





# Tonga - **TCC** Security Perspective from Smaller |SP

Name: Maíle Halatuítuía TCC, Network Engíneer (Core Network)







2023 FIRST Regiona



1.Abstract Approval/Accept by FIRST PC2.TCC Management Approval3.Fellow attendance From Tonga



## Introduction about myself

- 1. Maile Halatuituia
- 2. Btech in Electrical Electronic
- 2. Field Experienced in Internet Technology
- 3. Since 2001 at TCC ISP (~21 yrs.)
- 4. Network Engineers
- 5. Exposed to Linux Distributions and Window Server Env
- 6. Cybersecurity
- 7. Attend Internet/Cybersecurity Related Courses, Workshops and some Conferences too
- 8. I was hoping to come in person to Vanuatu for the first time but things not turn in our favor  $\odot$
- 9. And here am I present Remote, thanks to technology.
- 10. I do hope you enjoy listening.













## What I will talk about



Submitted Abstract

Tonga - **TCC** Security Perspective from Smaller ISP/Operator/Enterprise







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Points to Discuss1. TCC - My Employer2. TCC - Security Perspective3. TCC - Statistics







## TCC – My Employer

## Background



- Began its life as "Post & Telegraph Departments"
- Later on its become Telecommunication & Telegraph Departments before late 70's
- In late 1978 TTD split to Domestic Business named TTC (Tonga Telecommunication Commissions)
- International Business taken over by Cable & Wireless a British Telecom Company
- Early 2001 Cable & Wireless and TTC merge to form TCC
- ✤ I join TCC later the same year.







## TCC – My Employer

**Business Service for Public** 



2g,3g both Voice and Data plus LTE Data Only in our Cellular Network

- PSTN Voice Services over cables (Copper/Fiber)
- Fixed Broadband Internet Service DSL, ADSL2+ and FTTH
- Transit Service and International Lease Circuit
- Online Customer Platform
- Limited Hosting Platform
- Main Island & Remote Islands too.
- Offer Infrastructure or Platform for e-Government Services both in Main & Remote Island







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## TCC – Topology



Normal topology

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- Jan 15<sup>th</sup> 2021, 3 4 days resume comm
- Kacífic , Starlínk, APNIC Router, C-Band



- Oct 2022 Int'l Cable Restored
- 12th July 2023 Domestic Restored



TCC, Network Engineer (Core Network)





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- ✤ We are one of 3 Operator's in Tonga
- ✤ ~150 k Population and ~60-70% Reside in the islands
- Estimations based on this figure (Customer Based ~70k)
- Fair number of Population has Service from TCC





## TCC – Security Perspective



2023

#### **Business Profile**

- Telecom Cellular and Cable Service
  - Copper and Fiber Cable Network
  - Evolved Packet Core
  - Fixed Access Network
- ISP Internet Service Provider
  - Pre/Post Broadband Subscriber
  - Email Provider Customer/Corporate
  - NAS for Billing
  - International Carrier, Provider, Partner, Customer
  - Communication to Remote Islands
- Corporate/Enterprise Internal TCC Business Profile
  - Corporate Services (Email, DC, Web Self-care, CDR Processing, Integration)
  - Integration's to Platforms for Billing.
  - Web Selfcare
  - Human Resource





#### Few Security Challenges

- Telecom Cellular and Cable Service
  - Mobile Core Concern about the CIA of End User Voice & Data Access
  - The whole Infrastructure
  - Fixed Access Network L2 Attacks , Traditional Protocols
- ISP Internet Service Provider
  - Linux Systems Security DNS Infrastructure Email Services/Gateways, Subscriber Access
  - Network Security Malware and Threat Detections, P-T-P Links
  - National and International Offices , Providers , Stakeholders , Customers.
- Corporate/Enterprise Internal TCC Business Profile
  - Corporate Services Security
  - Secure Billing Systems Infrastructure Itself
  - Secure the Process of handling Customer Information's
  - Consider the Integrity of the Subscriber Data for Billing









