


Gavin Reid

But cyber!



Where are we with security in 2016?





## RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### DHS infosec chief: We should pull clearance of feds who fail phish test

Repeat offenders "should not be holding a TS SCI with the federal government."

by Sean Gallagher - Sep 21, 2015 12:00pm EDT

[Share](#) [Tweet](#) 123

In the wake of the [Office of Personnel Management hack this year](#), which reportedly took advantage of a phishing attack to steal credentials used to gain access to highly sensitive personnel records, US federal agencies have been increasing their security training and employee testing around phishing. In addition to [the employee awareness campaign](#) launched by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, more agencies are using security auditing tools that simulate phishing attacks against employees to test whether the employees abide by their information security training. Those who fall for phishing tests are generally either required to take a security refresher class or at worst are publicly called out for their errors in agency e-mails.

But at least one federal chief information security officer thinks that these steps aren't enough and



[Enlarge](#) / Paul Beckman, the DHS' chief information security officer, thinks repeat phishing failures should get an employee's clearance pulled.

The state of the industry...



What we need to do differently...



What is threat?



What is intelligence?



intent, capability and opportunity

# What can threat intelligence help you with?

How do we know if we are completely clean of compromise?

Are we Targeted?

How did we get infected?

What has this IP done in the past?

IS this part of a larger campaign


Are we part of x new hack?

If the hackers reuse infra will notice and be able to take advantage of that?

# Indicators of Compromise...


*“An IOC is an observable artifact of an intrusion on a host or network. Analysts can use it to trace the steps of an attack and identify what was affected, how long it was active or if there are any persisting elements of the intrusion.”*

- Observables
- Measurable events
- Stateful properties





IP with no (or invalid) context...



# IP with context...better



**Malware:** Dridex

**Attachment File Name:** RZZA3440.doc

## **Attachment MD5s:**

b4fe7224da594703e78d62d9cb85c5f4c3a00c36  
ea51040c3a10c557154bc7b15b9acbcd6555539  
8a7e3fd0f0a389cf9582b75b4f8855dbe555bff08  
0c57808aBe699ba4855340adf5c9d7092e9df08  
b

## **Payload URLs:**

hxxp://internetz1[.]com/03/39.exe  
hxxp://gggrp[.]com/03/59.exe  
hxxp://fefg[.]com/03/39.exe  
hxxp://woofe[.]com/03/39.exe  
hxxp://contestswin[.]net/03/39.exe

## **Payload MD5:**

5e91af2e44c17de55134ff935c0f30f1

## **C2:**

130.0.133[.]35

## Intelligence – best

Investigator finds new malware in word doc used in spearphish

– hashes file

7c47ff87c0frca93e135c9acffee48d3f

– Sandboxes and Finds c2

**Query TI dbase (Intel 471)**

**finds that same file/C2 has been used before by a specific hacker group X**

Group X uses various hacker forums, IRC, samples , URLs and C2's

Check nF for IRC connections to server. Runs the new IOCS into comparison engine and finds other infections – helping organization completely understand and fix the problem




The screenshot shows a blog post from B2 (Usually Reliable, Probably True) under the CC HA CE (Cyber Crime, Hacker, Actor) category. The post is titled "Actor [REDACTED] offers Microsoft Word exploits for CVE-2015-1650 and CVE-2015-1770" and was published on 19 Aug 2015 at 23:35:54. It features tabs for "RAW TEXT" and "RESEARCHER COMMENTS". The main content states: "On 18 Aug 2015, actor [REDACTED] posted the following on exploit.in: --- Microsoft Office Word Exploit | cve-2015-1650 + cve-2015-1770".

# Progression? of detection capabilities



Feeds...



# Sources...(providers)



Industry Orgs



Secret Groups



Vendor Threat Intel



First Party Data



Government Orgs



Peer Groups



Open Source




CIRTs



ISACS

# What IS context?



# Data Enrichment...



Whois



GeoLocation



Reputation



History



Hash



PDNS



VirusTotal



Sandboxing



Confidence

## Where does the data come from

Customer  
data

Web

Scanning  
Crawling

Malware  
processing

Honeynets

Human  
INT



How to eat them


**Cybox**

**IOC**

**Raw**


**CSV**

# Operationalizing...Platforms



# How does Cisco do it

- Python/Django front end UI
  - Apache or Django runserver
- MongoDB backend
  - Fault Tolerant
  - High Performance
  - NO SQL
  - Mongo FS for files
- Document based
  - Files and metadata





# What does CRiTs look like

### Top Backdoors

Name	Samples
DPD	1
PIVY	

### Top Campaigns

Name	Emails	Indicators	Samples
Group 3	0	2067	1
Group 17	0	818	11
Group 16	0	68	0
Group 13	0	13	0
Group 10	0	0	0

