The FIRST Multi-Stakeholder Ransomware SIG will foster collective action among the FIRST constituents, peer security organizations, and other groups who are focusing on the Ransomware Response, mitigation, remediation, investigation, and prevention. The SIG will focus first on empowerment tools that help the constituent communities and resource collection to allow the SIG participants to have one point to “check first” for ransomware investigation resources. A focus on curating and instigating data collection and analysis will be a key focus, providing the community tools to track impact, consequences, and loss. This would allow the SIG to select the next phase joint action whose impact can be measured.
The Multi-Stakeholder element would include M3AAWG, APWG, and other allied efforts whose trust interests with FIRST member participation in those groups.
FIRST Multi-Stakeholder Ransomware SIG’s initial goals would be focused on quick wins of pulling together all the resources into one location, build a rhythm of consultation, and finding elements of action. As mentioned in the lead of the SIG,
The initial goals and deliverables of the group are:
Establish three regular working groups/consultation times.
1.1. The first would focus on collecting materials to enable a “one stop” for any organization looking for the best ransomware help.
1.2. The second would focus on collective action and data analytics action that influence 1.1 and 1.3.
1.3. The third focuses on International Policy recommendations that can be adopted. The focus would be to empower the FIRST members to constructively interact with their government policy-making constituents.
FIRST Ransomware Resources Center: Public web page that helps any organization to find ransomware prevention, incident response, mitigation, remediation, response, investigation, and long term policy efforts. The first wave would collect all the resources from the FIRST constituents and their allies.
Listening and Learning from the Multi-Stakeholder Community. The Multi-Stakeholder Ransomware SIG be mindful of changing assumptions, priorities, pain points, and shifts in the ransomware battle. We will start with a series of panel session workshop pulling in stakeholders to give them a voice to their most urgent priorities. For example, we will facilitate a series of sessions with law enforcement ransomware investigators who give voice to their aggravations and aspirations. We would hold several to cover multiple geographies and timezones. Over time, we would integrate these “giving voices” to our Multi-Stakeholder Community to ensure our collective work is on an effective path.
Additional goals and deliverables would be dictated through successful action and activities within the participants.
Ransomware cannot be solved by a single stakeholder, country, or organization. It is a global problem with multiple stakeholders that damage society.
Ransomware would not be solved with short-term solutions. The growth is rooted in the ability of criminals to succeed and profit without consequence. Coordinated multi-stakeholders persistent energy of action is required to inflict consequences on the threat actors. This requires long-term institutionalized thinking.
Inflicting consequences on the criminals behind ransomware requires long-term thinking. Given this, we can craft our scoping consultations to build materials, and tools that would be of service to peers who would be part of a multi-stakeholder effort.
We would start our work by building a resource guide to find all the trust groups, organizations, efforts, studies, University Research, and other work that is trying to push back against Ransomware. Many times, new groups start to “solve the ransomware problem” fail to seek out what is already happening. They also tend to focus on a single discipline such as anti-virus and computer science or money laundering and financial forensics. It is important to break those silos to enumerate the potential solutions space, which should incorporate many of these elements in concert. This guide would capture this “survey of potential allies” and be of service to the Multi-Stakeholder participants.
This becomes a living doc for the FIRST community (and others) ... but also becomes a survey that helps identify “what is missing,” “who are the players on the field,” “what can be done now,” and “where does the effort instigate the biggest change."
Within our peer communities, we have a multitude of available data that can be integrated to provide the task forces with full situational awareness. . Before we can even attempt to talk to policymakers we need to have facts, not just InfoSec Propaganda. That means we need to demonstrate what the losses are and how they impact the economy.
We have teams doing different things at different times with minimal to no coordinating between the teams. We would research the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders and look for how these roles - working together - can be more effective. We would capture and understand who needs to do what, and what should be avoided (e.g. pay ransoms). This affects security professionals as well as insurance Companies.
Identify gaps/stumbling stones, i.e. why does this not happen: Let's see why things go foul. Often, it is because of wrong legal or economic incentives.
Approach policymakers. This is what FIRST, and others have been doing in the past, often in the background. The hope is to convince decision-makers of the right thing to do.