## TCC – Security Perspective

How we Deal with these Challenges

- Telecom Cellular and Cable Service
  - User Traffic Voice and Data 3GPP Standard Security Implementation.
  - Fixed Network Security Protocol like Spanning tree, Block Rogue DHCP Server
  - Detect Loops on MSAN's and switches Uplinks.
- ISP Internet Service Provider
  - Linux Systems Security Hardening Systems (Greylists, RPZ on DNS, SPF Lookup)
  - Sadly we have not done DNSSEC 😕 ... Live with it for now.
  - Network Security Routing Security at the Border
    - Apply IP Base Filtering across the Board
    - Web Application Firewall and Threat Detection
- Corporate/Enterprise Internal TCC Business Profile
  - Rely on Domain Controller (Credentials, Policy)
  - Zero Trust Approach on Network Security
  - Deploy Smart Host for Email Systems.
  - End Point Security (Defender's and Third Party) and Threat Intelligent Tools
  - Cloud Based Threat Detection Tools
  - Malware Detection and Threat Detections in Application Layer
  - Deal with Human Resource (Equally Important if not more important)



Improving Security

Name : Maile Halatuituia





## TCC – Security Perspective

Do we need to do More ? Not Restrict to TCC but in General Maybe

- Telecom Cellular and Cable Service
- ISP Internet Service Provider  $\cap$
- Corporate/Enterprise Internal TCC Business Profile

#### Human Resource – Possible Weakiest Links in our Cyber Security Chain.

- End User on Cellular or Fixed Service  $\cap$
- User in Corporate Offices, Employee on any type of Organizations
- Engineers in ISP Environment, or IT Administrators Ο
- Security Awareness or Not Ο
- We are all in the same category as End User of Systems
- And we will always be that Weakiest Links Ο
- Its important take extra effort to address Human Ο
- CERT Tonga and Partners done a great Job for their Awareness Program. Ο
- But I think there's a lot more to do  $\cap$









## TCC – Security Perspective What it is then?



- Technological Point of View
- Narrow the Gate Start at the Gate and move Downstream Ο
  - We should Inspect at the Gate and Decide what to pass and not.

Please note I don't mean Law/Unlawful Interception. Rather I mean there are unsecure

Protocol still use today. And sadly most of Major Attack amount to these Protocols,

RDP used by Meduza Ransomware or Samba TCP port 445 were used by other well known Malware like **WannaCry** 

Blocking these Traditional Port means Hackers will work a bit more to find their Target.

- Zero Trust Approach Never Trust, Always Verify (Borrow from APNIC) Websites
- Home Users, Office Users, End Users, Administrators, Engineers
- Any approach we make regarding Security whether in Office
- At Home or in any Environment.
- We should stop Everything/Everyone at the Gate and only Allow what is needed











Technological Point of View



More Cloud Based and Digitalized of Working Environment

- $\circ$  Means Perimeter for Traditional Network is more Blurred than Ever.
- $\circ\,$  Threats are Evolved and Attackers take advantage of the new Surface Appear
- $\,\circ\,$  Signature Based Detection Technology help us Alert of possible Incidents
- $\,\circ\,$  Still Intense Cyber Security Monitoring is Required
- $\,\circ\,$  In order to detect more Sophisticated Threats that Evades Controls in Place
- $\,\circ\,$  Of course this requires Resource which most of us at this end do
- $\circ\,$  Not Have

What it is then ?





## Human Resource Point of View

- Train the End Users We should not stop do that.
- Train the Trainers, Administrators, Engineers All Human is Users of some Systems

### Engineers no different to End Users of our Service or Systems

- > We should be equally train if not more than our End Users
- Cybersecurity Specialist Skills
- Intelligent-led Risk Assessments Skills
- Forensic Analysis Skills
- Different Level of Threats require different level of Skills









- Human Resource Point of View
- From Attackers Point of View , We are all the Low Hanging Fruit
- I guess we all know Social Engineering is for Human not Machine or Bot
- We are the most Vulnerable Entity in Cybersecurity Chain.
- From Risky Online Behavior
- Using Insecure Password
- Irresponsible Use of Sensitive Information
- Or our Behavior on Online Platform
- These can all lead us to Exposed Secure System and ourselves to the Attackers.

A misconception at times that "Security through Obscurity"

#### Small, Medium and Large Organization or Users, no one is Immune to Cyberattacks

So it is important to train Users of System regardless of type we are bound to.

Now we can see some Sample Statistics we see on this end as an ISP











We are the Source – Intentional/Unintentional

Hel

- Noticed of Claimed Infringement Ο
- LeakIX Guardian Ο
- Bit Ninja Server Report Abuse Ο
  - Source of Abuse
- Online Database Listed like EGP Abuse
  - Our IP's being used as source of scans , probably Malware affect these End Users
- Or more direct message like this Ο

AO To internet@tcc.to We removed extra line breaks from this message.

