The Need for Confluence

The Essential Role of Incident Response in Secure Software Development

Why do security incidents occur?

What is the root cause?

Faulty software (more often than not)

What is the definition of insanity?

- Year after year
- Thousands upon thousands of incidents
- Same root cause
- What are we doing about it?
- We *talk* about proactive, but do we do it? *Really*?

en with vegetation (land well ~ within Crazy Vkra adj, 1 / Meehek with much contact impanity; "a mean is who had go ac mad" [xyn: brainsietk. demented, dis o leted, disturbed, mail sick, unbalancen, unhinged 2 : fimiish; totally unsound; "an impractical solution"; "a crazy scheme"; "a bail faked ideas"; "a screwball proposal without a prayof of working" [Stat forked, and rewball, a southware Maak v, 1 ; to make a

You can't bolt security on later

- A room full of firewalls, intrusion detection|prevention systems, etc., will not protect bad software
- We must address the root causes
- Active participation in development



Why aren't things improving?



Learn from history

 We don't pay enough attention to our failures

 Consider other engineering disciplines



Lack of knowledge

- Developers tend to not have security knowledge
- Security team tends to not have development knowledge
- "Us" and "them"



We're overly trusting

- We tend to have misplaced trust in our users
- Sometimes users are malicious
- Sometimes they don't even try to be



Focus

 Too much attention is paid to functional spec

 Consider what can go wrong as well



Complexity

Complexity is fighting us every step of the way
 Consider AJAX



Connectivity

- Connectivity is everywhere
- Do you know where your data is?
- Consider mobile users, SOAP, grid computing



Extensibility

- Extensibility isn't what it used to be
- Who wants a computer that isn't?
- Is your desktop user privileged?



Old school paradigms

 Old school information security solutions don't adequately protect the software

Consider IM,
 Skype, WiFi,
 VPNs



Testing isn't working

- Software testing does not adequately address security
- Penetration testing is not sufficient



So how can we help?

- Deep integration into the development process
- Consider five stages
 - Requirements
 - Design
 - Code
 - Testing
 - Deployment



But first, think positive

- We're too quick to use negative models
 - Anti-virus products
 - Signature-based IDS
 - Vulnerability scanning
- These are not adequate
 - Think positive validation

- Prove something safe and then allow it
 - All else is evil
- Throughout a system
 - From OS through application
- Prime example
 - Input validation

Part of the team

- Don't just be a reviewer/auditor
 - Adversarial role can be detrimental
- Be a security consultant to dev
 - Each project
 - Guide and assist the dev team



Requirements

- Help build security requirements
 - Regulatory compliance
 - Abuse/misuse cases
- Guide discussions on what bad things can happen

- Focus on lessons learned
 - Cite similar architectures and failures
- Requirements must be actionable
 - Focus on "must not" actionable statements

Design

- Help conduct design reviews
- Consider available approaches
 - Microsoft's threat modeling
 - Cigital's ARA

- Identify and prioritize design weaknesses
 - Based on business risk
- Build mitigations for high priority risks
- Nightmare scenarios can be useful

Code

- Learn the technologies
- Help build prescriptive language guidance
 - Input validation
 - SQL utilization
 - Authentication
 - Session management

- Help build reusable class libraries frameworks
 - Enterprise coding standards
- Code reviews to verify compliance
 - Manual vs. automated
- Look at open projects
 OWASP's ESAPI

Testing

- Penetration testing alone is not enough
 - Coverage
 - Internals
- Consider Microsoft's testing approach
 - Fuzzing
 - Pen testing
 - Dynamic validation

- Results must be meaningful to the dev team
 - Findings by code module
 - Integrate with bug tracking s/w
 - Prescriptive guidance

Deployment

- Verification of safe deployment environment
 - Not just pen testing
 - Host hardening
 - File access controls
 - Event monitoring

- Verify and validate manually and empirically
 - Time to break out the network sniffer
- If WAFs used, help train the WAF on app's normative behavior

Issues to consider

• Cultural barriers

- Years of "us and them" may be tough to overcome
- Developers "allergic" to security
- Authority to mandate
- Positive incentive

- Consider small steps towards a goal
 - But first, understand what the goal is
- Measurement helps
 - Track and show improvement

Checklist of things to do

• Read, study, learn

- Work through
 OWASP WebGoat
 exercises
- Language references
- See reference list
- Seek dev team
 - Discuss possible roles and responsibilities

- Learn dev environment
 - Bug tracking
 - Process
- Pilot studies
 - Pick a project and dive in
 - Capture lessons learned
 - Constant improvement

Further reading

- The Security Development Lifecycle, Howard and Lipner, Microsoft Press
- Software Security: Building Security In, McGraw, Addison Wesley

• OWASP

- "Build Security In" portal, <u>http://</u> <u>BuildSecurityIn.us-</u> <u>cert.gov</u>
- Secure Coding Mailing List, <u>http://</u> www.securecoding.org

Kenneth R. van Wyk KRvW Associates, LLC

Ken@KRvW.com http://www.KRvW.com

