

# A baker's dozen: application security on a limited budget

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# About Chris Romeo



### SECURITY BACKGROUND

- CEO / Co-Founder @ Security Journey
- 22 years in the security world, CISSP, CSSLP
  - 10 years at Cisco, leading security education.
- Co-Lead of the OWASP Triangle Chapter

### LISTEN TO ME



## The Application Security Podcast

### TALK TO ME



@edgeroute
@AppSecPodcast





- 1. Traditional application security programs
- 2. The importance of security community
- 3. Building a program based on OWASP
  - Awareness and education
  - Process and measurement
  - Tools
- 4. Final thoughts



# Traditional AppSec programs





# Goals of an AppSec Program





# What if I had to develop an application security program with a budget of \$0?

### Enhance with OWASP Resources

Fill in missing areas of your program





# Security Champions

se • cu • ri • ty cham • pi • on [sih • kyer • uh • tee cham • pee • uhn], noun 1 a person passionate about security with a desire to educate those around them.

we all want to embed security champions in our companies.





# STOULASP

# FLAGSHIP PROJECTS 18

LAB PROJECTS **2** 

As of 6 September, 2019

INCUBATOR PROJECTS **73** 

# Scale of project risk

Rating	Explanation $\sqrt{1}$
0	The only way this goes away is if owasp.org disappears off the Internet
1-3	Stable project, multiple releases, high likelihood of sustainability
4-6	Newer project, fewer releases
7-9	Older project with a lack of updates within the last year
10	If I added one of these to this project, I should have my head examined



# NOTICE

Use OWASP projects with caution. There is no guarantee that a project will ever be updated again.



# The categories



### Process and measurement

Tools



# Awareness, knowledge and education





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A1:2017-Inje	ction	
A2:2017-Brok	cen Authentication	
A3:2017-Sen	sitive Data Exposure	
A4:2017-XMI	External Entities (XXE)	
A5:2017-Brok	cen Access Control	
A6:2017-Sec	urity Misconfiguration	
A7:2017-Cros	s-Site Scripting (XSS)	
A8:2017-Inse	cure Deserialization	
A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities		
A10:2017-Ins	ufficient Logging & Monitoring	

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/

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Project Risk 2

C1 Define Security Requirements	C2 Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries	C3 Secure Database Access	C4 Encode and Escape Data
C5 Validate All Imputs	C6 Implement Digital Identity	C7 Enforce Access Control	C8 Protect Data Everywhere
	C9 Implement Security Logging and Monitoring	C10 Handle All Errors and Exceptions	

https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls/



# The intermingling

OWASP Top 10 - 2017	OWASP Pro Active CONTROLS
A1:2017-Injection	C4 Encode and Escape Data, C5 Validate All Inputs
A2:2017-Broken Authentication	C6 Implement Digital Identity
A3:2017-Sensitive Data Exposure	C8 Protect Data Everywhere
A4:2017-XML External Entities (XXE)	C5 Validate All Inputs
A5:2017-Broken Access Control	C7 Enforce Access Control
A6:2017-Security Misconfiguration	None
A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	C4 Encode and Escape Data, C5 Validate All Inputs
A8:2017-Insecure Deserialization	C5 Validate All Inputs
A9:2017-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	C2 Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries
A10:2017-Insufficient Logging & Monitoring	C9 Implement Security Logging and Monitoring





## Cross Site Scripting Prevention RULE #0 - Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations

The first rule is to **deny all** - don't put untrusted data into your HTML document unless it is within one of the slots defined in Rule #1 through Rule #5. The reason for Rule #0 is that there are so many strange contexts within HTML that the list of escaping rules gets very complicated. We can't think of any good reason to put untrusted data in these contexts. This includes "nested contexts" like a URL inside a javascript -- the encoding rules for those locations are tricky and dangerous.

If you insist on putting untrusted data into nested contexts, please do a lot of cross-browser testing and let us know what you find out.

Directly in a script:

<script>...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...</script>

Inside an HTML comment:

<!--...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...->

In an attribute name:

<div ...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...=test />







### JavaScript-based

Intentionally insecure web app

Encompasses the entire OWASP Top Ten and other severe security flaws

https://owasp.org/www-project-juice-shop/



## Missing pieces in awareness, knowledge and education



Administration of the training platforms



## Awareness and education: impact and headcount

### Knowledge Hands-on training Awareness Assimilation of **Foundational** A concise understanding reference for key concepts of the most through solving the most activities that difficult AppSec important problems lock in concepts in knowledge and AppSec make it

practical

Security

# Awareness and education: getting started

### Awareness

Lunch and learn sessions to teach the basics of all awareness documents

### Knowledge

Teach developers about available cheat sheets

Host an internal copy of the cheat sheets

Lead a training session covering the three most crucial cheat sheets for your organization

### Hands-on Training

Build an environment that hosts JuiceShop Schedule a hack-a-thon where teams gather and work on JuiceShop in teams and learn from each other