Loginattempts from Your net

The address 202.134.31 and from Your network tried to log in to our network using Port 23/tcp. This is a matter of concern for us and continued tries might result in legal action. If the machin The times included are in Central European Time (CET). Sourceip Date port destips

14.07.2023 03:48:43 202.13 22 23 154.14.98.28

#### In addition to this we can see few Sample Flow for Telnet, Samba and RDP in the next few slides

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Hello,	
We have discovered a malicious web shell being hosted on your network:	

hxxps://slaud.teegeniments[.]com/aspnet\_client/support.aspx [201110107\_4]hxxps://webury.il.tee uts[.]com/aspnet\_client/support.aspx





Flow Data - Telnet

## TCC – Statistics

Fri 25 Aug

Sat 26 Aug

# Improving Security Together



#### Netflow Processing

3.0 M 2.8 M 2.6 M

2.4 M 2.2 M

2.0 M 1.8 M

1.4 M 1.2 M 1.0 M 0.8 M 0.6 M 0.4 M

Telnet

Thu 24 Aug

protocol

any 1.6 M

Bits/s



Sun 27 Aug

Mon 28 Aug

Tue 29 Aug

Thu Aug 24 03:15:00 2023 Bits/s any protocol

\*\* nfdump -M /var/nfsen/profiles-data/Telnet/Telnet -T -R 2023/08/24/nfcapd.202308240315:2023/08/31/nfcapd.202308310205 -n 10 -s ip/flows nfdump filter:

anv

Top 10 IP Addr ordered by flows: Date first seen Duration Proto 2023-08-24 03:14:45.632 597995.751 any 2023-08-24 04:35:12.958 584744.509 any 2023-08-24 16:58:45.773 531462.652 any 2023-08-24 03:14:45.462 577970.114 any 2023-08-24 03:53:17.333 585524.144 any 2023-08-24 03:28:42.399 600061.707 any 2023-08-24 03:32:00.761 599861.095 any 2023-08-24 03:39:10.589 599433.697 any 2023-08-24 03:26:37.420 598946.115 any 2023-08-24 04:57:31.289 594433.653 any



Wed 30 Aug

Summary: total flows: 6239513, total bytes: 50.2 G, total packets: 650.5 M, avg bps: 668739, avg pps: 1082, avg bpp: 77 Time window: 2023-08-24 03:14:45 - 2023-08-31 02:09:44 Total flows processed: 6239513, Blocks skipped: 0, Bytes read: 399593516

Sys: 3.881s flows/second: 1607315.8 Wall: 3.865s flows/second: 1614230.6

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Duration

0.000

0.000

0.000 0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000 0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000 0.000

0.000

0.000 0.000

0.000

0.000 0.000

0.000

0.000



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#### Flow Data - Telnet

Date first seen 2023-08-24 03:14:45.632 2023-08-24 03:14:45.667 2023-08-24 03:14:45.757 2023-08-24 03:14:46.806 2023-08-24 03:14:46.813 2023-08-24 03:14:46.847 2023-08-24 03:14:46.849 2023-08-24 03:14:47.572 2023-08-24 03:14:47.635 2023-08-24 03:14:48.007 2023-08-24 03:14:48.051 2023-08-24 03:14:48.575 2023-08-24 03:14:48.598 2023-08-24 03:14:50.377 2023-08-24 03:14:50.614 2023-08-24 03:14:50.643 2023-08-24 03:14:51.460 2023-08-24 03:14:51.497 2023-08-24 03:14:51.603 2023-08-24 03:14:51.613

	Src IP Addr Src Pt	Dst IP Addr Dst	Pt	Packets	Bytes	bps	Bpp Flow	WS
	49176	34.183.89.141	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	42092	101.97.183.160	23	100	6000	0	60	1
_	38849	94.137.174.235	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	52649	16.151.67.222	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	40862	134.121.188.29	23	100	6000	0	60	1
_	50052	41.173.226.132	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	41933	156.184.62.214	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	1 51995	197.126.182.41	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	44590	159.43.35.11	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	47825	162.90.232.181	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	57174	195.136.155.164	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	33207	21.68.9.3	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	59511	100.253.59.104	23	100	6000	0	60	1
1	56579	210.52.205.230	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	51510	113.93.78.103	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	43602	85.32.34.150	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	47900	119.39.19.48	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	42219	107.138.166.5	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	46182	112.5.253.167	23	100	6000	0	60	1
	_ 53524	209.198.248.236	23	100	6000	0	60	1

