Keerthana PurushothamKeerthana Purushotham (IEEE, US)
Keerthana Purushotham is a software engineer and applied researcher specializing in Linux security, cloud infrastructure, and AI-driven automation. She currently works on Amazon Linux at AWS, where she focuses on vulnerability management, CVE triage, and security tooling for large-scale, correctness-critical systems. Her work bridges low-level systems engineering with machine learning and statistics, enabling predictive approaches to risk assessment, patch prioritization, and threat modeling.
Keerthana holds a Master’s degree in Computer Science from UC San Diego, with strong foundations in algorithms, operating systems, probabilistic learning, and security. She has published peer-reviewed research in IEEE and ACL venues, with work spanning cloud security, NLP, web crawling, and image processing, and maintains an active Google Scholar profile.
Her open-source projects explore secure ephemeral AI tooling, distributed cloud services, and structured prediction models. Across industry and research, she is driven by building reliable, explainable, and scalable systems that operate at the intersection of security, infrastructure, and applied machine intelligence.
An applied research summary introducing advanced confusion-matrix metrics that outperform accuracy in predicting CVE exploitability impact. CVE impact prediction is often evaluated using accuracy, despite operating in a domain characterized by extreme class imbalance, asymmetric risk, and incomplete ground truth. This paper argues that accuracy is a poor proxy for security effectiveness and can actively obscure dangerous failure modes, particularly false negatives involving rare but high-impact vulnerabilities. Grounded in statistical fundamentals, we reframe CVE evaluation through confusion-matrix–derived metrics- such as false-negative rate, likelihood ratios, and correlation-based measures, that apply to any predictive black box, not just machine learning models. Using real-world CVE workflows and illustrative failure cases, we show how these metrics provide earlier and more reliable signals of degraded trust in vulnerability assessments. The result is a practical, risk-aware evaluation framework that aligns statistical measurement with operational security outcomes, enabling teams to detect hidden blind spots before they translate into exploitable incidents.
TLPCLEAR-Accuracy-Is-Not-Enough-Detecting-Hidden-Risk-in-CVE-Impact-Prediction.pdf
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Khushali DalalKhushali Dalal (VulnCheck, US)
Khushali Dalal, a Product Security Engineer at Juniper Networks with deep expertise in vulnerability assessment, CVSS scoring, and secure product development. With certifications including CCNA, CompTIA Security+, and Juniper’s own credentials, she brings a strong technical foundation in networking and cybersecurity. Khushali is passionate about advancing product security at scale and bridging the gap between engineering and risk management. As a chair of Women of First SIG, she is very much passionate about spreading awareness and supporting women in cybersecurity.
Khushali began her journey at Juniper in the infrastructure Verizon team as an Associate Systems Engineer(SE), where she supported and implemented Juniper lab in Verizon PoC, with a focus on LAN and WLAN design. Then she moved into the Verizon channel team as a Partner SE for Verizon’s Managed WLAN solutions. And in her last role she established an early-in-career program to support and build relationships between the Juniper SE and Verizon SA community.
Educational background, Khushali was born and raised in a small town of India- Ahmedabad, Gujarat. She has a bachelor’s in electrical and Telecommunication Engineering from India and a master’s in cyber security from University of Maryland College Park.
The rise of large language models has fundamentally changed how vulnerability reports are written. As AI dramatically increases both the volume and perceived credibility of vulnerability submissions. PSIRT and vulnerability management teams are seeing a surge of submissions that are partially or entirely AI-generated—often polished, technically plausible, and sometimes completely wrong. In this interactive session, attendees will explore how AI-generated vulnerability reports are reshaping vulnerability intake, triage, and validation. Participants will be presented with a series of real-world–inspired vulnerability reports and asked to determine whether each report was written by a human researcher, generated by AI, or produced through a mix of both. As the session progresses, new context will be revealed: missing proof-of-concept details, contradictory technical claims, hallucinated CVEs, reused templates, and subtle signals that affect credibility and prioritization. The audience will vote and debate in real time, followed by facilitated analysis explaining how PSIRT teams evaluate signal versus noise when AI is in the loop. The challenge is no longer identifying AI use, but preserving signal, accuracy, and response quality as AI becomes embedded in researcher workflows. Rather than framing AI as purely a problem or a solution, this talk focuses on practical detection, validation strategies, and process adaptations that security teams can use today. Unlike talks focused on AI detection tooling or automation alone, this session examines real PSIRT decision-making failures and corrections observed in live vulnerability response programs.
