>
```

- **Message:** “Apache 1.3.x and 2.x on Windows 2000 and Windows XP, and Apache 2.x on Unix are affected.”
- **CMSI provides**
  - identifiers “w2k”, “wxp”, “unix”, and “apache”
  - identifier “version” and syntax rules to give version information such as “1.3.x”, “2.x”


### Snippet from DAF-advisory

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
## Structure of CMSI (I) Overview



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## Structure of CMSI (II) Category Tree



- **Category Tree serves several purposes:**

- Users of the model should be facilitated in finding their way around  
⇔ Tree should not be nested to deeply!
- Category nodes can be used for (very) coarse system information
- Category nodes such as "Server" and "Client" can be used for creating user profiles  
(e.g.: "Tell me about vulnerabilities in server products only")
- **Implementing and using the category tree is not much effort but already brings benefits: it allows expressing and filtering with respect to information such as**
  - "Windows is affected"
  - "Unix is affected"
  - "A web-server product on Windows is affected"




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## Structure of CMSI (III) Product Families



Think of a product family as a flashcard:

### MS Windows 2000 (w2k)

Products:

MS Windows 2000 Workstation (w2k:ws)  
 MS Windows 2000 Server (w2k:server)  
 MS Windows 2000 Advanced Server (w2k:aserver)  
 MS Windows 2000 Datacenter Server (w2k:data)  
 (...)

Attributes for this family:

patchlevel: SP[0-9]+

Language: [A-Z][A-Z] (ISO-649 lang. codes)


Unique identifier

Regular expressions

Explanation how to use attribute / attr. semantics



## Structure of CMSI (IV) Product Families



• Product family comprises one or more closely related products.  
 Consequently,

- the same vulnerability will often affect all members of a product family
- Version information (version number, patch level, etc.) is given in a similar fashion for all members of a product family

⇒ "Product family" is the right level of abstraction for a common model of system information:

- In many cases, information of type "product family X is affected" will be precise enough
- Syntactic rules for providing, e.g., version information, can be given on a per-family basis

• One product family can be the child of several category node

⇒ Ambiguities in the tree can be worked around

## Constraints on a CMSI -- revisited

- **Common model should include machine-readable information**
  - Unique identifiers and syntactic rules provide for machine-readable information
  - Changes concerning human-readable names are no problem: computer-readable identifier stays the same
  - More than one human-readable name can be given to assure that users of the model find products under the name they are used to
- **Mappings are, by nature, proprietary, but structure and contents of model must facilitate mappings!**
  - Coarse mappings possible by mapping to categories or product families
  - Very fine-grained mappings possible by mapping to products & significant attribute information (version info., etc.)
- **Maintenance issues must be considered as one of the prime design criteria for a common model**
  - Because model treats version information "only" by supplying rules for specifying version information, maintenance effort seems manageable: release of new version usually will not trigger any changes in model.

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## Status of CMSI

- **Structure of CMSI**
  - An XML schema for describing the contents of the common model (category tree and product families) has been defined. It is described in a FIRST 2005 paper and available from the CMSI home page (<http://www.cert-verbund.de/cmsi>).
  - An XML schema for including system information based on CMSI has been defined and is already part of the EISPP/DAF advisory exchange formats (see [http://www.cert-verbund.de/daf/daf\\_description.html](http://www.cert-verbund.de/daf/daf_description.html))
  - CMSI has been tightly integrated into the open-source development of the incident handling system SIRIOS, a project of CERT Bund (see <http://www.cert-verbund.de/sirios>). SIRIOS also supports IODEF and EISPP/DAF.
- **Contents of CMSI**
  - Category tree agreed upon within CMSI-working group of the German CERT association (modulo some cleaning up...)
  - At the moment, the category tree is being filled with the most important product families

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




## Before I forget: What's the story behind the logo?



Like bees, we want to communicate useful information with means that are as simple as possible and yet effective...



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


## Closing Remarks: What to remember from this talk?

- Like CVE, system information is orthogonal to all standardization efforts in computer security (and other fields, as well)
- If you need to build a model for providing machine-readable system information in a consistent way: check, whether CMSI meets your demands
- If you do not want to start from scratch with filling your model, check the status of the model being built by the German CERT working group
- If you agree that a truly common model of system information in the fashion of CVE should exist, talk to us and let's join forces.
- Further information:

- <http://www.cert-verbund.de/cmsi>

- [bgrobauer@cert.siemens.de](mailto:bgrobauer@cert.siemens.de)



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