Summary: total flows: 20, total bytes: 120000, total packets: 2000, avg bps: 160508, avg pps: 334, avg bpp: 60 Time window: 2023-08-24 03:14:45 - 2023-08-24 03:19:43 Total flows processed: 3089, Blocks skipped: 0, Bytes read: 197828

Sys: 0.016s flows/second: 185726.3 Wall: 0.000s flows/second: 8065274.2

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#### Flow Data – RDP Receiving End – Used by Meduza

-								
Date first seen	Duration Proto	Src IP Addr:Port	Dst IP Addr:Port 0	ut Pkt In	Pkt Out	Byte In	Byte Flows	5
2023-09-14 02:01:09.258	2.271 TCP	60.240.226.218:27841 <->	17 3389	100	100	5200	73300	2
2023-09-14 02:00:47.107	0.000 TCP	58.171.33.27:56740 <->	1:3389	100	0	28500	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:50.537	0.000 TCP	202.29.172.175:49186 <->	:3389	100	0	89400	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:18.937	0.000 TCP	202.29.172.175:53505 <->	:3389	100	0	31700	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:53.911	0.000 TCP	60.240.226.218:11583 <->	5:3389	100	0	33300	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:19.513	0.000 TCP	45.227.255.4:39225 <->	3:3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:01:31.811	0.000 TCP	138.199.59.41:57081 <->	3389	0	100	0	71700	1
2023-09-14 02:01:19.823	0.000 TCP	139.99.250.110:49207 <->	:3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:00:14.444	0.000 TCP	42.81.139.3:53211 <->	1. :3389	0	100	0	8300	1
2023-09-14 02:00:54.146	0.000 TCP	213.136.74.180:49501 <->	:3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:00:03.522	0.000 TCP	132.148.76.25:40403 <->	3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:00:45.868	0.000 TCP	58.171.33.27:56741 <->	:3389	0	100	0	8300	1
2023-09-14 02:00:06.388	0.000 TCP	89.39.104.164:52629 <->	:3389	100	0	9900	0	1
2023-09-14 02:01:25.263	0.000 TCP	103.228.74.153:46443 <->	3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:01:09.992	0.000 TCP	60.240.226.218:27833 <->	:3389	100	0	121300	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:21.470	0.000 TCP	138.199.59.41:49560 <->	:3389	100	0	4000	0	1
2023-09-14 02:00:57.550	0.000 TCP	45.227.255.4:6473 <->	3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:00:11.013	0.000 TCP	132.148.76.25:40403 <->	.3389	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 02:00:34.713	0.000 TCP	45.227.255.4:16585 <->	3389	0	100	0	25400	1

Summary: total flows: 20, total bytes: 538300, total packets: 2000, avg bps: 48776, avg pps: 22, avg bpp: 269

Time window: 2023-09-14 02:00:03 - 2023-09-14 02:04:42

Total flows processed: 63, Blocks skipped: 0, Bytes read: 4164 Sys: 0.016s flows/second: 3891.8 Wall: 0.000s flows/second: 253012.0

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#### Flow Data – RDP Receiving End

5 5 security vendors flagged this IP address as malicious	≲ Similar - ీంo Graph	♦ API
/89 58.171.33.27 (58.160.0.0/12) AS 1221 (Telstra Corporation Ltd )	AU Last Ana AU 19 days	alysis Date ago
AS 1221 (Telstra Corporation Ltd )	19 days	ag

DETECTION	DETAILS	RELATIONS	COMMUNITY
DETECTION	DEIALEO	REEAHONG	COMMONT

Security vendors' analysis ()	Do you want to automate checks?		
Antiy-AVL	() Malicious	Cluster25	() Malicious
Criminal IP	() Malicious	CyRadar	() Malicious
SOCRadar	() Malicious	CrowdSec	i Not Recommended
Abusix	✓ Clean	Acronis	✓ Clean
ADMINUSLabs	✓ Clean	AlienVault	✓ Clean
alphaMountain.ai	✓ Clean	Avira	✓ Clean