### Latest Indicators

Value	Type	Date Added	Campaign	Source	Status
mx.xmlflash.net	Domain	2013-11-14	Group 3	OTHER	New
www.nbsd.k12.ms.us	Domain	2013-11-14	Group 4	OTHER	New
/serv/pte.exe	Domain	2013-11-14	Group 4	OTHER	New
www.myspace-login.com	Domain	2013-11-14	Group 4	OTHER	New
2014 individual income tax credit policy	String	2013-11-14	Group 4	OTHER	New

### Recently Added/Modified Samples


Filename	Size	Filetype	Receive	Backdoor(v)[C]	CVE
jack246.exe			08/12/2013		
Sample 60eed7a7c5f4f4aeace594e2e4d180a0.exe_carver			08/12/2013		
c5eb1cff314e4d682b1315dfab44e7dd			08/12/2013		
Sample 68aee94684ba33d1e5d97d7d27d0fe13.exe_carver			08/12/2013		

# Automated Indicator Actions

Current

In Progress

Future



CRITS



Prevent

BGP

ESA

DNS RPZ

HIPS

AV

WSA

Detect

Lancope

HIPS

SCCM

LUPA/  
PCAP

passive DNS

Syslog

Share

CSIRT

Govt

CDSA

Partner

SBG

# What about techniques

```
Administrator: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe - wmic
wmic:root\cli>?

[global switches] <command>

The following global switches are available:
/namespace Path for the namespace the alias operate against.
/role Path for the role containing the alias definitions.
/node Servers the alias will operate against.
/impllevel Client impersonation level.
/authlevel Client authentication level.
/locale Language id the client should use.
/privileges Enable or disable all privileges.
/trace Outputs debugging information to stderr.
/record Logs all input commands and output.

C:\>
C:\>
C:\>wmic
wmic:root\cli>/node

NODE - Specify which servers the alias will operate against.
USAGE:

/nodelist:<machine id list>
NOTE: <machine id list> ::= <@filename ! machine id> ! <@filename !
NOTE: Enclose the switch value in double quotes, if the value contains
```

wmic /node:"@server-targets.txt" service get name

wmic /node:"machine-FQDN" service get name

# So what could you do

```
Administrator: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

C:\>wmic qfe get HotfixID,ServicePackInEffect,InstallDate,InstalledBy,InstalledOn /format:csv

Mode,HotFixID,InstallDate,InstalledBy,InstalledOn,ServicePackInEffect
GAVREID-1787C,KB2849697,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2849696,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2841134,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2670838,,NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2830477,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2592687,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB971033,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2819745,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2479943,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2491683,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2506014,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2506212,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2506928,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2509553,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2511455,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2515325,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2533552,,NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2533623,,NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2534111,,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2536275,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
GAVREID-1787C,KB2536276,,GAVREID-1787C\Administrator,2/5/2015,
```

C:\>wmic qfe get HotfixID,ServicePackInEffect,InstallDate,InstalledBy,InstalledOn /format:csv

# Powers(hell)

Set-ExecutionPolicy	Mimikatz	EncodedCommand	Find-AVSignature
DllInjection	Invoke-Shellcode	Get-Keystrokes	Get-TimedScreenshot
Invoke-CredentialInjection	Invoke-PSInject	Invoke-ServiceStart	Get-RegAutoLogon
Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor	Invoke-ServiceUserAdd	Write-ServiceEXE	Invoke-TokenManipulation

# Where?



About

Documentation

Presentations

Demos

Blog Posts

Github

Disclaimer

[About](#) [Documentation](#) [Presentations](#) [Demos](#) [Blog Posts](#) [Github](#) [Disclaimer](#)



Empire is a pure PowerShell post-exploitation agent built on cryptologically-secure communications and a flexible architecture. Empire implements the ability to run PowerShell agents without needing powershell.exe, rapidly deployable post-exploitation modules ranging from key loggers to Mimikatz, and adaptable communications to evade network detection, all wrapped up in a usability-focused framework.

# PowerShellEmpire Agent

Tracking Evolution of the PowerShell Empire  
Agent and discussion in Chinese Forums

Customize View ⚙

Colors

- Social Media
- Mainstream
- Blog
- Niche
- Forum
- News Agency
- Primary Source
- Code Repository
- Other

Total references

Event Marker Size

- 1 reference
- 64 references

Hidden (6)

@secure\_sean PowerShell Empire - a pure #PowerShell post-exploitation agent.

Translated from Chinese: "If the listener does not specify an executable file, the program may enable the default cmd.exe instead:

Jul 2015

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan 2016

Feb

100%

Jul 1 2015

8 months

Feb 29 2016



# Making it intelligent

What do you do with this data to help your organization

- Detecting this technique means logging WMIC & Powershell
- Pull logs from at least your server environment
- Whitelist know good and alerting on all else
- Empire commands get investigated immediately

## Maturity...

Low: most indicator-based; IP-based blocking; only able to consume tactical products.

Medium: indicators are grouped and have context; Indicator to internal data comparisons automated. Mix of 3rd party with some first party

High: production of unique and relevant products for different internal customers; Used for prioritization of security arch. Automatic subscription of high fidelity data to security controls. HI-FIDELITY FIRST-PARTY

Can you protect what you can't see?



Thanks!