VulnCon-2026-Khushali-AI-is-Writing-Your-Bug-Reports.-Can-You-Tell.pdf
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Przemysław RoguskiPrzemysław Roguski (Red Hat, PL)
Przemysław “Rogue” Roguski is a Security Architect at Red Hat who specializes in shift-left security initiatives focusing on embedding security best practices and attestation into the earliest stages of the SDLC. He contributes security analysis work on Red Hat OpenShift and other OpenShift-related products. He also designs security solutions and processes across Red Hat.
He contributes to the security ecosystem as a member of the various SBOM/VEX working groups, an OASIS OpenEoX Technical Committee member and a key contributor to the CWE program. Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) are fundamental to modern software transparency, providing a component inventory vital for vulnerability management programs. However, in complex, modern build environments, especially those involving multistage builds, traditional analyzed SBOMs fail to provide the necessary detail, often grouping content from various build stages and layers into a single component. This session delves into the critical need for and implementation of Contextual SBOMs. A Contextual SBOM is an advanced form of the SBOM that captures origin of the content sourced from base image or build stages of the multistage builds. By precisely identifying content that is COPY-ied from builders in multistage builds , the Contextual SBOM enables a significant "shift-left" in security. This intelligence is essential for precise vulnerability management, allowing security teams to differentiate between transient build tools and actual product dependencies, thereby ensuring a verifiable, trusted software supply chain and proactively managing vulnerabilities during the build phase. Key Topics The Foundational Role of SBOMs: An overview of why SBOMs are critical for software transparency and establishing an effective organizational vulnerability program. The Challenge of “Legacy” SBOMs: Discussing the limitations of non-contextual SBOMs in modern containerized and multistage build environments, where content origin and dependencies are obscured. Defining Contextual SBOMs: An in-depth look at what a Contextual SBOM is and how it delivers the granular data required for precise vulnerability management. Establishing Content Relationships: The use of relationships (e.g., CONTAINS, DESCENDANT_OF) within the Contextual SBOM to accurately define how content is sourced from specific build layers. Identifying Build-Time Dependencies: Technical methods for parsing information from build layers, identifying and contextualizing content copied from different build steps. Examples of Contextual SBOMs effective usage.
Contextual-SBOMs_-Unlocking-Precise-Vulnerability-Management.pdf
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Ken Dunham
Ken Dunham has over three decades of combined business, technical, and global leadership experience in cybersecurity, incident response, and cyber threat intelligence. His career path is non-traditional, starting with education, consulting, and programming.
Mr. Dunham has extensive experience with all sectors and business sizes and former TS-SCI US DOD experience (redacted). He has led many of the largest global investigations in the history of computing and countered emergent threats to counter actors, campaigns, and payloads of all types as the threat of the unknown are discovered and countered.
CTI threat hunting is a critical function for effective actionable outcomes in reducing cyber risk to an organization. Changes in the CTI community in the last few years, coupled with tooling and culture and influence of CRINK nations and bias, have diluted our collective integrity and understanding of analytical tradecraft for effective and efficient threat hunting outcomes in the CTI lifecycle. What are the essential tenants of success to ensure efficient and effective CTI threat hunting outcomes to reduce risk within an organization to the left of boom?
CTI Threat Hunting with Effectiveness
January 7, 2026 09:00-11:00
Thomas PatzkeThomas Patzke (Evonik Industries AG, DE)
Sigma is an open and generic format to share log detection signatures. In this hands-on workshop we learn what Sigma is and how to write good Sigma rules by developing some for existing threats. It will cover simple rules for detection of single events as well as correlation rules for detection of event relationships.