# Process and Measurement





# Project Risk



https://owasp.org/www-project-samm/



### Application Security Verification Standard

# Project Risk

| Requirement                                   |                                  |  |  |  |
|---|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| V1. Architecture, design and threat modelling | V11. HTTP security configuration |  |  |  |
| V2. Authentication                            | V13. Malicious controls          |  |  |  |
| V3. Session management                        | V15. Business logic              |  |  |  |
| V4. Access control                            | V16. File and resources          |  |  |  |
| V5. Malicious input handling                  | V17. Mobile                      |  |  |  |
| V7. Cryptography at rest                      | V18. Web services                |  |  |  |
| V8. Error handling and logging                | V19. Configuration               |  |  |  |
| V9. Data protection                           | V11. HTTP security configuration |  |  |  |
| V10. Communications                           |                                  |  |  |  |



https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verification-standard/



### Application Threat Modeling



Project Risk 5

### **4 Questions**

Most threat model methodologies answer one or more of the following questions in the technical steps which they follow:

### 1. What are we building?

As a starting point you need to define the scope of the Threat Model. To do that you need to understand the application you are building, examples of helpful techniques are:

- Architecture diagrams
- Dataflow transitions
- Data classifications
- You will also need to gather people from different roles with sufficient technical and risk awareness to agree on the framework to be used during the Threat Modelling exercise.

### 2. What can go wrong?

This is a "research" activity in which you want to find the main threats that apply to your application. There are many ways to approach the question, including brainstorming or using a structure to help think it through. Structures that can help include STRIDE, Kill Chains, CAPEC and others.

### 3. What are we going to do about that?

In this phase you turn your findings into specific actions. See Threat\_Modeling\_Outputs

### 4. Did we do a good enough job?

Finally, carry out a retrospective activity over the work you have done to check quality, feasibility, progress, and/or planning.

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Application\_Threat\_Modeling



### CODE REVIEW GUIDE



Project Risk

12

Secure code review methodology

Technical reference for secure code review: OWASP Top 10

HTML5 //Load values from database store with channel select mt = mull; // = NotificationClient.0x Same origin policy lient = new bl.deske ElficationClient() ( Deny = # Reviewing logging code (onClient.Insert(); 1411F1CP Error handling els# cationClient.LastRequest = DateTin cationClient.RequestCount = Notifi **Buffer overruns** icationClient.Update(); Client-side JavaScript onClient.Deny == false) new bl.desktop.Notificati Code review do's and don'ts quest Notificatio ant Request Usermust Address stions.Count: Code review checklist - 2; i++) Code crawling in NotifyLocation

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP\_Code\_Review\_Project





Project Risk 1

### Information gathering

Configuration and deployment management testing

Identity management testing

Authentication testing Authorization testing Session management testing Input validation testing Testing for error handling Testing for weak crypto Business logic testing Client-side testing



https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/



# Missing pieces in process and measurement



Deployment advice/experience on how to be successful



## Process and measurement: impact and headcount

### Process

ASVS provides important requirements

App threat modeling defines the process with examples

Code review guide describes how to perform a code review and what to look for

Testing guide provides how to test and a knowledge base of how to exploit vulnerabilities

### Measurement

A roadmap to where you are today, and a plan for where you want to go with your AppSec program





# Process and measurement: getting started

### Process

Choose one of the process areas to start with (threat modeling) and build out this activity as your first

Early wins are key!

### Measurement

Perform an early assessment to determine where you are

Map out your future Share these assessments with Executives and Security Champions (and anyone else that will listen)

Advocate for Executive support on your plan to build a stronger AppSec program



Tools







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https://owasp.org/www-project-modsecurity-core-rule-set/











https://owasp.org/www-project-zap/





Project Risk



https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/



# Missing pieces in tools





# Tools: impact and headcount

Infrastructure

CRS provides a true WAF solution

Dependency check identifies vulnerable 3rd party software

ZAP provides DAST, and plugs in to any dev methodology







# Tools: getting started

### Infrastructure

Add Dependency Check to your build pipeline tomorrow

Teach ZAP to Security Champions and interested testers

Work with your infra owner to deploy a test of ModSecurity + CRS

ThreatDragon POC



# Headcount summary





# The 13 OWASP projects as an AppSec program





# Apply What You Have Learned Today

- Next week you should:
  - Assess a high-level current state of your application security program and determine if you have visible gaps
- In the first three months following this presentation you should:
  - Perform a deeper assessment using OpenSAMM
  - Choose one of the dozen to implement
- Within six months you should:
  - Measure the impact of your first project implementation
  - Plan and execute on one or two additional pieces, resources permitting



# Final thoughts for an AppSec program on the cheap

- 1.Use Open SAMM to assess current program and future goals.
- 2. There is no OWASP SDL; build/tailor required.
- 3.Start small; choose one item for awareness and education to launch your program.
- 4.Build security community early; it is the support structure.
- 5.Evaluate available projects in each category and build a 1-2-year plan to roll each effort out.
- 6.While OWASP is free, head count is not; plan for head count to support your "free" program.



# How to engage with Security Journey



Free trial of the Security Belt Program

https://app.securityjourney.com

The Application Security Podcast

\$\$\$\$ hive security
articles that are
worth your time

powered by Security

https://www.securityjourney.com/hi5

chris\_romeo@securityjourney.com

@edgeroute @AppSecPodcast



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