

Investigator of Interest – Our Philosophy of Adaptive Incident Response Pascal Arends, FoxCERT





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Topic:

- Why Adaptive Incident response
- What is Adaptive Incident Response
- Defining your investigation strategy
- Tips and Tricks



The spying program

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They know everything

- Your mail server is being tapped!
- They have access to your chat server!
- They are listening on your system!



Nothing to see here move along

- A lot of communication before the investigation
- Attacker can easily monitor this with an automated system
- He knows the indicators you are looking for and use these as keywords for spying on you



Adaptive Incident Response





Adaptive Incident Response

- Cyber threat landscape
- Incident information
- Attacker profile
- Business impact

Running scared

- Keep the investigation noise down
- The attacker will not run at first sight of an investigation
- Advanced attackers are in your network for the long run
- He has to maintain a lot of systems to.
- The investigator and attacker have a information gap, speculation is needed.



Adaptive IR defining your investigation strategy





Scoping

- Fact finding
 - Investigation motivation
 - Investigation leads



Scoping

- Attacker profiling
 - Analyze all the facts/ information
 - Make hypotheses
- Which is the more likely hypothesis
 - Bored kid or Espionage
 - Could it be an activist/ hacktivist



Scoping

- Threat landscape
 - Who are your enemies
 - What can they get (Crown-Jewels)
 - External exposure



Investigation questions

- What happened
- Is it targeted
- What has been stolen
- Who did it
- How return to business-as-usual (fast)



Business-as-usual considerations

- •Management Doesn't want to hear anything about BAU not being top priority
- •With BAU being highest priority they don't see the full extend of the breach, what information the attacker has, in what stage the attacker is.
- •At the end the business cannot give a complete picture to the stake-holders



Business-as-usual considerations

(Short term) Reasons not going back to BAU:

- (Better) Attacker profiling
- What is the attacker searching for
- What does the attacker know
- In what stage of the attack are they
- Targeted or not



Business-as-usual considerations

(Long term) Reasons not going back to BAU:

- Better remediation
- More lessons learned
- Better defenses for possible upcoming breaches



Determining the strategy

- Combine the gathered information
 - Investigation facts
 - Attacker profile
 - Hypotheses
 - Threat landscape
 - Business impact



Intrusive VS Non-Intrusive investigation

- Intrusive advantages:
 - Faster
 - Smaller group has to know details
- Intrusive disadvantages:
 - Attacker can easily detect the investigation




Intrusive VS Non-Intrusive investigation

- Non-intrusive advantages:
 - Monitor the attacker
 - Better remediation
 - More lessons learned/ better prepared next time.
- Non-intrusive disadvantages:
 - Slower
 - More employees need to know details




Noise level Non-intrusive investigation





Noise level (typical) breach



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Turn the table





Out-Of-Band communication

- Don't use production communication channels
- Use separate investigation machines
- Use a back-up internet line?
- Use a an out of band document exchange portal

Hide the noise

- The idea is to make as little noise as possible during the investigation, hide in normal day-to-day routines.
 - Use out-of-band sources
 - Use admin tools
 - Use maintenance windows
 - Pull disks (RAID setup?)
 - Use passive network monitoring

FOX IT



Network investigation

High noise

• Software on the host

Medium noise

• TAP/HUB

Low noise

Switch SPAN



Host acquisition

High noise

- Live acquisition
- Installing agents
- Running scripts

Medium noise

- Offline acquisition
- Using installed agent

Low noise

- Pulling disks (RAID1)
- Make VM snapshots
- Getting information out of backups
- Using maintenance window



Host investigation

High noise

• Live investigation

Medium noise

- Using installed agent
- Retire a system (for live investigation)

Low noise

• Offline investigation



Malware investigation

High noise

- Online research
- Dynamic analysis w. Internet

Low noise

- Static analysis
- Dynamic analysis no internet



Log investigation

High noise

- Live log investigation
- Collect logs through scripting/agents

Low noise

• Pre installed central log collector

Readiness

- Have a data acquisition plan
- Have a central log collector
- Have the backup schema
- Have a SPAN-port available on switches
- Know your Threat landscape
- Talk with the MT about investigation strategies
- Have out-of-band communication channels



If you want to stay off your attackers radar, hide!!

And make the attacker become the defender

Questions?

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