Cyber Threat Intelligence

What Are The Characteristics Of A Mature Cyber Threat Intelligence Program And How Is It Measured?

By Mark Arena



Mark Arena

- CEO of Intel 471
- Previously Chief Researcher at iSIGHT Partners (FireEye), Australian Federal Police



General infosec view on intelligence

When it comes to cyber threat intelligence, the security industry mostly appears to take the view that indicators of compromise (IOCs) are the best approach to initiate/drive the intelligence process.



CTI: An incident-centric approach

Begins with detection of an event (reconnaissance or compromise)

 Any time we initiate/drive the intel process from indicators of compromise (IOCs)

• Enumerate TTPs and Actor (intent, goals, motivation) from IOCs





Pros of the incident-centric approach

Direct relevance is established

 Potentially allows identification of the threat actors and groups that are targeting your organization

 Provides IOCs that can be used to aid in the identification of compromise from the same threat actor, campaign and incidents across an organization.



Cons of the incident-centric approach

 Reactive approach initiated after your organization has already been impacted to some degree.

 Focuses primarily on the attack surface and doesn't reflect the process that the threat actor needs to go through to impact your organization.

Difficult to be predictive.



The actor-centric approach to CTI

• The reverse of the incident-centric approach





Attribution - valuable or not?

 Lots of debate in the infosec community re: value of attribution (or not)

• I believe that attribution to various levels (person, group, nationstate, etc.) provides valuable insights that support decision-making at all levels



Which actors should I be interested in?

Actors targeting my organisation

Actors targeting other organisations in my sector/vertical

Actors that are enablers for the actors targeting me and my sector

All prioritised by business impact (intent will drive prioritisation)



With actors, we want to understand:

- Who are they?
- What are their associations with enabling actors and partners?
- What are their motivations?
- What are their technical skills and abilities?
- Who are they targeting?



Next step

What are their TTPs?

 Fuse actor-centric information (through analysis) tied to TTPs and ideally campaigns and even IOCs



Pros of the actor-centric approach

Enables your organization to be proactive and predictive.

 Provides context around an actor's motivations and their abilities before an incident occurs.

 Focused on adversary's business process rather than just the elements that (could) impact an organization's attack surface.



Cons of the actor-centric approach

- Relevance to your organization might not be readily apparent.
- It is challenging to gain and maintain accesses where threat actors and groups operate.
- Requires analytical effort to fuse with your other sources of information.
- Requires regularly updated prioritization of threat actors to focus on.
- May be missing IOCs to look for within your organization.



The formal definition of intelligence...

"... intelligence is information that has been **analyzed** and **refined** so that it is **useful to policymakers in making decisions** - specifically, decisions about potential threats ..."

https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/defined



Cyber threat intelligence

• Threat is a <u>person</u> with a motivation, goal and sophistication

Malware isn't a threat, the person using it is



Identify your intelligence customers

- Executive
- Corporate security
- Fraud
- Risk
- SOC



What intelligence products do they get?

Executive

- Corporate security
- Fraud
- Risk
- SOC




Giving a tactical intelligence product to an executive





Intelligence cycle





Your intelligence program's maturity is based on your ability to do each part of the intelligence cycle



Planning, Direction, Needs, Requirements

Three requirements lists to build and maintain:

- Production requirements What will be delivered to the intelligence customer/consumer.
- Intelligence requirements What we need to collect to meet our production requirements.
- Collection requirements The observables/data inputs we need to answer our intelligence requirements.



Production requirements

 What is needed to be delivered to the intelligence customer (the end consumer of the intelligence).

Intelligence requirements

• What we need to collect to be able to meet our production requirements.



Production requirement	Intelligence requirements
What vulnerabilities are being exploited in the world that we can't defend against or detect?	 What vulnerabilities are currently being exploited in the wild?
	 What exploited vulnerabilities can my organization defend?
	 What exploited vulnerabilities can my organization detect?
	 What vulnerabilities are being researched by cyber threat actors?



Intelligence requirements

• What we need to collect to be able to meet our production requirements.

Collection requirements

 The observables/data inputs we need to answer the intelligence requirement.



