

A strategy for Inexpensive Automated Containment of Infected or Vulnerable Systems

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NOTE: Updated slides available online at https://selftest1.nus.edu.sg:9876/ppt/steven_sim_FIRST_2006.pdf



Agenda

- NUS IT infrastructure
- The awakening
- A first step
- Exploring alternatives
- The evolution
- Track record
- What's next?
- Closing



The NUS IT infrastructure

- Not-for-profit
- Multi-gigabit, high speed network
- 35,000 students and 6,000 staff
- 30,000 concurrent online nodes
- Plug-and-play networks
- Wireless networks
- Heterogeneous and diverse IT



The awakening

- That blasted worm
- Expensive and labor-intensive containment
- Bottleneck in incident management
- Need to process re-engineer
 - detection
 - containment
 - alert (response)
 - eradication (remediation)



A first step

• Acceptable Use Policy

- Legal counsel
- IT steering committee
- Student union

• Detection: Statistical-based anomaly IDS

- simple
- low overheads
- minimal false positives
- Containment
 - switch-port disconnection
- Alert (Response)
 - win-popup alerts
- Eradication (Remediation)
 - users not easily reached



• The process





A first step

• Limitations

- a DoS attack on innocent users
- require OOB to alert users
- difficulty with remediation
- tendency for user to change ports
- manual and fairly labor-intensive



Exploring alternatives

Commercial containment products

- route blackholing
- admission control

• Benefits

- robust
- efficient



Exploring alternatives

• Limitations

- costly
 - expensive (\$\$)
 - tremendous effort
 - overhaul of all unsupported switches
 - agent dependent
- integration with detection feeds not available
 - lack of consideration for false negatives
 - in-house developed detection mechanisms



Detection

- statistical anomaly-based IDS
- honeynets
- vulnerability scanners

Containment

- DHCP blackholing
- internal intruders quarantined
 - botnet irc servers blocked
- Alert (Response)
 - win-popup to infected machines
 - abuse contact of external origin auto-alerted
- Eradication (Remediation)
 - self-help



• The process





Self -help

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Home	MeDookmarks & mozilia.org & moziliaZine & mozdev.org
What h	nappened
	ernet access is normal, please ignore this page. If you find that you are re-directed to this page whenever you launch Internet, it means this computer's internet access has been restricted, as it is detected to be infected with virus.
What s	hould you do
Step 1	Scan and clean all viruses from system. If no viruses are detected on your system, it is likely that your PC is infected with a new unknown virus. Please approach NUS IT Care for assistance.
Step 2	 Change the local administrator password to non-guessable. Install or update Trendmicro Officescan. For staff, click <u>here</u>, then click Run. For students, click <u>here</u>, then click Run. Check and secure any open file shares.
Step 3:	[MUST DO] To re-activate, click here. Your system will be re-activated within two working hours.

Please ensure that all the above steps are followed. Failing to clean the virus properly will cause your computer be restricted again.

Should you encounter any problems, kindly contact Computer Centre NUS IT Care at <u>ccehelp@nus.edu.sq</u> or call 68742080 for assistance. Please take note of the error message and symptoms when problem is hit.

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• Email on release

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Follow up This message was ser	t with High importance.		
To:	t@nus.edu.sg		Sent: Thu 4/20/2006 12:04 PM
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• Email alert to external abuse

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From: 🔍 ccecert@nus.edu.sg		Sent: Sun 4/9/2006 1:15 PM
To: abuse@moe.edu.tw Cc:		
Subject: [Network Abuse] Intrusion	attempts from 192.83. targeting 137.132.X.X.	
Dear abuse contact for 192.83.	, abuse@moe.edu.tw	
The system 192,83,166,250 hel	ongs to your domain and is sending illegitimate/ma	alicious traffic to our network 137.132.X.X within the last
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Beneficial features

- cost and effort
 - cost of implementation
 - ease of implementation
- user management
 - managing user expectations
 - empowering users
- minimal false negatives
 - efficacy of current antivirus detection pattern can be determined

 new antivirus-undetected malicious trojans, backdoors and worms can be discovered



• Limitations

- does not handle non-DHCP based hosts
 - rely on switch-port disconnection
- longer time window of infection/vulnerability

need to be improved upon

loopholes to circumvent DHCP blackhole and remediation steps

mitigated through monitoring of reinfections

- self-help is Windows specific
 - eradication for other OS infections handled onsite.



VIDS Detections





Honeynet Detections





Blackholed/Quarantined systems





• Some signatures created that is based on discovered binaries in containment

- TSPY_AGENT.AX
- TSPY_AGENT.AK
- TROJ_DROPPER.GG
- TROJ_SMALL.AHE
- TROJ_AGENT.XT
- TROJ_AGENT.XU
- TROJ_AGENT.XV
- WORM_RBOT.BWC
- WORM_RBOT.BZC
- HKTL_PROCKILL.I

- BKDR_NORUNORG.A
- BKDR_SERVU.AS
- BKDR_SERVU.AZ
- BKDR_HACDEF.AQ
- BKDR_SHELL.B
- WORM_NETSKY.DAM
- WORM_SOBER.DAM
- WORM_MYTOB.DAM
- WORM_LOVGATE.DAM
- WORM_MYDOOM.DAM



What's next?

• Enhance containment for non-DHCP based systems

 new server allowed on network after risk accessed and managed (this includes administrative, network and host vulnerability assessments)

 – existing server switch-port disconnected from network should any periodic network vulnerability assessment fail



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Closing

Containment strategy

- Inexpensive
- Simple
- Easy to develop
- Easy to implement
- Easy to maintain
- Effective



"The virus may be spreading despite the control measures already taken. Far more human and animal exposure to the virus will occur if strict containment does not isolate all known and unknown locations where the bird flu virus is currently present."

Dr Juan Lubroth