Thomas Patzke has almost 20 years experience in information security and has done lots of stuff in this area, from offensive to defensive security topics. Now he is doing incident response, threat hunting and threat intelligence at the Evonik Cyber Defense Team. Furthermore, he is co-founder of the Sigma project and maintains the open-source toolchain (pySigma/Sigma CLI).
Detection-Engineering-with-Sigma.pdf
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Sophia Sanles-Luksetich
Zachary GoldmanSophia Sanles-Luksetich (GitHub, US), Zachary Goldman (GitHub, US)
Sophia Sanles-Luksetich: Senior Security Analyst with 6+ years of experience, focused on building data visualizations and producing analytics for vulnerability management, with prior experience in bug bounty triage. Her work has been critical in navigating and leveraging vulnerability management’s massive and continuously growing database of security findings.
Zach Goldman: Security Engineer with 5+ years of experience, currently specializing in developing the Exceptions feature to better track and manage deviations from standard remediation processes. His work directly supports leadership at both the organizational and team levels, requiring a high degree of polish and cross‑departmental collaboration.
Modern vulnerability management is drowning in noise: massive alert volumes, inconsistent vendor scores, and fragmented data sources make it difficult to understand what truly matters. This session shows how GitHub flipped its inverted risk funnel by building a unified, extensible risk‑scoring model that normalizes findings across 20+ heterogeneous sources and hundreds of thousands of daily alerts. We’ll demonstrate how combining CVSS with threat‑driven metrics like EPSS and KEV, asset‑specific context, and the newly updated FedRAMP SLA requirements turns raw findings into actionable prioritization. We’ll also cover the engineering systems that make this scale possible, including routing strategies and enrichment pipelines. You’ll learn how to evolve industry standards rather than replace them, tune formulas and weights using calibration sets, and future‑proof your scoring model as new metadata and detection strategies emerge. If your critical alerts outnumber all other severities, this talk will show you how to restore clarity, reduce alert fatigue, and drive remediation where it has the greatest impact.
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Alexandre Dulaunoy
Cédric BonhommeAlexandre Dulaunoy (CIRCL, LU), Cédric Bonhomme (CIRCL, FR)
Forecasting vulnerability activity is challenging: sightings such as PoCs, scanner detections, or Fediverse mentions are sparse, noisy, and highly bursty. We present experiments on predicting short-term sighting trends for individual vulnerabilities using real-world data and multiple statistical approaches. Classical SARIMAX models struggle under data scarcity, while Poisson regression and simple logistic/decay functions yield more stable and interpretable results. Building on the VLAI severity model, we outline practical techniques CTI teams can apply today to anticipate spikes in attention and better prioritize vulnerabilities despite limited historical data.
Alexandre Dulaunoy encountered his first computer in the eighties, and he disassembled it to know how the thing works. While pursuing his logical path towards information security and free software, he worked as senior security network consultant at different places (e.g. Ubizen, now Cybertrust). He co-founded a startup called Conostix, which specialised in information security management. For the past 6 years, he was the manager of global information security at SES, a leading international satellite operator. He is now working at CIRCL in the research and operational fields. He is also a lecturer in information security at Paul-Verlaine University in Metz and the University of Luxembourg. He is also the lead developer of various open source tools including cve-search and member of the MISP core team. Besides his activities in cyber-security, he's also fond of generally fixing anything that's broken around the office.
Cédric Bonhomme is a seasoned computer scientist with a deep passion for computer security and privacy. From 2010 to 2017, he worked as an R&D Engineer at a research center, specializing in Multi-Agent Systems and Cybersecurity. Since 2017, he has been an integral part of CIRCL, actively contributing to CSIRT operations and the development of innovative open-source software projects. Currently, he serves as the lead developer of Vulnerability-Lookup, driving advancements in vulnerability research and management.