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#### <u>Flow Data – Samba Receiving End – Use by WannaCry</u>

**TCC** – Statistics

Date first seen	Duration Proto	Src IP Addr:Port	Dst IP Addr:Port	Out Pkt In	Pkt Out	Byte In	Byte Flows	
2023-09-14 10:19:46.126	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:52791 <->	100456 045.01:445	0	100	- 0	19800	1
2023-09-14 10:20:42.381	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53258 <->	1707178 di 445	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:35.964	0.000 TCP	41.160.52.153:56400 <->	-1.445	0	100	0	4400	1
2023-09-14 10:20:15.867	0.000 TCP	175.176.26.69:6708 <->	1 <del>75.076.047.0</del> 1:445	100	0	21400	0	1
2023-09-14 10:20:43.568	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53272 <->	1/0.176.117.01:445	100	0	38700	0	1
2023-09-14 10:20:02.632	0.000 TCP	1:05:2001.00 1:65338 <->	100-210-101:445	0	100	0	5200	1
2023-09-14 10:20:22.975	1.198 TCP	59.90.196.26:53107 <->	178 18 0 V - 01:445	0	200	0	54600	1
2023-09-14 10:20:12.698	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53008 <->	4	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:26.969	0.000 TCP	147.50.41.210:53874 <->	<b>445</b>	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:17.545	0.000 TCP	189.186.36.10:56850 <->	202.104 27.073:445	0	100	0	4400	1
2023-09-14 10:20:19.425	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53080 <->	175.176.117 91:445	0	100	0	15000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:34.696	0.000 TCP	175.176.26.69:6714 <->	175.17.112.01:445	0	100	0	11300	1
2023-09-14 10:20:41.862	0.000 TCP	123.136.30.98:58757 <->	175-17 on 1805:445	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:24.863	0.000 TCP	147.50.41.210:52581 <->	2000 00 20 20 08:445	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:52.240	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53359 <->	170.17.47.01:445	0	100	0	5200	1
2023-09-14 10:20:27.418	0.000 TCP	222.71.127.234:46294 <->	101101127173:445	0	100	0	4000	1
2023-09-14 10:20:13.869	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:53030 <->	12.0.17.0.147.01:445	0	100	0	19800	1
2023-09-14 10:20:08.725	0.000 TCP	59.90.196.26:52979 <->	<b>120.170.112</b> 01:445	100	0	4000	0	1
2023-09-14 10:20:14.366	0.000 TCP	175.176.26.69:6707 <->	2	0	100	0	11300	1
2023-09-14 10:20:27.793	0.000 TCP	147.50.41.210:52009 <->	<b>CTTTT</b> 1.01.08:445	0	100	0	13700	1

Summary: total flows: 20, total bytes: 252800, total packets: 2100, avg bps: 30589, avg pps: 31, avg bpp: 120 Time window: 2023-09-14 09:50:00 - 2023-09-14 10:24:55

Total flows processed: 81081, Blocks skipped: 0, Bytes read: 5242740 Sys: 0.060s flows/second: 1330964.1 Wall: 0.107s flows/second: 753926.3

Name : Maile Halatuituia





Some Final Thoughts before we see some statistics

- $\circ~$  We should do more Awareness.
- End Users and Systems Users a like.
- More Technical Capability to be able to Monitor, Visualize and Simulate Incidents.
- Narrow the Gate → Blocking these Unsecure like RDP, Telnet, Samba from Internet
- Do we have legal Right to do that as an Operator or ISP ?
- Maybe we can have legal entity work out some guidelines to address it ?
- However existing of these unsecure connections like RDP, Samba and even Telnet on the Internet
- o Bring out the Questions , Does local organization have Policy, maybe there is Policy but not enforce
- Giving the legal rights to ISP's to Block these will make Attackers think more and Work Harder.
- Of course we have to consider tools like Honeynet and Honeypot too.

#### Cyberdrills

- ✤ Local within Organizations
- Across Government Ministries
- Maybe between Same Company locate in Different Economies.
- With this Drills we can test the Readiness not only of the Technology in place but of course the Human Involves too before any Actual Cyberattacks Happens.

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If you have Question/Comments please send me an email Email : maile.halatuituia@tcc.to

Thank you all for listening

Malo Aupito



