

CSAF/VEX: Improved Security Data

VulnCon 2024

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- ► 14 years at Red Hat
- 10 years in Red Hat Product Security
- Member of CVE AWG, CSAF TC, OpenEoX TC

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- ▶ Level 4: Al patches all vulnerabilities ¯_(ツ)_/¯



Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX)

- Used to "assert the status of specific vulnerabilities in a particular product"
- Example:
 - libfoo in versions 2.0.0 to 2.5.6 are vulnerable to CVE-2038-0119; version 2.5.7 fixes this vulnerability; versions 1.0.0 to 1.1.7 are not affected
 - · Versions must be comparable
 - · Ranges (or range bounds) must be explicitly specified
 - Affectedness status must be standardized
 - Component and vulnerability must be identified



CSAF VEX

- VEX is a profile in the Common Security Advisory Format (CSAF 2.0) that defines required fields and values to provide vulnerability affectedness statements
- Notable features:
 - · Identifying products by CPEs (among other product identifiers)
 - · Allows correlation of components to products via tree-based definitions
 - Components by PURL
 - Vulnerabilities by CVE IDs
 - Linking to SBOMs



Red Hat's VEX implementation

- Single CSAF file per product version released through a security advisory:
 - advisories/2022/rhsa-2022_7777.json
- Single CSAF file per published vulnerability (identified by a CVE):
 - vex/2023/cve-2023-1111.json

Motivation:

- Red Hat has a large variety of products, some with 1000s of components
- ► A single vulnerability may affect a large number of products/components
- Example: RHEL vs Ansible vs OpenShift



Product composition

Product and component
 definitions are defined in a
 product_tree element, and
 contain references to CPEs and
 purls that are consistent across the
 entire security data set

```
"product tree": {
 "branches": [
      "branches": [
          "branches": [
              "category": "product name",
              "name": "Red Hat Build of Quarkus".
              "product": {
                "name": "Red Hat Build of Quarkus 2.13",
                "product_id": "8Base-RHBQ-2.13",
                "product_identification_helper": {
                  "cpe": "cpe:/a:redhat:quarkus:2.13::el8"
          "category": "product_family",
          "name": "Red Hat build of Quarkus (RHBQ)"
          "branches": [
              "category": "product_version",
              "name": "apache-mime4j-core",
              "product": {
                "name": "apache-mime4j-core:0.8.3.redhat-00008",
                "product_id": "apache-mime4j-core:0.8.3.redhat-00008",
                "product identification helper": {
                  "purl": "pkq:maven/redhat/apache-mime4j-core@0.8.3.redhat-00008?type=jar"
      "category": "vendor",
     "name": "Red Hat"
```



Product-to-component relationships

 Relationships between products and components provide the ability to assert the affectedness of both



Vulnerability

- One object identified by a single
 CVE ID along with its metadata:
 - Textual descriptions
 - · Mitigation statements
 - CVSS ratings
 - Impact
 - External references
 - •

```
"vulnerabilities": [
    "cve": "CVE-2022-45787",
    "cwe": {
      "id": "CWE-787".
      "name": "Out-of-bounds Write"
    "discovery_date": "2023-01-06T00:00:00Z",
    "ids": [
        "system name": "Red Hat Bugzilla",
        "text": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show bug.cqi?id=2158916"
    "notes": [
        "category": "description",
        "text": "A flaw was found in Apache James's Mime4j ...
        "title": "Vulnerability description"
        "category": "summary",
        "text": "Temporary File Information Disclosure in...",
        "title": "Vulnerability summary"
```



Vulnerability product statuses

first_affected first_fixed fixed known_affected known_not_affected last_affected recommended under_investigation

```
"product_status": {
    "fixed": [
        "8Base-RHBQ-2.13:quarkus-vertx-http:2.13.7.Final-redhat-00003"
    ]
},
"remediations": [
    {
        "category": "vendor_fix",
        "details": "For details on how to apply this update, ..."
        "product_ids": [
            "8Base-RHBQ-2.13:quarkus-vertx-http:2.13.7.Final-redhat-00003"
        ],
    }
}
```

Connecting VEX and SBOM

SBOM

Procurement and Audit

Manifest Provenance Licensing


VEX

Risk Management


Vulnerability Management Exploits Incident Response



CSAF/VEX: Improved Security Data




Red Hat Vulnerability Scanner Exchange





Producing VEX as part of Secure Development Lifecycle





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- ► A VEX statement represents the end result of two actions:
 - Initial analysis of the vulnerability's affectedness to a product/component
 - · Analysis should be done based on data from existing SBOMs
 - · Part of the *Maintain* SDL phase



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A publication of a fix for an affected product/component

- A security advisory is published that asserts that a fix was made to a new version of a product/component; VEX statement is updated
- SBOM for the new product is published with new versions matching those noted in the security advisory
- · Part of the *Release* SDL phase



Mapping vulnerability metadata to product support models

Assertions of affectedness must be aware of product versions

- Example: a vulnerability fixed in Red Hat OpenShift 4.15 (latest version) is assumed to be fixed in all future releases
- Example: a vulnerability fixed in Red Hat OpenShift 4.15 is applicable only to that one product version, while OpenShift 4.13 or 4.14 (supported versions) are still considered as affected

Mapping vulnerability metadata to product support models

- Machine-readable product support life cycle
 - https://openeox.org/



Challenges & Improvements

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- Ambiguity in security data standards
 - pkg:rpm/rhel/audit-libs@3.0.7-5.el8?arch=x86_64&distro=rhel-8.9
 - pkg:rpm/redhat/audit-libs@3.0.7-5.el8?arch=x86_64distro=rhel-8



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Expressing assumed affectedness

• CVE-1234-5678 affects the Windows kernel, do I need to publish a VEX statement asserting that the Linux kernel is not affected?





Q&A

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- twitter.com/RedHat