Forecasting-Vulnerability-Sightings-Under-Data-Scarcity.pdf
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Brian Hein
James ShankBrian Hein (CA), James Shank (Expel, US)
Cyber threat intelligence is often idolized for being “actionable” — but action alone doesn’t pay the bills or stop adversaries from profiting. This talk challenges the industry’s obsession with tactical “actionability” and reframes the mission around the outcomes that matter to the business and the adversary alike.
Building on the earlier “From Trust Groups to Action Communities” conversation, this session explores how defenders can evolve again — from action to impact. We’ll examine how threat intelligence can influence business decisions, alter adversary cost models, and measure success in real dollars, not dashboards.
Drawing from real-world community collaboration and collective defense case studies, we’ll also explore how informal “Fight Club” networks and open-action communities achieve 1000x force-multiplying effects — even when formal structures fail.
If you’re tired of vanity metrics, “pew-pew” dashboards, and over-engineered slides about IOCs, join us for a practical discussion on how to turn intelligence into outcomes that adversaries can’t afford to ignore.
Brian Hein lives and breathes collaboration and threat Intelligence. A German living in Canada's Capital Ottawa (via Laguna Beach, California) who has spent years conducting advanced threat research at HP's Office of the CTO and HP Security Research as well as at Flashpoint Intelligence. Brian also explored cyber threat intelligence at DTAG, one of the world’s largest carriers. After a year supporting Canadian initiatives, he joined and left Silobreaker, who supported Brian’s mission for over a decade. Brian has co-authored several books and helped develop a couple of patents. He is also active in the Wold Economic Forum’s Cybercrime Atlas initiative where he serves as a Case Lead.
James Shank joined Expel as Director of Threat Operations in 2025. Prior to Expel, James held various roles at threat intelligence companies SpyCloud and Team Cymru. James keeps the needs of the Internet information security community at the center of all his efforts. He is involved in and coordinates several community-oriented efforts to combat online threats, and notably was a part of a collaborative effort to take down Emotet. He works with community members to find innovative solutions to thorny issues that are hard to solve by individual operators.
How-NOT-to-Be-Your-Adversary-s-Best-Friend.pdf
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Arūnas VenclovasArūnas Venclovas (NRD Cyber Security, LT)
Security analysts and threat hunters often want to sharpen their ability to detect and respond to malicious network activity, especially without relying on expensive commercial platforms. In this presentation we will review a curated set of free, open-source tools, which provide deeper visibility into organizational network traffic and uncover threats before they escalate.
The presentation begins with a quick dive into core network traffic collection methods, such as packet capture, logging, and NetFlow analysis. We will also explore the daily workflows and investigative mindset of an effective threat hunter. Lastly, we will go through how to identify suspicious patterns, enrich findings with intelligence feeds from the Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP), and connect the dots between seemingly unrelated events.
Through brief case studies and live-style investigative walkthroughs, you will see how theory translates into practice. The session will conclude with a guided, hands-on demonstration of open-source tools in action—equipping participants with ready-to-use techniques to strengthen their monitoring and detection capabilities immediately.
Arūnas Venclovas, Director of Product Development at NRD Cyber Security Arūnas is an experienced leader in product development with a deep understanding of cybersecurity, IT, and telecommunication markets. Currently serving as the Director of Product Development at NRD Cyber Security, Arūnas is responsible for deploying cyber security solutions in National and sectorial CERTs with the aim to automate operations, build capacity and empower for successful work. Arunas has played a major role in automating and modernizing CSIRTMalta (Malta Critical Infrastructure Protection) operations by improving Incident Detection, Response and Threat Intelligence actualization. Also, he is working closely with multiple CIRT's (Eg-FinCIRT, etc.) in assisting them to improve network detection capabilities by automating threat hunting, rulesets adjustment and solving other related challenges.