Intelligence requirements	Collection requirements
What vulnerabilities are currently being exploited in the wild?	 Liaison with other organizations in the same market sector.
	- Liaison with other members of the information security industry.
	 Open source feeds of malicious URLs, exploit packs, etc mapped to vulnerability/vulnerabilities being exploited.
	 Online forum monitoring where exploitation of vulnerabilities are discussed/sold/etc.



Intelligence requirements	Collection requirements
What vulnerabilities are being researched by cyber	- Online forum monitoring.
threat actors?	- Social network monitoring.
	- Blog monitoring.



Requirements updates

- Update your requirements at least bi-annually
 - Changing threat landscape
 - Changing internal security posture
 - Changing business needs
- Ad hoc requirements should be a subset of an existing requirement
 - If it doesn't fit, your original requirements are either not comprehensive enough or poorly written



Traceability

Enables the business justification of:

- Increased staff versus requirements asked of intel team
- Vendor purchases/subscriptions



Once you have your collection requirements

- Look at what is feasible.
 - Consider risk/cost/time of doing something in-house versus using an external provider

• Task out individual collection requirements internally or to external providers as **guidance**.

• Track internal team/capability and external provider ability to collect against the assigned guidance.



Collection

- Characteristics of intelligence collection:
 - Source of collection or characterization of source provided
 - Source reliability and information credibility assessed
- Some types of intelligence collection:
 - Open source intelligence (OSINT)
 - Human intelligence (HUMINT)
 - Liaison/outreach
 - Technical collection



NATO's admiralty system

• Used for evaluating intelligence collection

Reliability of Source	Accuracy of Data
A - Completely reliable	1 - Confirmed by other
B - Usually reliable	sources
C - Fairly reliable	2 - Probably True
D - Not usually reliable	3 - Possibly True
E – Unreliable	4 – Doubtful
F - Reliability cannot be	5 – Improbable
judged	6 - Truth cannot be judged



Processing / Exploitation

- Is your intelligence collection easily consumable?
 - Standards
 - Centralized data/information (not 10 portals to use)
 - APIs

• Language issues?

Threat intelligence platforms (TIPs) can help you here



Intelligence analysis

 Analysts who are able to deal with incomplete information and predict what has likely occurred and what is likely to happen



Intelligence analysis

- Intelligence style guide
 - Defines format and meanings of specific terms within your intelligence products



Words of estimative probability

• Consistency in words used to estimate probability of things occurring or not occurring, i.e.

100% Certainty		
The General Area of Possibility		
93%	give or take about 6%	Almost certain
75%	give or take about 12%	Probable
50%	give or take about 10%	Chances about even
30%	give or take about 10%	Probably not
7%	give or take about 5%	Almost certainly not
0%	Impossibility	



Not analysis

 Dealing with facts only (intelligence analysts aren't newspaper reporters)

Reporting on the past only, no predictive intelligence

- Copy and pasting intelligence reports from vendors
 - You have outsourced your intelligence function



Dissemination

 Intelligence products written with each piece of collection used graded and linked to source.

 Intelligence products sent to consumers based on topic and requirements met.

What information gaps do we have?



Feedback loop

- We need to receive information from our intelligence customers on:
 - Timeliness
 - Relevance
 - What requirements were met?
- This will allow identification of intelligence (collection) sources that are supporting your requirements and which aren't



Intelligence program KPIs

Quantity – How many intelligence reports produced?

- Quality Feedback from intelligence consumers
 - Timeliness, relevance and requirements met



Putting it into practice with XYZ Online

XYZ Online is a US headquartered company (approx. 5000 employees)
 that sells numerous goods online that ship to most places worldwide

Has Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)

Has 4 person cyber threat intelligence team



Excel spreadsheet example

Questions?



THREAT INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CHECKLIST

- 1. Biannual process in place to derive, update and capture prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs) that map to your organization's business risks.
- 2. Tracking of ad hoc requirements that meet and do not meet standing PIRs in order to identify emerging intelligence needs and requirements.
- 3. Documented intelligence production requirements.
- 4. Documented collection requirements.

https://intel471.com/threatintelprogramchecklist.pdf

My blog on intelligence program strategy and tradecraft: https://medium.com/@markarenaau