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Emmanuele Zambon
Luca Allodi
Roy RicaldiEmmanuele Zambon (Eindhoven University of Technology, NL), Luca Allodi (Eindhoven University of Technology, NL), Roy Ricaldi (Eindhoven University of Technology, NL), Victor Asanache (Eindhoven University of Technology, NL)
Telegram hosts a dynamic and fragmented ecosystem of cybercriminal communities that has become a key source of threat intelligence. Yet, discovering and collecting data from these spaces remains difficult due to invite-only access, ephemeral activity, and high noise levels. This work introduces TeleHUNT, an automated framework for systematically discovering and mapping cybercriminal communities on Telegram. TeleHUNT evaluates 28 discovery configurations that combine advertisement types (links, handles, forwards), seed origins (Open Web vs. Dark Web), and contextual or temporal filters to assess efficiency, accessibility, and saturation across multiple operational settings.
Over a 15-day run, TeleHUNT collected more than 43,000 Telegram advertisements linked to 3,468 distinct communities across six cybercrime market segments. Link-based strategies achieved the broadest reach (≈2,000 communities) but generated higher noise (50–70%), while forward- and handle-based approaches offered near-perfect precision (~99%) at the cost of early saturation. Open Web seeds uncovered all six market segments and sustained diversity, whereas Dark Web seeds reached saturation faster. Accessibility analysis confirmed that invite links remain the dominant gateway to private or vetted groups, while forwarded messages obscure provenance. Together, these results provide the first reproducible evaluation of Telegram cybercrime discovery efficiency, offering actionable guidance for CTI teams seeking goal-driven, scalable intelligence collection.
Roy Ricaldi is a Doctoral Researcher in Cybercriminal Ecosystems at the Threat Analysis Group of Eindhoven University of Technology. His research focuses on the evolution of, and shifts within, the cybercriminal ecosystem, examining emerging technical threats and how organized cybercrime operates as a complex, professionalized economy. Roy investigates the organization, motivation, capabilities, and interactions of offenders, to better understand modern cybercrime and enhance deterrence and disruption efforts.
Emmanuele Zambon is an Assistant Professor in the Threat Analysis Group at Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands. His research focuses on intrusion detection engineering, security operations, and the security of critical infrastructure environments. Emmanuele is the CTO of the Eindhoven Security Hub SOC at TU/e. He co-founded and served as CTO of SecurityMatters, now part of Forescout Technologies, a spin-off company that developed a platform for network monitoring, asset inventory, and intrusion detection for industrial networks deployed worldwide.
Luca Allodi is an Associate Professor at Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherlands, where he leads the Threat Analysis research group. His research investigates the interplay between attacker operations and defensive strategies and technology, with a focus on Cyber Threat Intelligence, Security Operations, Intrusion Detection, and Social Engineering. He is the Scientific Director and is one of the founders of ESH-SOC at TU/e, a professional Security Operations Center that translates cutting-edge research into operational security practices. He founded and leads CTILab at JADS, a research center and laboratory specializing in tailored Cyber Threat Intelligence data and services. He earned his PhD from the University of Trento, Italy, with a thesis on vulnerability risk evaluation and management.
Hunting-Cyber-Threat-Intelligence-on-Telegram.pdf
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Sebastian WagnerSebastian Wagner (Institute for Common Good Technology, AT)
IntelMQ is a Free and Open Source tool chain to automate Threat Intelligence data handling.
IntelMQ automates the boring processes of incident handling to concentrate on the tasks that really need your attention. Learn how to ingest data from various sources such as Shadowserver, how to arrange your bespoke workflows, connect with other systems (such as MISP, databases, RDAP, Ticketing systems etc) and how to notify your constituency.
Contents of the workshop include:
The content may vary based on participants' input and questions. Participants are encouraged to send in their questions and examples to intelmq@commongoodtechnology.org beforehand, so we can cover them in more detail in the workshop
About IntelMQ: The open source tool was created in 2014 by CERT.pt and CERT.at (Aaron Kaplan, Tomas Lima) and is used globally for incident handling automation globally by at least 600 IT security teams. It is entirely free of charge. IntelMQ.org is the community supporting the project's the long-term evolution.
What will participants gain from the workshop? An in-depth know-how as well as the skills to deploy and adapt the IntelMQ tool to their specific automation needs.
Sebastian Wagner is an IT-Security expert and trainer, Free Software enthusiast, full-stack software developer, and project manager. He currently working for a small software firm, and is active in NGOs for the common good in cooperation with FIRST and Shadowserver. He co-maintains IntelMQ for 11 years and previously worked at CERT.at for six years.
FIRST Regional Symposium for Central Asia
Tashkent, UZ
February 26, 2026 13:30-15:00, February 26, 2026 15:30-17:30
Hosted by UZCERT
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Jenn GileJenn Gile (OpenSourceMalware, US)
Jenn Gile is a community builder and tech educator in the Security and DevOps fields. She's Co-Founder of OpenSourceMalware.com, on staff with BSides Seattle, and is an advisor at Endor Labs. Jenn previously worked at NGINX, F5, and the U.S. Department of State. Outside of work, she's deeply involved in the cycling community as a board member for 2nd Cycle.
Malware is all about scale and time: How can I hit the most people in the shortest time? But not all ecosystems are equally vulnerable. The JavaScript ecosystem, particularly its package manager npm, is arguably the most vulnerable to supply chain malware attacks. And with JavaScript being the language of the web, this is a problem that impacts an estimated 27.4 million developers. So what are we to do?
Jenn-Gile-npm-Account-Takeovers_-Preventing-the-next-Shai-Hulud.pdf
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Michał DondajewskiMichał Dondajewski (CERT.PL, PL)
Michał Dondajewski is a CSIRT Collaboration Senior Specialist at CERT Polska, responsible for fostering national and international partnerships in cybersecurity. He coordinates projects that enhance the resilience of cybersecurity incident response teams and promotes best practices in threat intelligence sharing. He manages the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) process and assigns CVE identifiers, ensuring effective communication between stakeholders. With a strong technical background, he is passionate about building secure digital ecosystems through global collaboration and knowledge exchange.
This session presents practical lessons from CERT.PL CNA’s role as a national CVD hub mediating between mostly Polish security researchers and product vendors, including both successful collaborations and difficult, low‑engagement cases. Using anonymised coordination examples, the talk explores researcher and vendor motivations and the operational constraints faced by a national CSIRT, such as limited influence over remediation decisions and communication bottlenecks. The session will also describe improvements introduced into CERT.PL’s CVD process: diversified contact channels to reach vendors, the adoption of a 90‑day default disclosure window, and the systematic involvement of sectoral CSIRTs where appropriate to share context and reduce fragmented communication. Attendees will leave with actionable patterns and anti‑patterns for enhancing their own CVD workflows, especially when acting as intermediaries between independent researchers and domestic vendors with varying maturity levels.
National-CSIRT-as-a-CVD-Hub_-Lessons-from-CERT.PL-s-Vulnerability-Coordination-Cases.pdf
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Harold BoothHarold Booth (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), US)
Harold Booth is a Computer Scientist and Group Manager at NIST and served as the program manager for the NVD from 2010 until 2016. His current work includes research into the security and measurement of AI systems, software understanding and software development. He is an emeritus member of the CVE Board.
The NVD is a major provider of vulnerability reference data that is used throughout the vulnerability management ecosystem. In recent years, keeping up with the flow of CVEs and providing enrichment data for each CVE has been a major challenge for the NVD. Adapting to the changing landscape of the vulnerability management ecosystem is a major challenge, not just for the NVD, but for all participants. This talk aims to provide some discussion on what some of those challenges are and potential paths for adaptation.
TLPCLEAR-NIST-s-National-Vulnerability-Database-Update-and-the-Vulnerability-Enrichment-Ecosystem
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Sebastian WagnerSebastian Wagner (Institute for Common Good Technology, AT)
In today's cyber threat landscape, effective coordination among incident response teams is crucial. This session will provide participants with a high-level overview of open-source tools that facilitate coordination, data sharing, and threat intelligence. The session will cover key tools like MISP and TheHive, and also highlight lesser-known gems that help you maintain an overview of your constituency.
We will focus on coordination tools and also scrape the topic of analysis and forensics.
The session gives you an overview of the role of open-source tools in enhancing coordination and cooperation among teams, including these tooling areas: Threat Intelligence Sharing and OSINT gathering, Attack Surface Reduction, Incident Response, Forensics and Analysis Tools, Analysis tools, Network Monitoring
Sebastian Wagner is an IT-Security expert and trainer, Free Software enthusiast, full-stack software developer, and project manager. He currently working for a small software firm, and is active in NGOs for the common good in cooperation with FIRST and Shadowserver. He co-maintains IntelMQ for 11 years and previously worked at CERT.at for six years.
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Amine Besson
Rémi SéguyAmine Besson (European Commission CSOC, NL), Rémi Séguy (European Commission CSOC, LU)
OpenTide (Open Threat Informed Detection Engineering), developed at the European Commission CSOC, bridges the gap between unstructured threat intelligence and actionable detections.
By modeling adversary behaviors as Threat Vectors and linking them to detection objectives and supporting rules, OpenTide enables faster operationalization of new intelligence, and understanding detection coverage in a much finer way than ATT&CK mappings. This session will show how OpenTide reframes TTP‑focused intelligence into a scalable workflow for modern detection engineering.
Amine Besson has one goal: figuring out what on earth we should be doing to detect actual threats. As an independent international contractor, Amine works around the world with the smallest to the largest SOCs and MDRs to discover how to answer to that question. Amine's projects usually span across Intelligence, Detection and Response Engineering, with a strong focus on automation and system-thinking over analyst driven workflows. Amine also maintains OpenTide (Open Threat Informed Detection Engineering), a project that was incubated at the European Commission and that aims at providing Detection Engineering teams with a platform to work in a repeatable manner.
Rémi Seguy has over 20+ years in the cybersecurity field, and has dedicated their career to safeguarding organisations by developing robust SOC and effective incident response teams. As a passionate advocate for knowledge sharing and collaboration - "sharing is caring"- Remi has actively contributed to the cybersecurity community and related open-source projects, such as MISP. In their current role, Remi has led the OpenTide initiative, turning it into a project at the core of the Detection Engineering team. Remi is looking for exchanging and collaborating with other Detection Engineering teams to develop repeatable, traceable, and pragmatic processes, effectively bridging the gap between Threat Intelligence, Threat Hunting, and Threat Detection.
OpenTide_-From-Raw-Intelligence-to-Structured-Threat-Informed-Detections.pdf
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Bob LordBob Lord (US)
Bob Lord is a cybersecurity executive and public-interest technologist with deep experience building and defending high profile digital systems. He has led major secure by design initiatives at the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) and at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), where he served as a Senior Technical Advisor focused on shifting more responsibility for customer safety to software manufacturers. He was the first Chief Security Officer (CSO) at the Democratic National Committee (DNC), boosting the security of the Committee along with state parties and campaigns. Earlier in his career he was the CISO at Yahoo and the first security hire at Twitter, where he built and led the information security program from the ground up.
The CVE Program is one of the most important public-interest technology infrastructures, but it was built for a very different era. Today’s defenders face adversaries who move faster, exploit automation, and operate at global scale. Meanwhile, the CVE ecosystem still relies on fragmented governance, inconsistent data quality, and processes that treat vulnerability reporting as a clerical task rather than a safety-critical function. This talk asks a simple but disruptive question: What would the CVE program look like if we designed it from scratch today? Drawing from lessons in aviation safety, transportation safety, and public health, we will explore a vision for a modern software defect registry that treats software as critical infrastructure, focuses on classes of defects rather than individual bugs, and enforces quality-by-design at the moment records are created. Attendees will see concrete examples of how this vision can work in practice, including walkthroughs of a CNA Dashboard and a User Dashboard that surface CVE record quality, recurring defect patterns, and manufacturer accountability in ways that are not possible today. These prototypes demonstrate what becomes immediately achievable when the system creates CVE records that are complete, accurate, timely, and structured for automation—giving defenders faster answers while enabling systemic analysis of how software fails over time. The goal of the session is not incremental change. It is a call to reimagine CVE as the backbone of software safety: an authoritative defect registry, an accountability mechanism for manufacturers, and an engine for eliminating entire classes of vulnerability. The talk will close with a pragmatic discussion of initial steps the community could take in 2026 to begin implementing this vision, focusing on quality-by-design requirements, opinionated tooling, and governance changes that enable meaningful progress without requiring a wholesale reset of the ecosystem.
VulnCon-2026-Lord-CVE-Vision-FINAL.pptx
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Vladimir Kropotov
Fyodor YarochkinVladimir Kropotov (Trend Micro, DE), Fyodor Yarochkin (Trend Micro, TW)
AI is bringing a lot of good by optimising processes, finding unexpected correlations, predicting critical events, creating content, and significantly optimising our jobs and daily routine tasks. At the same time over reliance on AI can bring risks to a variety of critical verticals and humans. This talk will be focused on increasing awareness about the risks of over reliance on AI decisions and highlight both general risks and the risks for particular critical verticals. It will include insights on how AI is changing the attack surface and being leveraged in different opportunistic, hacktivism and targeted attack scenarios.
Vladimir Kropotov is an Advisor and principal researcher with the Trend Micro Forward-Looking Threat Research team. Active for over 20 years in information security projects and research, he previously built and led incident response teams at Fortune 500 companies. He holds a master's degree in applied mathematics and information security. He also participates in various projects for leading financial, industrial, and telecom companies. His main interests lie in network traffic analysis, incident response, and botnet and cybercrime investigations. Vladimir was a speaker at a variety of cyber security events, including BHEU, BHAsia, HITB, hack.lu, FIRST and others.
Fyodor Yarochkin is a Senior Researcher, Forward-Looking Threat Research Senior at Trend Micro with a Ph.D. from EE, National Taiwan University. An early Snort Developer and Open Source Evangelist as well as a Programmer, his professional experience includes several years as a threat investigator and over eight years as an Information Security Analyst.
The risks of AI (over)reliance to the security and privacy
February 18, 2026 09:00-10:00
Efstratios Lontzetidis
Stef CollartEfstratios Lontzetidis (NVISO), Stef Collart (NVISO)
Incorporating Threat Intelligence (TI) into Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) can be difficult and costly based on several factors. However, this collaboration is crucial in modern incident work, significantly enhancing the DFIR operations, saving time and offering contextualization to consumers of the DFIR report. This presentation aims to explore the relationship between TI and DFIR, providing insights into how TI can be incorporated in incidents with structured processes and responsibilities, and what additional value the usage of appropriate tools and research methodologies can bring. Sample outcomes include campaign, malware family, threat actor and motivation identification as well as expansion of infrastructure through pivoting and hunting.
Stef Collart is a Principal Threat Hunting & Threat Intelligence consultant at NVISO. He has worked in SOC and CSIRT teams for multiple MSSPs and customers across a wide variety of sectors gaining a broad skillset. The broad skillset also reflects the interest in a broad range of topics with a current focus on incident response, threat hunting and threat intelligence.
Efstratios Lontzetidis is a Senior Threat Intelligence Consultant at NVISO. He has experience in consulting and researching roles in both private and public sectors. He holds a BSc in Applied Informatics from the University of Macedonia, a MSc in Information Security and Digital Forensics from the University of East London and certifications such as GCTI, GCIH, CPTIA, CRTIA and PJMR. His research interests include cyber threat intelligence, infrastructure hunting, and malware analysis.
Unlocking-Insights-The-Role-of-TI-in-Modern-DFIR-Operations.pdf
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